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Aff fails---only terrestrial retaliation can deter---otherwise China calculates mutual destruction to be net beneficial even if they’re rational, which they aren’t.

James Lewis 13, Senior vice president and program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Anti-satellite%20Weapons%20-The%20Stimson%20Center.pdf \\SYang

In order to deter China from using ASAT weapons, China’s leaders would have to calculate that an ASAT attack would lead to an escalation of conflict or to damaging retaliation. In peacetime, Beijing would probably calculate that an ASAT attack might risk being seen as a casus belli. If so, it is unlikely that China’s kinetic or directed energy weapons would be used outside of conflict. If, however, Washington and Beijing are already engaged in an armed clash, the threat of the use of force in space is somewhat moot. Washington could, for example, threaten to escalate the conflict by warning that an attack on a satellite will result in the destruction of China’s space launch complex. Beijing may nonetheless calculate that at this stage of its military modernization, interfering with US satellites is worth any retaliatory interference with their own satellites, and that the risk of escalation in other domains is either low or acceptable. There is some evidence that Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. China has little experience with the arms control negotiations that underpinned nuclear deterrence, has a different conceptual framework for conflict and international relations, and lacks the experience of the Cold War for interpreting American actions and signals. Chinese military concepts on “deterrence” differ significantly from US concepts, meshing Schelling’s ideas of deterrence and compellence in ways that encourage use and increase the risk of miscalculation.7 Deterring Chinese ASAT attacks during armed conflict would require threatening something other than China’s own satellites, since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not yet so dependent on space assets that the satellites’ loss would constrain their operations as much as the loss of American satellites would hurt US forces. In this situation, Chinese leaders may see an exchange of satellite attacks as working to their benefit. Only a credible threat to retaliate against a terrestrial target would change China’s calculus, but such threats bring the risk of escalation of conflict that would need to be weighed carefully. Responding to an attack on a military target in space or a military cyber network with an attack on the Chinese homeland would likely be seen by China as escalatory. Additionally, nationalist sentiment among the citizens of potential opponents like China or Iran suggests the most likely effect of US escalation unless it was sustained and broadly destructive, would be to reinforce support for the regime and for a continuation of the conflict. Belief shapes perception. The Kremlin believed that the United States was inherently aggressive and sought the destruction of the Soviet Union. Soviet political and military leaders debated whether the US investment in weapons was to retain a credible deterrent or to attain first strike capabilities. Paranoia also colors how authoritarian Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. regimes that lack domestic legitimacy view the United States. Cultural and linguistic differences also contribute to misinterpretation of deterrent messages.

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