Chinese leadership fails – the US is successful
Zhao, 18 – Suisheng Zhao is professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (“A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order” Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1458029
But China is not ready. First, as one Chinese scholar admitted, ‘China does not have the comprehensive national strength to change the current global order led by the US and other Western countries for more than 70 years’.41 A fragile rising power much weaker than most outsiders think, China is a middle-income country, facing immense internal hurdles, such as the environmental destruction, rampant corruption, inequality, and huge local government debt, all of which have the potential to derail its rise. Preoccupied by mounting challenges, Chinese leaders have to fight an uphill battle to mobilize resources and internal support for the global leadership role. China is far from achieving the donor status of many OECD countries. For one prominent Chinese scholar, the most dangerous challenge is the extreme-leftist policy-line and ‘the false-large-empty’ (假大空) slogans, making international promises and setting strategic objectives beyond the reach of China’s national strength.42 China’s international initiatives do not play a critical role in China’s rise but are the consequences of its rise.
Although some scholars have claimed that the US power was declining so that the post-World War II order was suffering from an acute case of Anno Domini, they may have to recant their predictions. With the world’s largest concentration of capital and technology, the US remains the most powerful nation. China has faster GDP growth than the US, but its net national wealth, i.e. the resources available to pursue national interests, is still not in America’s league. From 2000–2012, Chinese net wealth jumped from $4.66 trillion to $21.7 trillion. American net wealth over the same period rose from $42.3 trillion to $67.5 trillion. From 2012 to 2017, while Chinese net wealth climbed to $29 trillion, American net wealth reached to over $93 trillion. Claiming that China is about to eclipse the US is untenable in the face of $64 trillion less in net wealth. The resource advantage rests overwhelmingly with the US.43
China has pushed RMB internationalization. But the share of RMB in global payment is below 2% while US dollar share remains above 40%. RMB accounts for a scant 1% of global reserves while the US dollar accounts for over 60%. The drive to internationalize RMB has not gained momentum since its inclusion in the SDR basket in 2015.44 Shortly before inclusion, China’s Central Bank announced a ‘market-oriented’ mechanism for setting the daily benchmark of the exchange rate, accompanied by 2% devaluation, the first since 1994, leading the onshore RMB to tumble by 4% in the subsequent two days. The Central bank intervened massively to halt the slide in the weeks after. Less than two months after RMB’s inclusion in the IMF basket, the central bank imposed new controls over capital outflow.45 These difficulties have made the cost outweigh the benefits of RMB internationalization.
Remaining the ‘indispensable nation’ of the world, the US cannot avoid the responsibility to provide public goods and security protection for its allies. Although President Trump has distanced Washington from its traditional allies and stepped back from global leadership, the American economy and geopolitics encourage a global outlook, imposing compelling imperatives on the superpower. Woven thickly into global value chains, protectionism calls for other countries’ retaliation against American producers and shifts burdens to American consumers. With checks and balances in the US constitution and the dynamism of the open society, economic liberals and internationalists in the US Government and across the states have been powerful countervailing forces against protectionism and disengagement. In spite of President Trump’s isolationist position, ‘American national interests endure. They include preventing any hostile power from dominating Asia, Europe, or the energy resources of the Middle East; sustaining an open international economic and political order, not subverted by spheres of influence that exclude the United States; protecting free access to the global commons, especially the maritime sea lanes that carry 90 % of global trade; nurturing alliances that magnify American power and influence; and promoting democracy and human rights, because the ultimate source of global security is a world in which power is bounded by law and pluralistic institutions’.46
Second, China cannot provide shared values and other elements of soft power to commons willingness on the part of other countries to align, and in some cases subordinate, their own narrow interests to those of the larger international community. China has made significant investments in developing its soft power with the opening of more than 500 Confucius Institutes across the world and carrying out extensive international branding campaigns. But China is not successful in projecting its values and ideals that others identify with and aspire to share. The US leadership comes with willing followers and trust through a network of alliances and other ties. For all of their differences with Washington and periodic resentment of its policies, many countries invested more confidence in the US than in any other nation. China does not possess the attributes that underpin US leadership. It lacks allies and inspires little trust in its own neighborhood. Its efforts to project soft power often fail to resonate abroad partly because China displays little empathy with the sensitivities of those living beyond its borders.47
While US global influence has dropped due to President Trump’s policy, it still holds much more soft power than China. Against the background of seemingly retreating democracy, China’s authoritarianism appears to be more appealing to autocracies. But this has not been accompanied by serious and significant interest worldwide in China’s development model. Promoting globalization, the Chinese Government is doing the opposite by imposing controls on the inflow of information and outflow of capital, leading people to question the sincerity of its posited global leadership.
A Chinese scholar admits that China might one day overtake the US in the size of economy but may never overtake the US influence and leadership in the world.48 Another Chinese scholar finds that China is short of international discursive power (国际话语权缺失). China had never played a world leadership role in history. The traditional Chinese system (华夏体系) was only an East Asian system, not universal, and cannot automatically transform into modern discursive power.49 Until China develops values that appeal universally, it misses one of the core features of global leadership.