No escalation or draw-in
Taylor, 14 -- Head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center – Australian National University (Spring, Brendan, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint”, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf)
History initially suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. For instance, in the unresolved Korean War (1950–53), which remains at the heart of continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an estimated two million military personnel were either killed or unaccounted for.7 A comparable number of casualties occurred in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which left today’s Taiwan flashpoint as a direct product.8 Further, at a time when some analysts are talking up the prospects of war between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is worth recalling that an estimated 15–35 million perished during the course of the second Sino–Japanese War (1937–45).9
While history is not destiny, more recent estimates suggest that the combustion of any one of these flashpoints today could prove equally devastating. Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, for example, predict that a conflict over Taiwan could spark a nuclear war involving 1.5 billion people and produce a fundamental change in the international order.10 Similar estimates produced at the time of the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis suggested that war on the Korean Peninsula could cost half a million lives and up to US$1 trillion in its first ninety days.11 Conflict between Asia’s two most powerful navies in the East China Sea could prove equally devastating, particularly given that China and Japan are also the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively. Total trade between these two historical great powers of East Asia currently stands at U.S. $345 billion.12
It is hard to envisage a credible scenario where a skirmish in the South China Sea could erupt into a conflict of similar proportions. The nationalist foundations of these disputes are fundamentally different from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. By way of example, recent polling suggests that 87 percent of the Chinese public view Japan negatively, whilst 50 percent anticipate a military dispute with Japan.13 Reflecting this sentiment, when Tokyo announced its decision to purchase contested Islands in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, this sparked widespread anti-Japanese protests across China that spread to more than 100 cities.14 Such public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat. Subsequently, a mere 150 protesters gathered in the city center.15 Crowds of comparable size have attended anti-Chinese protests in the Philippines. For instance, a March 2012 protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila that organizers expected to draw 1,000 protesters attracted barely half that number.16
The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18
Ross’ observation, in turn, dovetails elegantly with the issue of proximity, which Hoyt regards as a defining feature of a flashpoint. The antagonists in the South China Sea disputes are less proximate than in the case of the Korean Peninsula—where the two Koreas share a land border that remains the most militarized on earth. The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint. Indeed, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland affords Beijing credible strategic options— and arguably even incentives—involving the use of force that are not available to it in the South China Sea.19
Finally, and related to the third of Hoyt’s criteria, the South China Sea cannot be said to engage the vital interests of Asia’s great powers. To be sure, much has been made of India’s growing interests in this part of the world— particularly following reports of a July 2011 face-off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters.20 However, New Delhi’s interests in the South China Sea remain overwhelmingly economic, not strategic, driven as they are by the search for oil. Moreover, even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake in the geographically distant South China Sea, it is widely accepted that India’s armed forces will for some time lack the capacity to credibly defend these.21 Similarly, while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila with improving its maritime surveillance capabilities,22 for reasons of history and geography, Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and even the Taiwan flashpoint dwarf those which it has at stake in the more distant South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests of China and the United States continues to be overstated.