China rise is inevitable--- it’s only a question of how the US reacts.
Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]
For many observers outside China, especially in the US, there is no doubt that China is bent on replacing America as the dominant power in the world (Mosher 2000). Indeed, for some observers, China’s elites are following nothing less than a 100-year plan to replace the US as the world’s dominant power (Pillsbury 2015). Prominent realist scholars worry that there is a certain structurally determined inevitability about both China’s rise and the chances of a conflict between the US and the PRC as the latter increasingly seeks to assert its growing power and influence (Allison 2017). While Western IR’s collective failure to predict the end of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in inter-state wars, or recognise the importance of national strategic cultures and beliefs in shaping thinking about security, suggests that we should be very cautious about its collective epistemic authority, there is no doubt that China’s behaviour has changed. One of the most important expressions of this possibility can be seen in the sophistication of China’s political and diplomatic elites as they have come to play a more prominent part in what some IR theorists describe as ‘international society’ and the institutional architecture that constitutes it (Clark 2014). At one level, hopes and expectations about China’s leaders being ‘socialised’ into the ways of Western diplomacy have been realised: China is nothing like the disruptive, revolutionary force that it was under before Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger engineered the celebrated rapprochement with the PRC (Kissinger 1994; van Ness 1970). At another level, however, it is clear that China’s foreign policy goals continue to reflect ‘national interests’ and values, especially under the increasingly coordinated and centralised leadership of Xi Jinping (Lampton 2015). Indeed, not only are Chinese policymakers still pursuing national goals, but they are doing so in ways that are also often strikingly similar to those employed by the US in an earlier era.