Critical infrastructure attacks don’t generate anywhere near the impact required to trigger escalation
Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145
Even under circumstances in which a state may possess the right cyber response capabilities at the desired time, its response may not generate sufficient costs against the target to be perceived as escalatory.41 Fundamental limits on the cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations stem from the fact that cyber capabilities lack the physical violence of conventional and nuclear ones. Cyber weapons target data; they disrupt, manipulate, degrade, or destroy data resident on networks and systems or in transit.42 Moreover, aside from those cyber capabilities that permanently destroy data and for which there are no backups to which a target can revert, cyber effects are temporary and often reversible.
The utility of military instruments of power for the purposes of coercion or brute force inheres in their abilities to inflict—or credibly threaten to inflict—significant damage and harm against a target state (its civilian population or its military forces) to achieve a political objective.43 Cyber weapons could be (and have been) used to disrupt an adversary’s networks and systems—overwhelming them such that they temporarily lose the ability to function or the target loses confidence in their reliability—or even to produce destructive effects by destroying data resident on these systems or, in rarer circumstances, producing effects in the physical realm.44 While conducting multiple cyberattacks against a targeted state’s critical national infrastructure, for example, could in theory generate significant economic and national security consequences, the temporal aspects of offensive cyber operations as described above limit the ability of even the most capable states to sustain persistent, high-cost effects against multiple strategic targets over time. There is simply no guarantee that a state can generate significant costs against a target in the context of an unfolding crisis. This reality starkly contrasts with the relative predictability and reliability of conventional effects. Indeed, the empirical record has largely validated this claim; “the vast majority of malicious cyber activity has taken place far below the threshold of armed conflict between states, and has not risen to the level that would trigger such a conflict.”45 This is why, in Lin’s parlance, “going cyber is pre-escalatory” and countervalue cyberattacks (those that target civilian, rather than military, assets) occur “all the time now and are at the BOTTOM of the escalation ladder” [emphasis in original].46 Rather than their ability to wreak permanent, destructive effects, cyber operations are often prized for their temporary and reversible nature.47
One metric to assess the cost-generation potential of offensive cyber is in terms of loss of life. By this measure, cyber operations are unlikely to inflict significant harm. While theoretically possible that cyber operations could lead directly to a loss of life, no one has reportedly died to date as a direct result of a cyberattack despite over 30 years of recorded cyber operations.48 Even in hypothetical catastrophic scenarios, the cost in terms of human casualties is minimal. For instance, common worst-case scenarios of cyberattacks revolve around the loss of power stemming from a cyberattack on an electric grid.49 However, even in this instance, the conceivable damage from the loss of power over an extended period is far less than that which could be wreaked using basic, limited conventional capabilities. To draw a comparison, when Hurricane Sandy hit the United States’ eastern seaboard in late October 2012, over 8.5 million people were left without power—with many going weeks and even months before it was brought back online.50 Yet a US National Hurricane Center postmortem of Hurricane Sandy reported that of the 159 people in the United States killed either directly or indirectly, only “about 50 of these deaths were the result of extended power outages during cold weather, which led to deaths from hypothermia, falls in the dark by senior citizens, or carbon monoxide poisoning from improperly placed generators or cooking devices.”51 If a cyberattack took out power of a similar magnitude and duration of Hurricane Sandy, it is conceivable that an equivalent number of casualties would result. The 2015 synchronized cyberattacks against Ukrainian power companies, attributed to Russia, was the first known example of an offensive cyber operation targeting a state’s power grid. Its cost was ultimately low—service was temporarily disrupted to 225,000 customers for several hours, and energy providers operated at a limited capacity for some time after service was restored.52 There were no reported casualties from this power outage. While any casualty resulting from a cyberattack would certainly be lamentable, even worst-case scenario figures are minor in comparison to the cost in human lives stemming from other, even limited, kinetic military operations.