China threat in biotech ethics is overhyped; they aren’t a security threat
Moore and Coplin 22 (Scott Moore and Abigail Coplin, “Closing the U.S. to Chinese Biotech Would Do Far More Harm Than Good”, China File, April 8th 2022, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/closing-us-chinese-biotech-would-do-far-more-harm-good, WC-NAS)
Just as security-driven approaches stand at odds with many realities of the biotechnology sector, U.S. policymakers and politicians sometimes mischaracterize and exoticize the threats that China’s growing global role in biotechnology pose to U.S. national security. These mischaracterizations often take the form of highlighting behavior that is hardly unique to China, and is, in fact, common in the industry. Fears by some U.S. officials that Beijing is pursuing research in areas like human genetic enhancement for military purposes, for instance, are wildly exaggerated; such techniques lie the realm of scientific feasibility. Moreover, while between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese biotechnology companies and research institutes should be thoroughly investigated, not all military-funded medical research and dual-use technologies constitute security threats. For instance, the media has BGI’s hearing loss research with the PLA, yet the American Department of Defense multiple hearing loss projects at American academic and commercial medical institutions, in addition to countless other medical research projects on topics as uncontroversial as cancer, , and . In both countries, many military-funded dual-use projects in the biological sciences consist of rather innocuous medical research, including .
Another dubious concern is the growing collection of biomedical data by Chinese firms operating abroad. Surreptitious collection of personal medical data was highlighted last summer both by Senator and in a finding that BGI Group, a leading Chinese genomics firm, was collecting data from millions of prenatal tests offered to pregnant women within and outside China. But the sort of collection undertaken by BGI, for instance, does not appear to be illegal, or even out-of-line with the practices of its foreign competitors. While BGI’s data collection efforts benefit from China’s more centralized healthcare provision system, using genetic diagnostic tests to build datasets is the main business model of both the and the clinical genetics industry globally. In fact, BGI’s proclivity for academic research, , and international collaboration arguably renders some aspects of the organization’s data use more transparent than some of its international counterparts.
At the same time, U.S. policymakers’ focus on surreptitious biomedical collection by Chinese firms abroad risks obscuring a bigger challenge to U.S. interests: Beijing’s increasingly protectionist approach to biomedical data-sharing. Thanks to its massive national health insurance scheme, China’s state has access to hundreds of millions of individual patients. This data could be extremely valuable both for medical research purposes and commercial applications, potentially facilitating treatment discovery and development. Yet China has adopted like the 2019 Regulations on the Management of Human Genetic Resources, requiring foreign firms, universities, and other entities to apply for permission from the state to use Chinese biomedical data. While many of these regulations have , they have been increasingly in recent years and are now being more vigorously, resulting in and —if not —international collaborations. China’s likewise contains explicit claims of sovereignty over China’s genetic and biological resources. While such regulations are , Beijing’s massive store of biomedical data may create a significant commercial and scientific advantage for Chinese biotechnology firms. Washington must take this risk more seriously and push for greater reciprocity.
Another legitimate worry is the perpetuation of human rights abuses tied to genetic data collection within China’s borders. Biomedical data, some of it amassed and analyzed with the of U.S.-based researchers and , has been from minority populations like the Uyghurs and large portions of the male Han population without informed consent and used to compile massive genetic databases. Journalists report that these databases are being used in forensic DNA profiling and potentially , making it easier to identify members of minority groups and potentially making them more susceptible to discriminatory surveillance or other forms of state repression. Such practices deserve the condemnation of the U.S. government and of the international community, and warrant a firm policy response, including banning the export of biomedical equipment to Chinese entities involved in such abuses. To its credit, the Biden administration has attempted to curb these practices, including through its .
Yet at the same time, Washington and Beijing have good reasons to see certain areas of biotechnology as grounds for cooperation rather than conflict or competition. The most advanced areas of biotechnology, like gene editing and synthetic biology, are double-edged swords. They show great promise to help cure chronic diseases and develop drought-resistant crops, but also to create dangerous new viruses, human genetic modifications, and even . The risks and threats posed by these emerging biotechnologies to any one country. Potentially dangerous biotechnology research can be undertaken virtually anywhere, meaning that all countries need to develop and enforce rules preventing research that could create new viruses or bioweapons, for example. China is an especially important player in international biosafety and biosecurity, and the country’s 2020 legislation on both topics is, on paper at least, among the in the world. Gene therapy trials based on somatic editing are underway in both the and , and as researchers in both countries begin to tinker with the fundamental building blocks of life, engagement on the use of these groundbreaking, but potentially dangerous, technologies is needed both to ensure transparency as well as to begin the difficult process of establishing mutually-agreed rules and norms.