A refusal of the US to accommodate China’s status could go nuclear
Onea, 14 - Tudor Onea is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-doctoral Fellow with the Department of Government at Dartmouth College (“Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and great power rivalry” Review of International Studies, Volume 40 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 125-152
Rivalries between great powers over dominance have captured scholarly attention since the days of Thucydides. However, the bulk of studies have concentrated on shifts in capabilities, while neglecting the motives that produce such positional rivalries. The status anxiety hypothesis is an effort to address this omission, by tracing their occurrence and continuation, sometimes for decades, to the clashing status requirements of the dominant power and those of the next-in-line state. In a nutshell, status anxiety argues that the refusal of the dominant power to allow the succession of the challenger will be a fundamental cause of rivalry, worsening as the rising power threatens to overtake the current leader in additional dimensions. The purpose of this article was to formulate this hypothesis as well as subject it to preliminary testing. The findings suggest that status anxiety represented a significant influence, though not necessarily excluding additional balance of power considerations, in the foreign policy decision-making of declining dominant powers: France in the mid-eighteenth century and Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Status anxiety thus helps account for the hostility France manifested towards Britain, and Britain towards German demands for superior status, a reaction which is more problematic to account for by theories stressing solely physical security and material gains.
A further contribution of this endeavour is that it suggests the existence of a dominant power club, distinct from the club of major or great powers, and, as such, following a different set of rules.138 The existing status literature has concentrated exclusively on the latter club, arguing persuasively that there is no impediment for granting either admission to new members or opportunities for further advancement to current ones.139 Hence, status competition in the great power club is seen as non-zero sum. But the dominant power club has a membership of one, which makes it unfeasible for the dominant power to satisfy the demands of dominant power aspirants without voluntarily surrendering its supremacy. Accordingly, status competition over the dominant position is more likely to be zero-sum and lead to rivalry.
The findings of this article are at this point only plausible, yet they highlight the need for further research covering the entire universe of dominant powers in order to determine both if intense status anxiety always prompts conflict and if reduced status anxiety or its absence lead to stability. Consequently, additional studies of the role of status for dominant powers foreign policy should be conducted, extending beyond the current en vogue concentration on the foreign policy of rising powers alone.
Indeed, dominant powers' status anxiety may be increasingly policy-relevant, if unipolarity were to erode due to a steady shrinking of distance between the US and China. This is not to suggest that Sino-American confrontation under the ominous shadow of nuclear weapons is inevitable, but to draw attention to the possible heightened risks posed by status anxiety in future decades. In the words of President Obama: ‘if other nations do not play for second place, I do not accept second-place for the United States of America’.140