The US must transition to offshore balancing to ensure primacy and a stable balance of power
Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK
A ‘flatter’ international structure compels the United States to play a less central role in providing functional services—generating public goods, stabilizing mar- kets, and promoting cooperation. Pax Americana—the integrated militarized sys- tem of alliances and economic relationships that institutionalized American leadership of the non-Communist world—is coming to a close. Global leadership is costly; it means asking your citizens to pay for others’ well-being, to send young soldiers to die in faraway places. So far, China has shown little interest in replacing the United States as a kind of chairman of planet Earth, in the words of Daniel Russel, an American diplomat who served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2013 to 2017; the Chinese display ‘no intention of emulating the U.S. as a provider of global goods or as an arbiter who teases out universal principles and common rules’.88 As it enters this new leaderless age, Washington must devise a grand strategy that properly deals with the new situation, one that fundamentally alters America’s role in the new world.89
Realists have proposed just such a change in American grand strategy—a foreign policy approach that essentially falls under the rubric of ‘offshore balancing’. Under this grand strategy, the United States would no longer attempt to police the planet. Instead, Washington would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, interven- ing itself only when absolutely necessary to preserve the regional balance of power. Calibrating its military posture according to the distribution of power in the three key regions, the United States would allow regional forces to be its first line of defense in the event that a potential regional hegemon emerges. This means, as Barry Posen maintains, ‘demobiliz[ing] most U.S. Army troops based abroad’ and closing most US bases across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East— about 800 of them in more than 70 countries.90
By passing the costs to more threatened allies, offshore balancing aims to pre- serve US primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home. As John Glaser points out, ‘A globe-straddling forward-deployed military presence is a costly burden that elevates peripheral interests to the level of vital ones, takes on security responsibilities that can and should be fulfilled by other states, and pro- duces negative unintended consequences for U.S. interests.’91 The trick, however, is implementing a retrenchment strategy—that is, how to wean the world off of American power while avoiding a hard landing (e.g. regional arms races and intense security dilemmas). Even with the most skilled leadership, we should expect a very bumpy ride.
We see this happening already. Trump’s visit to Asia created unease among allies about the role the United States will play in the Asia-Pacific region. Seeking Beijing’s help to deal with North Korea, President Trump failed to press China on its military buildup in the South China Sea, reinforcing the perception that America is beginning to retreat from the region and, quite understandably, fueling Japan’s underlying fear of abandonment. Tokyo now strongly suspects that the United States may make some kind of deal with China that could put Japan at a disadvantage.
As Japan and China recognize the altered dynamics around the Pacific Rim, some observers believe that they may inch toward a possible reconciliation. Such a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is unlikely, however, given their long-standing historical enmity. Negative attitudes toward Japan are widespread among main- land Chinese. According to a recent Pew survey, less than 10% of Chinese think that Japan can be trusted—and the feeling is mutual. Young Chinese, who did not personally experience the war, express surprisingly vehement anti-Japanese feelings—sentiments that are due in no small part to state propaganda and patri- otic education in schools that make criticism of Japan politically correct.92 Moreover, the Chinese see themselves as the natural hegemon, and in their— worldview, the Japanese should be subordinate to them—in other words, Chinese elites refuse to accept Japan’s legitimacy as a major Asian state. Neither Shinzo Abe nor his successors will tolerate such a future for Japan, which is why Japan is offering maritime and development assistance to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Ultimately, however, China’s rise and America’s retreat to a more offshore posture will force into existence a military alliance between Japan and India (and, perhaps, Russia as well) to restore a regional balance of power to counter growing Chinese power.
In conclusion, the key to managing the future of US–Chinese strategic rivalry is prudence and perspective. Short of a military confrontation on the Chinese lit- toral with the United States and its allies, China is unlikely to avail itself of the elements of its A2/AD capabilities that could be deployed to materially block free- dom of navigation and overflight operations (e.g. sinking vessels or shooting down aircraft). Recognizing this fact, US leaders would be wise to heed the nonin- terventionist vision of US foreign policy espoused by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and, accordingly, not go ‘abroad in search of monsters to destroy’.93 Remaining alert to possible security threats emanating from China’s East and South China Seas policies, Washington must place such threats in per- spective. As Benjamin Herscovitch puts it, ‘no armies are being launched into bat- tle, no civilians are being slaughtered, and no cities are being reduced to rubble’.94 A balanced threat assessment of an outward-looking China suggests that it poses only a modest danger to American vital interests. If prudence prevails on both sides, a stable regional balance of power will emerge among the local states—one nested within an even more stable Sino-American bipolar system that, unlike its US–Soviet predecessor, is not rooted in a zero-sum battle between the totalist ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Western-style democratic capitalism.