Slow economic growth is the key variable – increasing US growth makes a cling to hegemony inevitable that causes great power war
Taliaferro, 18 – professor of political science at Tufts University (Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. et al. (2018) Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1093/isr/viy023
Conflict between hegemon and challenger can take many forms, ranging in intensity from a sustained rivalry for geopolitical influence in one or more geographic regions to a major or hegemonic war. Again, we narrowly defined peaceful change as a process in which the hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more geographic regions. This may entail the hegemon withdrawing its military forces and forward bases from a region, renegotiating, or modifying alliances and economic agreements with regional states, often at the behest of the challenger. It is important to note that peaceful change might occur in one locale, while conflict might occur simultaneously in another locale. Lastly, the likelihood of either of the two outcomes—conflict and peaceful transition— depends upon the grand strategic adjustments by the hegemon as well as the challenger.
Neoclassical Realist Theory of Peaceful Change
Our neoclassical realist theory purports to explain the conditions under which a regional or global hegemon will concede some or all of the challenger’s demands without contest. Like all neoclassical realist theories, our theory assumes that all states respond to the international constraints and opportunities they face but that how they respond will be shaped by their domestic constraints (Rose 1988; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).
Our argument is that peaceful change is only likely in one of three circumstances: (1) when the hegemon’s foreign policy executive (FPE) has high confidence that change is inevitable because it lacks the military, political, or economic capabilities to resist it; or (2) when the political and economic costs of resisting that change are anticipated to be prohibitively high; or (3) when the FPE is domestically constrained in its ability to extract and mobilize the resources to resist the challenger. Each of these three propositions is a sufficient condition for the hegemon to accept peaceful change. They combine to make a necessary condition for peaceful change; that is, unless one or more of them is obtained, the hegemon will resist peaceful change. In this section, we unpack the logic underlying each of these propositions.
The dependent variable (DV) is the pattern of strategic adjustment by the hegemon. A hegemon has two broad strategic choices in response to a rising challenger: it can accept peaceful transition, or it can resist it.7 Resistance entails a variety of strategies, ranging from containment to preventive war. Economically, the hegemon might deny the challenger access to its markets, use sanctions, employ exchange and currency controls, and more broadly isolate the challenger from trade to undermine the economic base for its military power. Militarily, the hegemon could forge alliances with states along the challenger’s periphery, dramatically augment its own defense spending, sabotage the challenger’s weapons programs, seek to embroil the challenger’s armed forces in costly proxy conflicts, or, in the extreme, initiate a preventive war (Copeland 2000; Levy 2008, 2011).
A strategy of peaceful transition (or retrenchment) entails the strategic reorientation away from confrontation with a challenger. The hegemon, acknowledging the inevitability of the power transition, scales back its military deployments and alliance commitments, relaxes or removes economic sanctions targeting the challenger, and cedes its leadership role to the challenger in formerly contested regions (MacDonald and Parent 2011, 11–13).
The three propositions we derive from the theory specify the combinations of neoclassical realism’s systemic-level independent variables (IVs) and domestic-level intervening variables (IVVs) that increase the likelihood that a hegemon will pursue a resistance strategy or a peaceful transition strategy.
Proposition 1 (the inevitability of international change) relates directly to three IVs: the relative distribution of power, the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a particular region, and the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. Hegemons that enjoy an overall power advantage over rising challengers are unlikely to see a future power transition as inevitable. Hegemons experiencing relative decline or those that are simply at a marked disadvantage in one or more categories of power vis-à-vis a challenger, however, are more likely to conclude that a power transition is inevitable.
The second IV is the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a contested region. A state’s strategic environment refers to the magnitude and the imminence of the external threats and opportunities that it faces at any given time. All other things being equal, the more imminent and dangerous the threat or the more fleeting and enticing the opportunity, the more restrictive a state’s strategic environment will be. Conversely, the more remote and less intense the threat or the more enduring and less enticing the opportunity, the more permissive a state’s strategic environment will be. Restrictive and permissive strategic environments exist along a continuum (Ripsman et al. 2016, 52–53).
Regional hegemons exercise geopolitical dominance over a single region. A global hegemon, by definition, has wide interests across several regions of the globe. Consequently, they can confront different strategic environments across different regions. An increase or a decrease in a challenger’s economic, political, or military penetration of a contested region, up to and including the conquest of all or part of that region, can shift the strategic environment the hegemon faces from permissive to restrictive or vice versa (Taliaferro 2018). Where a global hegemon faces a restrictive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that the competitor will challenge its leadership in the locale and that a power transition is inevitable. Conversely, where it faces a permissive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that a power transition is not inevitable.
The third IV is the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. The degree of systemic clarity involves the signals or information that states receive from the international system or a regional sub-system. Systemic clarity has three subcomponents: (1) the extent to which external threats or opportunities can be readily identified, (2) whether the international system provides information about the time horizon in which those threats or opportunities will materialize, and (3) whether there is an “optimal” strategic response (Ripsman et al. 2016, 46–47).
The logic here is that if the hegemon judges that it has no alternatives to prevent a power transition, it would be irrational to waste resources resisting the inevitable. In general, hegemons have different strategic options for countering challengers in the short- and long-run. In the short-run, a hegmon can balance internally by increasing its armaments or externally by seeking allies. Over the longer turn, it has more options. Economic growth and emulation can redress relative decline. Nonetheless, if the hegemon’s leadership calculates that it lacks the resources for economic growth and emulation over the longer term, and they also calculate that the rising challenger’s economic growth will likely continue indefinitely, they might conclude resistance is futile. For instance, by 1901, recognizing the United States’ ascendency, Britain ceded leadership over the Western hemisphere by signing the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (Lobell 2003, 70–71). In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the depth of the Soviet Union’s relative economic decline made it impossible to continue competing with the United States. Gorbachev scaled back military commitments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and began to make unilateral concessions in nuclear and conventional arms control (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000, 33).