Quick timeframes are a neg warrant---defenders can patch vulnerabilities within minutes, but escalation requires attackers to have sustained access---those defensive pauses prevent cyber-space escalation and allow decisionmakers to defuse crises
Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145
Third, these limitations become even more salient when we consider how strategic interactions are likely to play out over time during repeated crisis interactions. Because the virtual domain is changeable in a way that the physical world is not, actions taken by defenders in the context of a crisis can radically and unpredictably alter an attacker’s ability to deliver and sustain effects against a target over time.30 Access and capabilities are neither guaranteed nor indefinite—they have a shelf life.31 Footholds into a target’s network that were time intensive to develop can unexpectedly disappear as vulnerabilities in a network are patched. Exploits may have a short shelf life as revealing information about them enables targets to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) and use these to prevent further damage from specific malware strains or quarantine malicious traffic using known malware signatures. An example of the latter is the US Cyber Command initiative, beginning in 2018, to share information about adversary malware by uploading samples to VirusTotal.32 Therefore, a target can “transition from vulnerability (to a particular attack) to invulnerability in, literally, minutes.”33 Third-party disclosure about software vulnerabilities by governments or private actors can also unintentionally precipitate the loss of access as exposure about vulnerability information enables network defenders to take measures to remedy them.34 For instance, the disclosures that began in 2016 by the group Shadow Brokers of purportedly pilfered US National Security Agency exploits and zero days ostensibly put US government accesses at risk.35 Put simply, a vulnerability upon which an access relies may in theory be only one update or disclosure away from being patched.
Thus, in the context of an ongoing crisis interaction between an attacker and defender, the former’s operational tempo is likely to be interrupted by the latter’s behavior, forcing the attacker to devote additional time to find or acquire new vulnerabilities and exploits in the midst of an offensive operation or campaign. As Inglis notes, to succeed in an offensive cyber campaign that unfolds over time, attackers must be able to sustain “the efficacy of tools under varying conditions caused by the defender’s response and the natural variability and dynamism of cyberspace.”36 The ability to build or acquire new accesses and capabilities “in real time” during a crisis is highly limited.37 Indeed, General Paul Nakasone remarked in a January 2019 interview on the radical difference in shelf life between conventional and cyber capabilities:
Compare the air and cyberspace domains. Weapons like JDAMs [ Joint Direct Attack Munitions] are an important armament for air operations. How long are those JDAMs good for? Perhaps 5, 10, or 15 years, sometimes longer given the adversary. When we buy a capability or tool for cyberspace . . . we rarely get a prolonged use we can measure in years. Our capabilities rarely last 6 months, let alone 6 years. This is a big difference in two important domains of future conflict.38
Therefore, as a 2013 Defense Science Board report notes, “offensive cyber will always be a fragile capability” when pitted against network defenders who are “continuously improving network defensive tools and techniques.”39
Each side can take defensive measures to blunt the impact and effectiveness of the other’s access and capabilities—particularly as information about them is revealed. Consequently, strategic accesses and capabilities are likely to become more vulnerable and less reliable over time, shrinking the set of cyber escalatory response options for all parties. This cycle is likely to generate temporal breaks in the pace of adversarial engagements in cyberspace, where states must regroup and develop or rebuild accesses and capabilities during an ongoing interaction. These pauses are likely to diffuse the pressure that typically accompanies—even defines—crisis situations, creating breathing space and, by extension, room for decisionmakers to deliberate alternative courses of action, for domestic political tensions to cool down, for intent to be communicated to adversaries, and for de-escalation pathways to be determined.
A potential counter to this argument is that most states likely already appreciate the time and resources required to develop accesses and tools, as well as their fragility. Therefore, those with sufficient resources are incentivized to alleviate these concerns through investing heavily in developing the ability to gain pre-positioned accesses and a range of capabilities and platforms to be prepared for the onset of a potential future crisis. Evidence of this kind of behavior could be, for example, the discovery of Russian malware in US critical infrastructure reported in 2018.40 While dormant access is almost certainly the case, states are likely to remain stymied by inadvertent or deliberate discovery of these efforts prior to a crisis. More importantly, even if pre-positioned accesses and capabilities are available in the opening moments of a crisis, the difficulties of maintaining them during iterated volleys between adversaries are likely to persist and blunt the ability of a given party to continue escalation of cyber capabilities.