Cyber attacks don’t cause escalation – resources, reversibility, and lesser impact
Sarah Kreps, 19 — (Sarah Kreps; Political Science Department, Cornell University, Published: 9-29-2019; "Escalation firebreaks in the cyber, conventional, and nuclear domains: moving beyond effects-based logics"; OUP Academic; Accessed: 6-26-2022; https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz007/5575971)//Pen-SY
The perseverance of the firebreak has come to define nuclear strategy, especially for the United States.1 It is also increasingly central to debates around US cyber strategy. Therefore, as critics of the persistent engagement strategy argue, understanding the logics of cyber escalation is vitally important to the strategy’s success [49–51]. Despite the importance of escalation for current US cyber strategy success, there is very little scholarly consensus about cyber escalation.2 As Joseph Nye asserts, “escalation ladders and thresholds are poorly understood” in the cyber realm [66]. A number of scholars and policymakers argue that cyber operations do not change the fundamental nature of escalation. For these scholars, it is the effects created by weapons that matter for escalation and not necessarily the means or the domain in which the effects are created. Cyberspace operations may have unique qualities, but the fundamental logics of escalation are tied to weapons’ effects and rather than how these effects are delivered. As long as cyberspace operations can create similar effects as operations in other domains, they create the same escalation ladders. The debate within this literature is about the technical ability of cyberspace operations to create the same effects as the other domains [56, 59, 60, 62, 67, 68]. Kostyuk et al., e.g., equate permanent damage to civilian infrastructure as the cyber equivalent of a nuclear war and existential attack, all of which should warrant a comparable escalatory response. They caveat that “at present, we do not believe a single mode of cyber attack alone would pose an existential threat to the US, however, this may change in the near future” [69]. Scholars within this line of reasoning devote significant attention to understanding the difficulty cyberspace operations have achieving access, the resources required for creating complex effects, and the highly-reversible nature of most cyberspace operations. Glaser and Farrell provide an effects-based typology and point to five characteristics of effects that may decrease escalation of cyberattacks: physical versus nonphysical damage (first- or second-order physical effects), no visible damage, military versus civilian, attacks that kill versus those that do not, and attacks in war versus peace [13]. According to this understanding of cyberspace and escalation, responses to a cyberattack should not be qualitatively different from any other attack as long as cyberattacks can advance to the level of nuclear or large-scale conventional capabilities [57, 59]. Until cyberspace attacks can provide the decisive edge toward taking territory or create the lethal effects comparable to large-scale or nuclear war, they will not be treated the same as attacks in other domains. The perspective is largely consistent with Valeriano and Maness’s quantitative analysis of cyberspace operations, who find cyber operations to be largely low intensity and find no evidence of higher intensity retaliation to cyber attacks [69].