Closet DA—The permutation is a form of intimidation that forces queer visibility and dictates what voices are heard and not heard.
Sjoberg 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, in “The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations” 06-09-2020, “Trans* theorizing for ethics in International Relations” doi: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315613529)//sfs
Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, made the argument that, in neoliberal capitalist imperium,1 ‘dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with uninhabitable identifcation’ (2006, xix), given that a dissenter must choose silence over being labelled treasonous or communist or some other label that has an unbreakable identifcation with evil in contemporary Western political performance.This catch-22, Butler argues, limits not only what we can hear, what we can see and what we can mourn, but also how we live, which she frames (in Levinas’ terms) as ‘the surplus of every sociality over every solitude’ (2006, 128). Butler argues that it is the over-infusement and policing of meaning, which serves not only the performative function of constituting human experience as such but also the regulatory function of rendering uninhabitable (deemed) unacceptable political space.Trans* theorizing has suggested that the trans* is treated as such an uninhabitable space that is nonetheless inhabited. Most of that discussion takes place in terms of outness and visibility. Being ‘out’ is a (controversial) concept that, in gay/queer/trans* communities, discusses the acknowledgment of one’s gender identity/sexuality/sexual preference to one’s friends, family, or community. In trans* theorizing, the controversy can be even stronger, because some would argue that being ‘out’ is a contradiction for the trans* because it implies something ‘in’—a secret, or hidden truth.A trans* man is a man, there’s no outness as trans* because the trans* is not an essential part of the person’s identity as a man—it is not a secret, or a hidden truth, but just an identity. Others suggest that outness requires an audience, but ‘it is common, that is, for non-trans people to neither know or care about the existence of trans-people’ (Shotwell and Sangray 2009, 59).This sometimes-invisibility, though, is paired with a sometimes-hypervisibility. Hypervisible things are things that are the object of gaze, fascination and/or sensationalism and abjection. In these contexts, Butler (1993, 227) characterized outness as a class privilege, looking for who has outness as ‘a historically available and affordable option’. On the one hand, some people and actors in global politics have the privilege of the visibility of the ‘true’ self, and others cannot or will not be heard (e.g., Spivak 1988). On the other hand, if visibility can be a privilege, hypervisibility can be deeply problematic and frequently dangerous. Moreno (2008, 140–141) suggests that there are ‘different dimensions of (in)visibility as an analytical category,’ including the individual/collective dichotomy, the universal/particular dichotomy and questions of cultural representation. In Moreno’s (2008) analysis, ‘group “outness” might actually present a condition of impossibility for individual “outness” or individual counternarratives to the dominant group narrative’ (Sjoberg 2012). If being trans* is the process of becoming or recognizing who one is rather than changing who one is, then the visibility of a trans* narrative would be problematic for the experiences of individual trans* persons. Furthermore, visibility as trans* has been argued to ‘reinscribe the position that genitalia are the essential determinants of sex’ (Bettcher 2007, 50) by suggesting that some transformation is necessary to make someone with female sex organs into a man, rather than recognizing that the person was always and already a man.‘Trans-theorists express concern that the continued emphasis on difference between how trans-people look and what they “are” is “fundamental to transphobic representations”’ (Sjoberg 2012, 345; citing Bettcher 2007, 50). It is precisely the understanding that there is something to see/make visible in the trans* that creates a politics of hypervisibility of the trans*. What happens is that ‘visibility yields a position in which what one is doing is represented as make-believe’ while ‘to opt for invisibility … generates the effect of revelation, exposure, or hidden truth’ (Bettcher 2007, 50).Visibility creates hypervisibility, which leads to the potential for the violent enforcement of sameness; invisibility creates silence, which leads to the potential for the violent assumption of sameness. In other words, there are violences of invisibility/exclusion (Bettcher 2007) and violences of hypervisibility/inclusion (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco 2013) that trans* theory both illuminates and provides some instruction for navigating. Sometimes, placing a person in a group (e.g.,‘citizens’ or ‘patriots’) creates a set of expectations of that person which might feel as unnatural as exclusion if not more so (e.g., particular behaviours or observations). Demands for conformity with dress, values and/or behaviours pressure those who are included, with sometimes violent results. So what implications for ethics in global politics can be found in this discussion of visibility? First, it contributes a suggestion that our interpretation of visibility for ethics purposes should be more complicated.Visibility and recognition are often either implicitly or explicitly considered in dichotomous terms—where someone (or someone’s rights, or someone’s status) is either seen or unseen, recognized or unrecognized.Trans* theorizing suggests that there are several more statuses—in addition to visible and invisible, there are situations of hypervisibility; situations of outness but invisibility; situations of visibility without outness. These statuses are not only applicable to trans* bodies in global politics; there are many complicated situations of not only who and what can be seen, but of what the material and ethical implications of visibility are/can be.A potential application of these expanded categories might be in the debate and discussion about when/if confict sexual violence is invisible (e.g., Henry 2010; MacKinnon 2006), and when/if confict sexual violence is too visible (e.g., Buss 2007; Eisenstein 2003). Both/and (e.g., Weber 2016) hypervisibility/invisibility can and do coexist, and that complication is necessary for ethical analysis of seeing/recognizing confict sexual violence (see, e.g., my discussion in Sjoberg 2016). Second, trans* theorizing’s contributions to thinking about visibility suggests that ethical analysis about global politics needs to take account of the moral implications of different visibilities in more complicated ways.Thinking about visibility and recognition as ethical goods is (and must be) oversimplifed. Instead, it is important to start asking questions about what it means to be seen, what dimensions of a person or group are seen, who benefts from and who is harmed by certain recognitions, and what implications about naturalness and truth are inherent in any given visibility and/or invisibility. In trans* theorizing, the recognition as ‘really an x’ or ‘really a y’ can be either liberating (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ matches the person’s understanding of self and recognition is desirable), mundane or annoying (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ matches the person’s understanding of self, but blending in is more desirable), or torturous and violent (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ does not match the person’s understanding of self).All of these are different moral situations, with different moral implications that need to be evaluated. Finally, trans* theorizing about visibility framing ‘outness’ or even (contingent) truth as a privilege suggests for ethics in global politics that revisiting the debate about what voices can be heard (e.g., Spivak 1988) and how the invisibility of certain persons and/or groups in global politics affects the dimensions that ethical thinkers see in the problems that they analyze (e.g., Hansen 2000). It is not just that some voices are seen and heard and others are not, it is also that the seeing and hearing of some voices costs those voices, especially in certain situations of external consumption. So two dimensions are important to consider: which voices are being heard, and what are the costs of visibility to marginalized voices in global politics? How are the costs of visibility to be factored into thinking about diversity, rights and security when substantive ethical calculations are to be had? While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to resolve these questions, they are questions that trans* theorizing inspires with broad applicability to ethical thinking in global politics.