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Increasing competition with China increases the risk of war – rivalry ends only with one side acceding to the leadership of the other

Heath and Thompson, 18 - Timothy R. Heath is a Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND Corporation, has over sixteen years of experience as a China analyst in the U.S. government; William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and the Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science (emeritus) at Indiana University, Bloomington (“Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy, volume 13, number 2 (april 2018), 91–120; The National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/ap13-2/AsiaPolicy13-2_Heath_Thompson_April2018.pdf

In sum, the rivalry between China and the United States will likely continue until one country concludes that it cannot win the competition and accedes to the leadership of the other. Another possibility is that one side concludes that the other side has lost the ability to compete or no longer threatens the other. This has historically been the norm for rivalries that evade or survive decisive combat, and there is little reason to expect the current U.S.-China rivalry to end differently.69 Sino-U.S. strategic competition is here to stay, and it could last many years, potentially even decades.

Aggressive Competitive Approaches Are Counterproductive

If rivalry is unavoidable, should the United States adopt a posture of aggressive competition or even war? John Mearsheimer has argued that “war with China is inevitable” and recommended a strategy of containment accordingly. He has acknowledged that such a strategy would result in an aggravation of security competition dynamics but stated that this is an unavoidable “self-fulfilling prophecy.”70 Some political leaders and analysts have similarly argued that competition is unavoidable and advocated for punishing measures designed to humiliate or weaken China.71

As Mearsheimer’s invocation of terms that evoke the Cold War “containment” strategy suggests, the advocacy of aggressive competitive strategies mistakenly assumes that all rivalries share the same levels of hostility and threat. In reality, not all rivalries are alike. Those rivalries that carry high levels of hostility, threat, and competition tend to feature high risks of conflict. The last major strategic rivalry that the United States faced, with the Soviet Union, was an example of this hostile, dangerous variation. Although in the Cold War the U.S. and Soviet militaries did not clash in a large-scale war, they frequently fought proxy conflicts around the world. The two countries also developed massive nuclear arsenals as part of a larger competition for influence and status in Europe and elsewhere, greatly adding to a sense of mutual vulnerability, threat, and hostility.

The U.S.-China rivalry lacks a great deal of the ideological dogma that helped make the Cold War a zero-sum contest. The rivalry retains the democratic-authoritarian cleavage of its predecessor but lacks the Manichean quality of a showdown between good and evil that suffused the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. While Washington and Beijing compete for international audiences, so far the competition is much more muted and is centered on various aspects of an international order to which both states remain largely committed. China’s economy is also far more integrated with the U.S. economy (and, again, vice versa) than was ever the case in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Economic interdependence can be a powerful constraint and is an unusually distinctive characteristic of the current Sino-U.S. rivalry, even though the possibility of more acrimonious trade relations looms and there remains the risk that competition will trump interdependence or worsen the rivalry as both sides attempt to produce the same types of goods.72 Both countries have also seen large exchanges of people and culture, another important difference from the Cold War. And unlike the Soviet Union, China has shown a much greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on shared challenges, such as climate change, disaster relief, and maritime piracy.

These differences suggest that the U.S. rivalry with China has the potential to remain at a less dangerous, violent level than was the case with the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Policies that aim to replicate Cold War strategies thus are not appropriate because they assume a higher level of enmity, threat, and competition than what currently exists. Indeed, policies that focus on containing or subverting the adversary, or that aim to mobilize the public against China, risk driving the rivalry to resemble the more antagonistic, dangerous variety of the Cold War. Similarly, actions that unnecessarily antagonize China by suggesting it is a country that cannot be trusted or with which cooperation is pointless carry the same perils. The current rivalry, troublesome as it is, could be made much worse by aggravating perceptions of hostility and threat. Because the potential for crisis and conflict increase when bilateral relations become characterized by high degrees of enmity, threat, and competition, confrontational Cold War–style policies are likely to exacerbate the rivalry and elevate the risk of war.

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