China and American biotech can develop cooperatively.
Moore and Coplin 22 (Scott Moore and Abigail Coplin, “Closing the U.S. to Chinese Biotech Would Do Far More Harm Than Good”, China File, April 8th 2022, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/closing-us-chinese-biotech-would-do-far-more-harm-good, WC-NAS)
China is fast becoming a biotechnology powerhouse and a perceived threat to the longstanding dominance of the United States in the sector. In Washington, these developments have been greeted in much the same way as China’s growing prowess in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies: with panic and punitive measures. Last May, Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio introduced the , which would, among other actions, ban the National Institutes of Health from funding China-affiliated entities. In September, Arkansas Republican Senator Tom Cotton and Wisconsin Representative Mike Gallagher for “” Chinese biotechnology companies over concerns they may be attempting to gather biomedical information on U.S. citizens for nefarious purposes. Just a few months later, the U.S. government 12 Chinese life sciences research institutes and 22 private firms on security grounds.
There is a big problem, however, with these largely reactive, security-focused responses. Biotechnology is an intrinsically transnational and rapidly evolving sector that holds just as much promise for mutually beneficial collaboration and cooperation as for competition and contention. These distinctive characteristics of biotechnology mean that Washington’s security-driven approach to China and biotechnology risks harming U.S. competitiveness in the sector instead of enhancing it, while also limiting America’s ability to share in the development of mutually-beneficial technologies and work with Beijing to address the shared challenges posed by rapid developments in fields like gene editing. U.S. policy and strategy on China and biotechnology must strike a better balance between addressing legitimate concerns while maintaining the openness and innovation that underpin America’s competitive advantage in emerging technology.
Washington’s recent focus on China and biotechnology reflects the sector’s rapid growth, both in China and elsewhere. Biotechnology has been a focus of Beijing’s scientific and technological development plans since the 1980s, but more recently, have spurred sharp increases in public and private investment into the sector. Estimates of in the over the past decade reach as high as $100 billion. In a , Xi Jinping himself called for China to “master” biotechnology and mount a “society-wide effort” to achieve breakthroughs in the field. The life sciences, Xi went on to say, could be a “national treasure” that China must “seize with its own hand.”
Yet such statements belie the ways biotechnology differs from other fields. Biotechnology intrinsically blurs boundaries between science and commerce, market and state, the global and the national, and even personal privacy and collective interest. Progress more heavily in biotech than in other high-tech industries on knowledge networks and transnational collaboration, those that connect the United States and China.
A raft of studies on scientific and technological innovation conducted over the past two decades demonstrate that the ability of individual researchers to collaborate with firms and institutions in different countries significantly increases the quality of their work, especially when the collaboration is U.S. and Chinese researchers, and especially in the . COVID-19 vaccines likewise provide a powerful example of how U.S.-China knowledge networks help translate basic biotech research into commercial and medical applications. One of the key innovations underpinning the development of Pfizer’s and Moderna’s mRNA vaccines—the stabilization of the coronavirus spike protein— from the research of Dr. Wang Nianshuang, a graduate of China’s Tsinghua University studying on a postdoctoral fellowship in the lab of Dr. Jason McLellan at the University of Texas at Austin.
Even in the realm of commercial biotechnology, the U.S. and Chinese biotechnology sectors are more complementary than competitive. Many and biotech firms employ transnational business models that leverage the very different strengths of the American and Chinese biotechnology ecosystems, while many others—like BeiGene and Edigene—were essentially “born global.” Chinese biopharmaceutical companies China’s large population of patients to conduct time- and cost-efficient clinical trials that help inform U.S. regulatory approvals. Cancer drugs developed by Chinese firms show in lowering prices and new treatment options to patients in the U.S. and elsewhere. Likewise, Chinese, American, and European firms all regularly each other’s technologies and as part of their technological development and marketing strategies. The corporate c-suites and scientific advisory boards of individual firms likewise often consist of individuals of multiple nationalities with experience working in both American and Chinese contexts. Ultimately, in both academic research and commercial science, the division between American and Chinese biotechnology is less clear and less meaningful than in other high-tech fields.
Biotechnology’s reliance on basic science and transnational knowledge networks also means that competition in biotechnology plays out differently than it does in other high-tech industries. Unlike the semiconductor and telecommunication sectors, whose development depends on expensive equipment and hard-to-acquire manufacturing expertise, barriers to entry in biotechnology are low. Likewise, as Eric Lander’s now infamous of CRISPR’s development illustrates, both foundational research and key innovations in biotechnology often take place in the public domain and build on incremental advancements made across the globe. When breakthroughs, like employing CRISPR as a means of gene-editing, do occur they through global scientific networks with little heed for national boundaries. Consequently, it is not a zero-sum industry in which a single innovation sets any firm or country ahead for a prolonged period. Take mRNA vaccines as an example. Not only did Moderna and the international Pfizer-BioNTech collaboration concurrently develop mRNA vaccines, China is also currently finishing up phase three trials for its own mRNA vaccine. In contrast to the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines, however, the is at room temperature for seven days—a key advantage when trying to vaccinate the developing world against COVID-19 and other diseases.
Given these dynamics, the restrictive policy tools under discussion in Washington pose serious risks to U.S. competitiveness in the sector. While policymakers “engagement” and “competition” as opposing modalities of contending with China’s technological rise, maintaining an innovative edge in biotechnology requires staying plugged in to international scientific networks and engaged with one’s competitors, regardless of whether they are domestic or international. This is, after all, part of why the biotechnology industry tends in clusters. Similarly, to grow its biotechnology industry, given its into global clinical research networks, highlights the potential perils of constricting U.S.-China knowledge networks in the sector. Blocking Chinese biotechnology companies from entering American markets is unlikely to impede China’s emergence as a major player in the industry, but it does threaten to prevent American firms and researchers from accessing the talent, ideas, and technologies these firms have to offer. To decouple is to risk missing out, and thus risk falling behind.