A hegemonic transition’s inevitable – US retrenchment and Chinese economic growth make a soft landing likely
Schweller, 18 - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003
China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key secondimage variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in rising and declining powers—the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, introverted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment.
Why the focus on nationalism? Nationalism provides a natural complement to structural realist theory; it is rightly viewed as realism’s domestic-level counterpart.3 The constant struggle among nations over issues of power, security, and prestige that animates realism is in no small part a consequence of nationalism, which ‘fuels interstate rivalry and by its sharp delineation of in- and out-groups, abets status rivalry, accentuates stereotyping, and deepens and perpetuates perceived grievances.’4 This seems obvious enough.
Thus, a rising power—especially late in its development when its economic and military power begin to approach that of the top dog in the system—becomes more assertive in pressing its status claims and grievances. This cannot help but foment domestic nationalism, as the public becomes either: (i) frustrated that the established powers are treating the country with disrespect by denying it the global influence it deserves or (ii) emboldened by concessions granted by the established powers that allow expansion to proceed unabated. Moreover, leaders of rising powers often whip up domestic nationalism to back their expansionist policies and/or to divert the public’s dissatisfaction with the pace of internal reforms and economic progress.
Less intuitively, nationalism can also support a policy of hegemonic retrenchment—redeploying military forces offshore, demanding that allies pay more for their defense, and reassessing trade agreements through a mercantilist lens with the aim of achieving favorable trade balances. Because of the redistribution of power, the costs to the declining hegemon of managing the international system increase relative to its capacity to pay. The problem becomes, as Walter Lippmann characterized it, the balancing of commitments and resources.5 An important means of bringing costs and resources into balance is to reduce overseas commitments—that is, political, economic, or military retrenchment—either by passing the ‘balancing’ buck to one’s allies (insisting on greater burden-sharing within the alliance), by unilaterally abandoning commitments, by seeking rapprochement with less threatening, secondary rivals, by attempting to appease the rising power, or by some combination thereof.6 All of these policies fit within the larger context of global retreat—of a weary titan coming home. The natural complement to this grand strategy is a xenophobic nationalism rooted in the rallying cry of ‘we must do more for ourselves and less for others, who should learn to take care of themselves and solve their own problems’—the opposite, it should be noted, of ‘the proper maxim of an unchallenged number one’: ‘Do good for others in order to do well for yourself.’7
Most important, the resurgent nationalisms of the rising challenger and the declining hegemon are entirely compatible with a future relationship characterized by peace and harmony. Obviously, the two nationalisms pose no inherent conflict of interests: China currently wants more global influence; the United States wants less. Hence, there is good reason to expect a soft landing as the world moves from unipolarity to bipolarity. Indeed, the future may well resemble President Xi Jinping’s proposal for a ‘new type of great power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi), the idea that China and the United States should share global leadership as equals and break a historical pattern of inevitable confrontation between rising and established powers.8 There is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate, in Xi’s opinion, as long as they treat each other as equals.9
If China continues to grow economically and militarily, then, like every other rising power in history, it will surely seek to expand its influence in the AsiaPacific region and throughout the globe. The question remains, how should Washington respond? Operating within an emerging bipolar world, Washington should adopt a grand strategy of offshore balancing: redeploying its military forces ‘offshore’ and passing the ‘balancing’ buck to regional powers in Asia. If China eventually makes a bid for regional hegemony, the United States should wait and see if its regional allies can contain it. If and only if such containment fails, then the United States will be required to deploy enough firepower to the region to restore a stable balance. The aim is to remain offshore as long as possible, while recognizing that it may become necessary for US forces to come back over the horizon. If that happens, however, Washington’s Asia-Pacific allies should still do much of the heavy lifting.10