All empirics go neg
Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145
There is a widespread view among practitioners and scholars that cyberspace is defined by an inherent potential for dangerous escalation dynamics between rivals.1 On the practitioner side, for example, senior US intelligence and military leaders expressed concerns about first-strike incentives leading to escalation in a 2017 joint statement to Congress, testifying that “adversaries equipped with [offensive cyber capabilities] could be prone to preemptive attack and rapid escalation in a future crisis, because both sides would have an incentive to strike first.”2 On the academic side, there is a palpable fear that cyberspace is an environment in which offense has advantages over defense and that this—coupled with factors such as problems of attribution, poor command and control, and the absence of meaningful thresholds or red lines—generates real risks of inadvertent escalation.3 Concerns about escalation grew even more passionate in the wake of the US Department of Defense’s release of its 2018 Cyber Strategy document, which articulates an operational concept of “defending forward” in which the DOD “disrupt[s] or halt[s] malicious cyber activity at its source.”4
However, there are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. Specifically, if cyberspace is in fact an environment that (perhaps even more so than others) generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? Most interactions between cyber rivals have been characterized by limited volleys that have not escalated beyond nuisance levels and have been largely contained below the use-of-force threshold.5 For example, in a survey of cyber incidents and responses between 2000 and 2014, Brandon Valeriano et al. find that “rivals tend to respond only to lower-level [cyber] incidents and the response tends to check the intrusion as opposed to seek escalation dominance. The majority of cyber escalation episodes are at a low severity threshold and are non-escalatory. These incidents are usually ‘tit-for-tat’ type responses within one step of the original incident.”6 Even in the two rare examples in which states employed kinetic force in response to adversary cyber operations—the US counter-ISIL drone campaign in 2015 and Israel’s airstrike against Hamas cyber operatives in 2019—the use of force was circumscribed and did not escalate the overall conflict (not to mention that force was used against nonstate adversaries with limited potential to meaningfully escalate in response to US or Israeli force).7