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“Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike… when NATO targeted two fuel tankers… The bodies were mangled beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders… distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, ‘I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of my flesh with me… and I called it my son’”

Wilcox 15 (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | Bodies of Violence Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations pg 1-4 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki)

Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike in northern Afghanistan in September 2009 when NATO targeted two fuel tankers that the Taliban had hijacked. Having gotten them stuck in a riverbed, the Taliban decided to give them to impoverished villagers who were struggling to stockpile fuel for the winter. The bodies were mangled and scorched beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders asked grieving relatives how many family members they had lost, and distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, “I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of flesh with me . . . and I called it my son” (Abdul-Ahad 2009). Bodies have long been outside the frame of International Relations (IR)—unrecognizable even as the modes of violence that use, target, and construct bodies in complex ways have proliferated. Drones make it possible to both watch people and bomb them, often killing dozens of civilians as well, while the pilots operating these machines remain thousands of miles away, immune from bodily harm. Suicide bombers seek certain death by turning their bodies into weapons that seem to attack at random. Images of tortured bodies from Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib provoke shock and outrage, and prisoners on hunger strikes to protest their treatment are force-fed. Meanwhile, the management of violence increasingly entails the scrutiny of persons as bodies through biometric technologies [2] Bodies of Violence and “body scanners.” In each of these instances, the body becomes the focal point, central to practices of security and International Relations—the body brought into excruciating pain, the body as weapon, or the body as that which is not to be targeted and hence is hit only accidentally or collaterally. Such bodily focus is quite distinct from prevailing international security practices and the disciplinary ways of addressing those practices in IR. Convention has it that states or groups make war and, in doing so, kill and injure people that other states are charged with protecting. The strategic deployment of force in the language of rational control and risk management that dominates security studies presents a disembodied view of subjects as reasoning actors. However, as objects of security studies, the people who are protected from violence or are killed are understood as only bodies: they are ahistorical, biopolitical aggregations whose individual members breathe, suffer, and die. In both cases, the politics and sociality of bodies are erased. One of the deep ironies of security studies is that while war is actually inflicted on bodies, bodily violence and vulnerability, as the flip side of security, are largely ignored. By contrast, feminist theory is at its most powerful when it denaturalizes accounts of individual subjectivity so as to analyze the relations of force, violence, and language that compose our profoundly unnatural bodies. Security studies lacks the reflexivity necessary to see its contribution to the very context it seeks to domesticate. It has largely ignored work in feminist theory that opens up the forces that have come to compose and constitute the body: by and large, security studies has an unarticulated, yet implicit, conception of bodies as individual organisms whose protection from damage constitutes the provision of security. In IR, human bodies are implicitly theorized as organisms that are exogenously determined—they are relevant to politics only as they live or die. Such bodies are inert objects: they exist to be manipulated, possess no agency, and are only driven by the motivations of agents. Attentive to the relations provoked by both discourse and political forces, feminist theory redirects attention to how both of these compose and produce bodies on terms often alien and unstable. Contemporary feminist theorizing about embodiment provides a provocative challenge to the stability and viability of several key concepts such as sovereignty, security, violence, and vulnerability in IR. In this book, I draw on recent work in feminist theory that offers a challenge to the deliberate maintenance and policing of boundaries and the delineation of human bodies from the broader political context. Challenging this theorization of bodies as natural organisms is a key step in not only exposing how bodies have been implicitly theorized in IR, but in developing a reading of IR that is attentive to the ways in which bodies are both produced and productive. In conceptualizing the subject of IR as essentially disembodied, IR theory impoverishes itself. An explicit focus on the subject as embodied makes two contributions to IR. First, I address the question vexing the humanities and social sciences of how to account for the subject by showing that IR is wrong in its uncomplicated way of thinking about the subject in relation to its embodiment. In its rationalist variants, IR theory comprehends bodies only as inert objects animated by the minds of individuals. Constructivist theory argues that subjects are formed through social relations, but leaves the bodies of subjects outside politics as “brute facts” (Wendt 2001, 110), while many variants of critical theory understand the body as a medium of social power, rather than also a force in its own right. In contrast, feminist theory offers a challenge to the delineation of human bodies from subjects and the broader political context. My central argument is that the bodies that the practices of violence take as their object are deeply political bodies, constituted in reference to historical political conditions while at the same time acting upon our world. The second contribution of this work is to argue that because of the way it theorizes subjects in relation to their embodiment, IR is also lacking in one of its primary purposes: theorizing international political violence. This project argues that violence is more than a strategic action of rational actors (as in rationalist theories) or a destructive violation of community laws and norms (as in liberal and constructivist theories). Because IR conventionally theorizes bodies as outside politics and irrelevant to subjectivity, it cannot see how violence can be understood as a creative force for shaping the limits of how we understand ourselves as political subjects, as well as forming the boundaries of our bodies and political communities. Understanding how “war is a generative force like no other” (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 126) requires us to pay attention to how bodies are killed and injured, but also formed, re-formed, gendered, and racialized through the bodily relations of war; it also requires that we consider how bodies are enabling and generative of war and practices of political violence more broadly. Security studies, the subfield of IR that focuses on violence, has defined its topic of study as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991, 212), with emphasis on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. Despite the traditional focus on military force, security studies has by and large ignored the bodies that are the intended or inevitable targets of the use of such force. One classic work in the field, Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966), specifically addresses coercion as the threat to cause pain and to hurt human bodies in order to manipulate a certain outcome. Few works are so explicit—that force involves the threat or use of military power to hurt and kill human bodies is usually implicit in security studies. Furthermore, when the violence to human bodies is made explicit, as in Schelling, such bodies are implicitly theorized precisely as organisms that can be hurt or killed. Contributing to the neglect of theorizing bodies has been the emphasis placed on national security. National security has long been the center of analysis in security studies, but in recent decades, the field has broadened to consider the referent object of security to be the individual, as “people represent, in one sense, the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied” (Buzan 1991, 18). The concept of “human security” posits the question of violence against human bodies as a central issue in security studies, yet this theorization accepts the individual as an exogenous unit of analysis. The relationship between bodies, subjects, and violence still remains under-theorized, a matter at least partly related to the ways in which the conduct of war and political violence, as violent social practices, have been written out of the field of IR and, in particular, out of security studies as a subfield (Barkawi 2011). This lacuna has been noted, if rarely explored in depth: “the absence of bodies in the discourses of a discipline that was borne of a concern with war and hence violence against bodies, itself raises curiosity as to the conditions of possibility that enabled this absence” (Jabri 2006b, 825). This work addresses this absence and aims to show what taking bodies seriously would mean to the study of violence in IR

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