China rise is inevitable---nationalist pressure and decline of the LIO---could also be China is revisionist card
Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK
Emerging powers are expected to be outward-looking, to show competitive inter- national faces, to expand when and where they can. Throughout history, it has been a commonly held belief that demographic and economic growth must, like an irresistible law of nature, lead to territorial growth and the enhancement of the country’s political influence in other regions. Self-interest obliges leaders of rising states to take advantage of opportunities to augment their countries influence, power, and status, but not recklessly. In other words, rational leaders will try to avoid expansion and imperial ambitions that risk triggering the formation of powerful counter-coalitions.
Nevertheless, resistance to its prestige and status demands—that is, pushback by the existing Great Powers—is fully anticipated and expected. A rising power demands its rightful place in the sun knowing that the established Great Powers who created the existing order are unlikely to concede the prestige, territory, and privileges they enjoy under the current system. Hence, rising powers are often portrayed as troublesome states—as revisionist challengers seeking to expand their political and military influence by hook or by crook at the expense of the old guard. Just as the need to expand appears to be in logic of a nation’s develop- ment, the impulse to oppose such expansion appears to be in the logic of a hegemon’s decline. These two logics combine to drive a narrative of encirclement within the emerging power—one in which the older and stronger nation(s) seek to stranle the new and rising one before it is too late. All this is fertile soil for the growth within the rising power of a powerful brand of nationalism that looks outward.
This is not to suggest that emerging powers are wholly distracted by external opportunities. Like all states, rising powers are Janus-faced, looking inward as well as outward. After all, sudden and dramatic national growth induces massive social and political dislocations. As a nation grows, therefore, it becomes increas- ingly essential for its rulers to continuously mediate between their national soci- eties and the international economy—to recalibrate periodically the balance between citizens, states, and markets as they simultaneously encourage stable and sustained growth.
Within rising powers, outward-looking nationalism is a natural response to the country’s exalted growth and the national pride and patriotism that it inspires among its citizens. That said, there are two other more devious and less straight- forward ways that outward-looking nationalism can arise (or rather, be whipped up by elites) and be used for domestic purposes. First, consistent with the diversionary theory of war, it redirects the public’s attention from internal troubles and the regime’s failures—in China’s case, official corruption, lack of political reform, pollution, youth unemployment, and a woefully inefficient capital market due to stalled reforms that would transform China’s dominant state-owned banks into commercial banks—to external opportunities and to enemies (an out-group), real or imagined, who are preventing the emerging power from harvesting those benefits. Second, as Jack Snyder argued, nationalism centered on (imperial) expansion—whether territorial, economic, political, or any combination there- of—may arise as a rationalization ‘for the interests of groups that derive parochial benefits from expansion, from military preparations associated with expansion, or from the domestic political climate brought about by intense international competition’.33
Consistent with this logic, many observers believe that, since 2010, Beijing has been pursuing its territorial ambitions more aggressively. China seeks to assert territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction over the bulk of the South China Seas—between roughly 62% and 90% of this sea. Combined, Chinese territorial and maritime demands stretch more than 800 nautical miles from the Chinese island province of Hainan and encompass islands, rocks, reefs, and waters claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Moreover, China has created more than 3200 acres of territory between 2013 and 2015— acreage that amounts to nearly 17 times more land creation in two years than all of the other claimant states combined in the past forty years.34 China’s ability to station its missiles, fighter jets, and strategic bombers on these artificial islands makes them tantamount to a fleet of ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’.35 In the East China Seas, China has repeatedly prompted ‘incidents’ in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. As a result, Sino-Japanese distrust has reached new heights, reflecting the insecurities felt by both countries as they contemplate their respective positions in Asia. China is also expanding its influence in the areas of global finance, trade, and aid. As the United States under Donald Trump retreats from globalization, especially from international trade agreements that fail to deliver short-term US trade surpluses, China has dedicated itself to the opposite strategy: making long- term investments with the aim of supplanting the United States as the world’s dominant power.36 Key to this plan is China’s new ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy. Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 to improve links between Beijing and its neighbors within Eurasia, the ‘Belt and Road’ strategy will make it possible for China to become the economic center of all of Eurasia. This is no fantasy. Witness the Chinese government’s January 2017 launch of a rail freight service between China and London. Traversing Asia and Europe, the Beijing–London rail link, the first of its kind, is just one of China’s growing portfolio of rail con- nections. There are presently 39 lines that connect 12 European cities with 16 Chinese cities.37
For maritime transport, China is developing new seaports in the Indian Ocean and has purchased the port of Piraeus in Greece, which it is expanding to serve as the hub of a transport network of China-built rail lines reaching from Greece into Hungary and then throughout Europe. This maritime trade route is being pro- tected by China’s fast-expanding blue-water navy, new air and naval bases built on reefs in the South China Sea, and China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, which guards the Red Sea and Suez routes to the Piraeus. Moreover, this vast continent-wide construction venture is being financed mainly by loans from China to other countries—loans that will bind recipient countries to China for a generation. Through these infrastructure projects and the construction of an alternative global architecture, most notably in the area of global finance and credit with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China—like the United States in the years after World War II—is spinning its economic power into a global web of finance, construction, and trade, making it possible for China to become the economic center of all Eurasia.38
Explanations of China’s new assertiveness have focused on both international structure and China’s domestic politics, that is, on both third-image and second- image causes. Regarding international structure, pundits claim that, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders perceived a dramatic shift in the global balance of power—an unprecedented transfer of power and wealth from West to East and South.39 The perceived decline of American power and onset of a more multipolar world, so the argument goes, have emboldened Chinese leaders to be ‘more confident in ignoring Deng Xiaoping’s longtime axiom not to treat the United States as an adversary, and in challenging the United States on China’s interests’.40 Here, China’s new assertiveness is consistent with the classical realist principle that nations expand their political interests abroad when their relative power increases. Or as Robert Gilpin explains the dynamic correlation between power and the national interest: ‘The Realist law of uneven growth implies that as the power of a group or state increases, that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over the environment. In order to increase its own secur- ity, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of inter- ests.’41 In this view, China’s new assertiveness is a predictable consequence of its changed (more exalted) position within the international system.
