Respect is the key variable – US accommodation is vital to preventing a violent transition
Biba, 17 - Institute for Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt (Sebastian, “It’s status, stupid: explaining the underlying core problem in US–China Relations” Global Affairs, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1276077
Behind such behaviour, however, is a much more profound mechanism, namely, a gradually intensifying status rivalry between the United States and China. Status refers to an actor’s specific rank within a social hierarchy. Status is of intrinsic value for a state because, generally speaking, the higher its rank, the more privileges a state can enjoy. As a result, states tend to seek a high status, just as they require this status to be recognized by others. However, not every state can have a high status, because then none does (Larson, Paul, & Wohlforth, 2014, pp. 7–9). Transferred onto the current US– China relationship, the situation, roughly speaking, is as follows: The US status, both globally and in the Asia-Pacific, remains relatively higher than China’s. Also, the United States wants to defend and bolster this status. Meanwhile, China seeks a higher status increasingly on par with the United States in many issue-areas and wants the United States to respect this claim. The problem with this status competition between the United States and China is twofold, though: First, it underlies, and in fact nourishes, many other grave concerns prevalent in US–China relations. Second, if not mitigated, it has huge potential to end up in serious conflict.
The long shadow of power transition
While status is an ideational concept and highly subjective, some key attributes that serve as the basis for status are material, since some of the same resources that guarantee power also relate to status (Larson et al., 2014, pp. 8, 13). Currently, the United States still retains its role as the world’s number-one power, both economically and militarily. In 2016, the US nominal GDP still accounted for 24.7% of the world economy (Statistics Times, 2016), while its military expenditure amounted to a massive 36% of global spending (SIPRI, 2016, p. 2). What is more, the United States is unwilling to voluntarily leave its top position to anybody else. Tellingly, Ashley Tellis writes that “[p]reserving American preeminence and by extension the current global system itself, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today” (Tellis, 2013, p. 110). At the same time, China has already made enormous progress since the beginning of its reform and opening period in 1978 and within less than four decades has catapulted itself into the second-biggest economy in the world (standing at 15.1% of global GDP at nominal) (Statistics Times, 2016) and trails only the United States in terms of military expenditure (13% of global spending) (SIPRI, 2016, p. 2). Significantly, when measured in real purchasing-power terms, China overtook the United States as the world’s leading economy in late 2014 (Arends, 2014).
In the past, when incumbent great powers like the United States were confronted with other rapidly emerging great powers like China, this has often – albeit not always – led to terrible wars, as the newcomers could not, or did not intend to, be integrated into the existing international order. Power transition theory (see Organski & Kugler, 1981) has made it its business to explain the occurrence, or absence, of major war between a dominant great power and one of its rising challengers. In doing so, the theory walks on two legs. First is the power dimension, which likewise functions as the theory’s necessary condition. The power dimension looks at whether the rising state has reached parity with (80% is seen as sufficient) or even overtaken the dominant state in terms of national power. While it can be somewhat tiresome to calculate one’s way through the various ways to measure national power and predict when exactly the stage of parity, or overtaking, is reached, China is without doubt currently the most powerful and most serious challenger of the United States.
The more interesting aspect about power transition theory, however, is its second leg, that is, its sufficient condition determining the war-proneness of a transition. This second dimension of the theory is interested in the degree of (dis)satisfaction of the rising challenger primarily with its status in the international order as well as with the benefits to be derived for itself from this order. Simply put, if the challenger is satisfied with its status in the existing order, that is, the status quo, war will be avoided; however, if the challenger is dissatisfied, the revisionist challenger will seek to topple the existing order and war will be the outcome. So, the critical question is how (dis)- satisfied is China with its current status in the international system, which is largely shaped by the United States.
China’s status seeking
To begin with, the Chinese are a highly status-conscious nation. In fact, “Chinese officials and analysts alike have, since the mid-1990s, evoked ‘international status’ as if it were the most desirable value, the one that leads to power, security, and respect” (Deng, 2008, p. 8). This has primarily to do with the fact that China used to be, or at least perceived itself to be, what is nowadays called a great power, or even a superpower, throughout most of its long history. Not only did the Chinese regard their “Middle Kingdom” as the centre of the civilized world, whereas all others were seen as “barbarians” to various degrees. Especially during the Han, Tang and late Ming/early Qing dynasties, the Chinese also claim to have wielded substantial global influence, as China then was a “highly advanced, culturally sophisticated, technologically developed society that contributed significantly to the global economy and [therefore] was internationally revered and respected” (Medeiros, 2009, p. 8).
The period of decline from the First Opium War in 1839 to the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, during which China became semi-colonized and which the Chinese refer to as the “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western and Japanese intervention and imperialism, is widely considered in China as a “historical mistake” to be corrected (Yan, 2001, p. 33). As Yan Xuetong has put it:
[T]he Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese being continuously dissatisfied […] until China resumes its superpower status. (Yan, 2001, p. 34)
On its path to (re)gain greater international status, China has already made noticeable headway and achieved some remarkable successes. In particular, China became a veto-wielding permanent UN Security Council member in 1971, thus taking an important first step out of international isolation in the aftermath of China’s Great Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. After subsequent membership in the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980, another milestone was China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, after 15 years of protracted negotiations. Moreover, while not in the club of the G7/G8, China surely has become a very prominent player in the G20 after this grouping gained traction in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. As a result, China is now a member of (almost) all key international, including many regional, organizations and an actor firmly established in the global governance system. No issue of global concern, from nuclear proliferation to climate change, can any longer be successfully tackled without China’s active and positive participation. Besides, China’s economic success has long promoted discussions about a new Chinese development model (“Beijing Consensus”) possibly outstripping the predominant US variant (“Washington Consensus”). The establishment of hundreds of Confucius Institutes since 2004 has spread enhanced knowledge about Chinese culture around the entire globe. Finally, the Chinese were able to fulfil a dream when hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.
Nonetheless, Beijing remains dissatisfied, and increasingly so. While China has not yet shown the intention of toppling the existing international order but has rather sought to integrate itself with it, at least to a certain degree (see Li, 2011), it still perceives this order to be largely dominated by the West (read: by the United States) and its own seeking for a higher status disrespected by Washington. In the Chinese official discourse, this becomes obvious, for example, in that China keeps calling for the “democratization of international relations”, meaning that non-Western powers, above all China, should be given a bigger say and thus a higher status in the existing global order. While the democratization of international relations is a long-standing Chinese claim, it has not lost any of its fervour. In June 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for “jointly promot[ing] more balanced international relations [and] advanc[ing] reform in global governance in keeping with new changes in the relative strengths of international forces” (Xinhua, 2014).