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Chinese leadership is vital to regime legitimacy – loss of it exacerbates social pressure for CCP collapse

Edney, 15 – Kingsley Edney is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations of China in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds (“Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China” Politics, Volume 35, Issue 3-4 November 2015 Pages 259–272, Wiley)

The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of China's most complex national security challenges and the most widely cited reason for the country wanting to increase its soft power. According to Li (2009, p. 31), soft power is ‘primarily utilized to refute the “China threat” thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China's domestic socio-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China's rise’. Deng (2009, p. 64) argues that in China the concept of soft power ‘to a large extent, means the ability to influence others in world politics with the goal of achieving great power status without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of hostile balancing or war’. In his analysis of the concept's role in China's rise, Ding (2010, p. 266) argues that the country's soft power strategy is one of reassurance that helps ‘to deal with foreign challenges and create a friendly international environment’. Rawnsley (2012, p. 126) notes that China's soft power strategy has been prompted by the emergence of a ‘China threat’ discourse in the West and therefore China's soft power can be seen as ‘not only reactive, but defensive’. Nye also claims that its soft power strategy is intended ‘to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbors’ and that soft power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China (Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013). This kind of national security perspective helps explain why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China's soft power project.

‘Regime security’ generally refers to ‘the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule’ (Jackson, 2010, p. 187). In China's case, however, the insecurity of the regime is generated by the possibility not only of violent challenges, but also of ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian), which is an extremely seriously concern for the CCP, particularly following the ‘color revolutions’ that have occurred in some post-Soviet states (see Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 88–89). The ‘regime’ can be defined as ‘the small state of persons who hold the highest offices … and/or are the elite that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the state’ (Job, 1992, p. 15). While this article uses the term ‘regime security’ rather than ‘state security’, it should be noted that there is often no clear dividing line between the two within a ‘state-embedded polity’ (Gilley, 2006, p. 501) such as China, where there is significant penetration of the state by the CCP. Despite China's successes in dealing with many of the common sources of insecurity for developing states, such as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15), two important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and lack of national cohesion.

For a political authority such as the CCP, legitimacy is determined by the degree to which it ‘holds and exercises political power with legality, justification and consent from the standpoint of all of its citizens’ (Gilley, 2009, p. 11). In other words, the use of power must proceed according to rules, these rules are justified by widely shared beliefs and the actions of those in subordinate positions provide evidence that they consent to the power relationship (Beetham, 1991, p. 16). There has been a great deal of elite discussion of party legitimacy in China, particularly since the early 2000s; one study showed that 68 per cent of sampled Chinese journal articles about legitimacy took the view that the CCP's legitimacy was under threat, while 30 per cent claimed the party faced a legitimacy crisis (Gilley and Holbig, 2009, p. 343). A more recent study found that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about regime legitimacy in China than their Western counterparts (Zeng, 2014). For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to resolve the question of whether or not the CCP currently faces a legitimacy crisis, however – only to show that the potential for the party-state to lose its legitimacy is a serious source of insecurity.

The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 2014, provides clear evidence that senior party officials are highly concerned about the legality of CCP power. The Plenum's major focus was the need for the party to ‘rule according to the law’ (yi fa zhi guo) and pointed out that ‘good law is a prerequisite for good governance’ and that for the party to rule according to the law it must first rule according to the constitution (Xinhua, 2014). Responsibility for the justification of party power falls on the Central Propaganda Department, which utilizes a comprehensive network of institutions to attempt to reproduce the official discourse justifying CCP rule and suppress any rival discourses that might challenge it (see Edney, 2014). Lack of consent is also a problem that requires significant resources to overcome. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in recent years the annual number of major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 (Huang, 2012). While all states use domestic force to some extent (see Buzan, 1983, p. 67), the huge investment of the Chinese authorities in the internal security apparatus, which in recent years has exceeded even China's military spending (Martina, 2014), demonstrates that the lack of consent to CCP rule is widespread enough to be a cause for serious concern.

Soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant component of the moral justification for maintaining the current system is based on the regime's ability to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction that is associated with a rise in soft power makes it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the truth of its claim that the country's international status is improving under its leadership, where ‘status’ is defined not only in terms of material capabilities, but also in terms of social recognition. For the most part, evidence of an increase in international recognition and attraction could be used to bolster claims that the regime has successfully improved the country's international status, regardless of whether soft power is a result of attraction to political values, culture or foreign policies, or whether it is generated by the policies of the regime or sources within broader society. Some internationally attractive cultural products can also be the work of dissidents or relate to aspects of culture or values that the regime would rather suppress, however, and these sources of attraction are difficult for the authorities to exploit.

Chinese political elites feel a keen sense of obligation to restore the country's past great power status (Deng, 2008, pp. 8–9) and show its people that China is globally respected and admired (Zhang, 2012, p. 620). The leadership attempts to appease domestic nationalist audiences by gaining ‘face’ for China abroad (Gries, 2004, pp. 120–121) and the party-state has often publicized statements of support or admiration from foreign allies to demonstrate China's international status and thereby bolster its moral claim to rule (e.g. Brady, 2003, p. 228). If there is a broad-based growth in Chinese soft power, these statements are likely to become more common and more credible as the number and variety of foreign actors who are attracted to China increases. Moreover, international attraction to China's success in areas such as economic development expands the number of ‘nodes’ in networks of ‘legitimacy belief’, thereby reducing the marginal cost of persuasion and squeezing out alternative discourses that might challenge regime legitimacy (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 26–27). This makes it easier for the CCP to claim legitimacy based on its success in moving China toward the shared goal of national ‘rejuvenation’.

Although ‘national cohesion’ is a concept that is rather nebulous and difficult to assess, the regular references to ‘cohesion’ in official CCP statements indicate that Chinese leaders are worried about it and seek to improve it (e.g. CCP Central Committee, 2011; 2013). As China has become a more plural society, generating social consensus (ningju gongshi) and unifying the people (ningju renxin) have become serious concerns for the propaganda authorities (Edney, 2014). According to propaganda chief Liu Yunshan, achieving the ‘China dream’ of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires cultural cohesion (Xinhua, 2013), while an early article on national cultural security published on a CCP website argues that if a country lacks cohesion – even if it is strong in terms of other forms of power – when it faces challenges such as a natural disaster or foreign invasion it will ‘collapse at the first blow’ (bu kan yi ji) (Yang, 2006). A lack of national cohesion can be a persistent problem for weak states that are unable to generate ‘a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation’ (Buzan, 1983, p. 67).

Normally soft power refers to a country's attractiveness to foreign constituencies. To consider the possibility that it could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the concept to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense, the soft power of the political, social and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the authorities at the center. Although this might seem to be a major step away from the traditional interpretation of soft power, Nye's (2011, pp. 19–20) argument that soft power is a key requirement of an effective counter-insurgency strategy and that dealing with the threat of terrorism requires the soft power of an appealing narrative that can win over mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting new members to their groups, highlights the concept's potential significance for state efforts to respond to domestic sources of instability. In this case, soft power involves enhancing regime security by making it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain material support from the local population, which then makes it easier for the state to deal with the security threat they pose.

The authorities in Beijing face a range of threats to national cohesion from peripheral regions, including the ongoing problem of terrorism and insurgent attacks in Xinjiang, protests and discontent in Tibet, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and de facto independence in Taiwan. In light of these challenges it would not be unreasonable for scholars, or even the authorities, to interpret ‘soft power’ as something that could also be applied to improve regime security by enhancing the cohesion between the political, social and cultural core of the Chinese polity and those on the margins. Indeed, in more general terms, Wang and Lu (2008, p. 427) have pointed out that Chinese interpretations of soft power include ‘the ability to generate compliance in a society by moral example and persuasion’.

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