Relatedly, Suisheng Zhao argues that China’s post-2008 ‘strident turn’ is explained by the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular national- ism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy: ‘Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests.’42 Such popular nationalism in China is very much a product of the country’s historical legacy ‘of a long and glorious past, unjust treatment at the hands of foreigners from 1840 to 1949 (and beyond), a desire to regain interna- tional respect and equality, an imperative for territorial reunification, and a wish to reaffirm their collective greatness as a people and nation’.43 A shared sense of shame and humiliation with respect to China’s experience of having been a play- ground of foreign (Western and Japanese) intervention and encroachment is particularly a potent driver of Chinese nationalism and its current behavior.44 Indeed, shame has been a stimulant, a call to action, for generations of Chinese leaders and intellectuals. Though it may sound odd to most Western ears, feeling shame was (and remains) the path to escape the bitter reality of China’s humiliat- ing past. ‘To feel shame is to approach courage,’ reads an inscription in the Temple of Tranquil Seas in Nanjing, where China signed one of its most unequal treaties with a foreign power. China ‘carries the self-image of a “victim nation,” albeit a nation with aspirations finally on a path toward greatness restored. This victim complex, coupled with China’s aspirations and growing power, creates a sense of entitlement—a combination that makes Beijing prickly in its dealing with the United States’ and its neighbors.45
We see this cantankerous and touchy mood not only in Beijing’s increasingly tough diplomacy but in the violent demonstrations over the past several years staged by Chinese nationalists against Japanese companies with operations in China, causing some of those companies to relocate to Vietnam. Today, more than ever, Chinese public displays of nationalism and outrage—whether set off by perceived unfair treatment by the West, US–South Korea naval exercises, or insults from the Japanese—appear genuine rather than manufactured. Moreover, whereas nationalism was traditionally confined primarily to young Chinese and to some soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it has spread to Chinese businesspeople, academics, and elite politicians.46 This diffusion of Chinese nationalism is the product of China’s rise and its domestic political system becom- ing more participative, with different factions fighting among each other, and China’s public sphere growing more dynamic, fueled by the Internet and social media. ‘Beyond the party’s control,’ notes Jayshree Bajoria, ‘the emergence of the Internet in the last two decades has given nationalists more power to vent their anger after particular incidents. It has also brought the huge Chinese diaspora in places like Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Europe, and North America, into closer contact with those residing within China’s borders’, facilitating the contin- uous flow and escalation of nationalist rhetoric and propaganda.47 And because social media can be used to organize large-scale, nationalist protests in Beijing and other cities against foreign governments, the continued expansion of informa- tion technologies throughout the population promises to accentuate the role of nationalism in Chinese policymaking; it also threatens to raise Chinese national- ism to dangerous and unstable levels of hypernationalism.48
Given China’s determination to avenge its past, there is every reason to expect that Chinese nationalism will continue to grow in lockstep with the country’s increased power. This phenomenon is already evident among Chinese policy- makers, military officials, and average citizens. The consensus is that China must eventually become more internationally assertive to the point where it, like the United States, is willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries to protect its far-flung interests abroad.49 Moreover, some suggest that the goal of global dominance lies at the core of China’s journey from humiliation to rejuve- nation. The notion of national rejuvenation, according to the conservative Chinese analyst Yan Xuetong, ‘conjures “the psychological power” associated with China’s rise “to its former world status”. The concept assumes both that China is recovering its natural position and that this means being the “number one nation in the world”‘.50