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Internal policy -- retrenchment bolsters Chinese integrationists and moderates their foreign policy BUT hegemony ensures hawks take over.

Ward 17, Department of Politics, and International Studies @ the University of Cambridge. PhD in Government @ Georgetown and MA in Security Studies @ Walsh School of Foreign Service (Steven M., Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-200)

The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

Liu Mingfu’s sensationally popular China Dream is a remarkably open call for a deep revisionist challenge to the liberal order. While Liu may not be a Nativist (according to Shambaugh’s classification), his writing is worth considering as a modern Chinese manifestation of the kind of argument that Friedrich von Bernhardi popularized in Germany during the years before World War I. Liu’s central proposition is that China should aim to become a “champion” nation – the global top dog or leader (as distinct from the hegemon, which to Liu implies a form of imperialism and military domination). As the “champion,” China would “create a new world order that prefers peace, development, freedom, and cooperative civilization.” This seems like a clear demand for China to – at some point – remake the international order.

What is significant is the source of the demand for radical revisionism, and its implications for China’s participation in the liberal order. Liu links the need for a new order to the deficiencies of American hegemony, the “worst expression” of which is “its monopolization of its status as champion.”60 In other words, the United States will not accede willingly to China’s attainment of a position of equality in a “multipolar” world. The book goes on to document and decry American efforts to contain the rise of China, considers lessons fromthe successfulAmerican defeat of two other potential “champions” (the Soviet Union and Japan), and makes a clear argument against integrating too deeply within the liberal order:

However, it cannot be denied that America has a clear upper hand in terms of control and power with China. China can be promoted to copilot to help the United States cope with risks, but this will only help America maintain its position as pilot. America allows opponents to board its plane, which is ultimately a higher degree of control and containment.61

Integrating within the liberal order would amount to becoming Washington’s “copilot,” which would do nothing more than strengthen the basis of a status hierarchy that the United States is intent upon preserving. This is reminiscent of the way that Bernhardi, militant pan-Asianists, andWeimar nationalists argued against participation in the pre-WorldWar I and interwar orders. And Liu’s book is hardly peripheral: in 2013, Xi Jinping began invoking the term “China Dream” to describe his vision for China’s future, and has reportedly been deeply influenced by the book’s central argument.62

Nativists and other revisionists may not be ascendant in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking, but their foreign policy preferences are not marginal either. While other schools of thought do not take such strident positions against participation in the liberal order, some share a sense of skepticism: Realists for instance, are also concerned that Western institutions are traps meant to keep China down.63 And Chinese elites remain worried about Chinese status and link it to the terms of participation in the liberal order – they emphasize “equality of participation” over “governance” and chafe at the idea of complying with American standards in order to be recognized as a “responsible power.”64

So while Chinese foreign policy is currently run mostly by proponents of intermediate and at least partially integrationist perspectives, Nativists and others like Liu constitute a loud and potentially influential voice for policies that reject the liberal international order – much like Pan-Asians or German radical nationalists spent the 1920s demanding policies of protest and delegitimation from the more moderate leaders who ran Taisho¯ and Weimar foreign policy.65 It is not difficult to imagine support for the Nativist perspective (not just among the elite but also in the public) growing along with developments that seem to confirm fears that Chinese status ambitions face an insurmountable, unjust obstacle imposed by the United States and the liberal order. Indeed, evidence suggests that Chinese “netizen” nationalists are hyper-aware of status issues and often mobilize in response to concerns about the way China is treated by foreign actors and what that treatment says about China’s international standing.66

Status, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Foreign Policy

The question that remains is whether – in China’s authoritarian system – pressure from outside the government for radical revisionist policies could have much influence. The government is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) committed to foreign policy moderation: but what if developments appearing to confirm that China faces a status “glass ceiling” increase support for the Nativist position and lead to widespread demands for policies aimed at rejecting the liberal order? Could these forces impact Chinese policy in the same way that they impacted German and Japanese policy? It is hard to know for sure, but there is good reason to think that the government is susceptible to influence from external pressure and that it may only become more so in the future.

While some scholars maintain that Chinese policymakers mostly effectively ignore public opinion, or that public opinion prompts short-term shifts in official rhetoric or policy but does not influence grand strategic direction, many others agree that “bottom-up” forces play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy.67 Unofficial attitudes and preferences cannot influence policy through the mechanisms of electoral political competition, but this does not mean they are irrelevant. First, policy has to be at least somewhat responsive to the diversity of elite preferences – just as Bethmann Hollweg was constrained by the attitudes of the Kaiser, Tirpitz, and the Pan-Germans, Chinese leaders may be constrained by the preferences of Nativists and some status-sensitive and integration skeptical Realists in the military and the Party.68 Second, mass opinion can threaten China’s elite through the dynamics of widespread popular protest. According to Weiss, mass protests may menace ruling elites by creating demonstration effects, tipping points, and information cascades; facilitating future mobilization against the regime; and fostering or exacerbating divisions within the leadership.69 And while strong authoritarian states like China can prevent and manage anti-regime protests, there are costs and risks associated with doing so, especially when public opinion is aimed at forcing the regime to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy posture.70 This means that the masses can be a potent weapon for anyone interested in forcing the government into adopting a more belligerent foreign policy; in turn, this means that any factor that makes it easier to mobilize anti-Western opinion (such as apparent evidence that the United States is unwilling to accommodate a Chinese claim to equal rights) may provide opportunities for Chinese proponents of challenging the liberal order.

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