Cyberattacks aren’t perceived as an “armed attack” – they are non-lethal and elicit weaker responses than kinetic attacks
Martin C. Libicki 20, Professor at the Center for Cyber Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy, “Correlations Between Cyberspace Attacks and Kinetic Attacks,” May 2020, 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, http://195.222.11.251/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_11_Libicki.pdf
4. PROPOSITION: CYBERATTACKS WILL BE TAKEN AS SERIOUSLY AS EQUALLY DAMAGING KINETIC ATTACKS If countries react to cyberattacks as they would to equivalent kinetic attacks, then an escalation in cyberspace (defined as above) could well result in a comparable escalation in physical space – again with the expected effects on international stability. But would they? Much of the answer depends on what constitutes “comparable.” Kinetic military effects tend to include death and destruction. No cyberattack has killed anyone directly, and few have actually broken physical things; wiping a hard drive – as many cyberattacks have done – still leaves the hard drive physically intact. But cyberattacks have been quite costly to their victims, even if measured solely in disruption and remediation costs. The NotPetya attacks were said to have cost their (mostly corporate) victims up to $8 billion (Greenberg 2018). Putatively, a kinetic attack that destroys $8 billion worth of military equipment but harms no one would be comparable and should, one would imagine, bring about a comparable reaction. Imagining a kinetic attack that breaks things but hurts no one used to be an exercise in fantasy. But the Iranian take-down of a $150 million U.S. Global Hawk in the summer of 2019 was such an attack. The U.S. response, a cyberattack, was also non-lethal. Lest this choice of avoiding lethality be ascribed to the individual characteristics of the U.S. President, note that the Pentagon was also thinking along similar lines. One of its favored options was to sink an Iranian craft, but only after giving its sailors time to get away (Baker, Schmitt, and Crowley 2019). Earlier, a Turkish shootdown of a Russian jet near the Syrian border had drawn a cyber response (e.g., DDOS attacks), but nothing violent (Murgia 2015). Returning to NotPetya, the U.S. reaction to this costly event was a limited set of sanctions. If Russia had deliberately disabled commercial satellites whose total replacement value summed to that much, would the United States have also limited its response to sanctions? One might counter that many of the affected corporations were not U.S.-headquartered: for example, Maersk, a Danish shipping company. If that matters, then replace United States by NATO and re-ask the question. So, while the non-lethality of cyberattacks means that a plausible response would be non-lethal, the failure to respond to NotPetya suggests that the broad scope of the cyberattack may have also played a role. Perhaps a cyberattack that damages software and thereby levies costs on victims is different in kind from a comparably costly kinetic attack that damages hardware. Research by Professor Jacqueline Schneider casts further doubt that a cyberattack would be treated as tantamount to a comparable kinetic attack (see Kreps and Schneider 2019). The results of two exercises – one conducted at the U.S. Naval War College and the other on-line – suggest that cyberattacks introduced into a simulated crisis were more often ignored or, at most, motivated a weak response in comparison to comparable kinetic attacks. In fairness, the United States has been used as the exemplar of how countries may respond to cyberattacks and other countries may react differently. But the United States deserves attention because it has responded most overtly, whether through public statements, levied sanctions, or news reports (Israel is also active, but it is a far smaller country and unique in many relevant respects). It is unclear whether the difference is that the United States suffers more cyberattacks than other countries (or seems to in part because of uncensored media coverage) or whether other countries have covert ways of responding that are not widely known. That noted, Jensen and Valeriano (2019) indicate that when citizens of the United States, Russia, and Israel were given a scenario with a major cyberattack, only a small percentage chose to escalate as a result. Roughly half of the respondents wanted something less than a titfor-tat response. They concluded that, “to date, cyber operations have tended to offer great powers escalatory offramps”. Conclusion: cyberattacks would be deemed less likely to garner a kinetic response than would kinetic attacks that levy comparable costs, because they are generally nonlethal and somehow considered less serious and more easily recovered from.