China will not model US policy
Ho 21 [ Benjamin Ho, assistant professor in the China Programme at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 8-25-2021,”Why China Will Not Cooperate with the West: The Pandemic Made Things Worse”, The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-will-not-cooperate-west-pandemic-made-things-worse-190251?page=0%2C1, accessed 6-28-2022]
Seen this way, it is not surprising that China fundamentally does not trust the United States. Not only does Beijing see Washington’s objective as wanting to keep it down and preserving its international primacy, it also views the current Biden administration—and its emphasis on democracy promotion—as an existential threat to its political worldview. Indeed, Western criticisms of Beijing on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet all feed into the CCP’s central narrative: the United States and the West want to challenge the Party’s grip on power and to remake China in the image of the West. Such a siege mentality means that Beijing is unlikely to find any common ground with the United States insofar as key strategic interests are concerned. Consequently, the CCP also views statements made by the United States and the West as trying to drive a wedge between itself and its citizens—which would effectively destroy its sacralized image and its paramount leader that has been so carefully and painstakingly built up over the years. Indeed, Chinese political observers—in their recount of the fall of the Soviet Union—often point not to Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, rather they attribute it to Nikita Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin as the start of the Soviet long decline. Unity is paramount to preserving the sacralized image of the party, and the CCP will go all out to defend this.
The events of the coronavirus pandemic have further exacerbated the tensions between China and the United States, not least because of the sky-high implications that are at stake. Given that China wants to portray itself as a responsible nation, one that is better than the West, it has spared no effort to promote its vaccines worldwide, particularly in countries who for various reasons are unable to procure the Pfizer or Moderna vaccines. While most foreign ministers would prefer to defer knowledge of vaccine science to health experts, in China, the foreign ministry has been on the forefront of vaccine promotion. The implications are obvious: Beijing sees vaccine diplomacy as a crucial means with which to convince other countries of its goodwill and friendship. Paired together with its Wolf Warrior diplomacy, in which China seeks to rebut what it sees as unfair allegations by unfriendly nations, Beijing intends to seize the moral high ground to claim that it is superior to the West.
To this end, it is likely that Chinese leaders are aware that it is being perceived somewhat in a negative light by its neighbors and they see the need to remedy it. In a June 2021 politburo study session, Xi exhorted party leaders to have better international communication in order to repair the country’s coronavirus-hit image and to win a battle of narratives with the United States and its allies. This is vital for China especially in terms of cross-strait relations which are presently at a low and which the possibility of conflict between Beijing and Taipei cannot be ruled out. Indeed, if war happens, China would have to demonstrate that it is the victim—either as a result of Taiwan’s intransigence—or because of the United States interfering in its internal affairs. While most countries in the region are unlikely to want to be drawn into a hot conflict (with the exception of Japan), the more China is able to present a positive image of itself, the more likely it is able to convince its neighbors of its just cause (jus bellum justum). This would increase both regional and international pressure on the United States not to put boots on the ground and thus further isolate Taipei from any external support.