Cyber weapons have to be uniquely tailored to each target---escalation can’t happen because the time pressure of a crisis doesn’t allow adversaries to gain access and deploy cyber capabilities
Erica D. Borghard 19, assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; and Shawn W. Lonergan, research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Fall 2019, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 122-145
Second, in addition to being dependent on access, offensive cyber capabilities lack universal effectiveness. While nuclear or conventional munitions are target agnostic—in most cases, the same munition can be used to target an aircraft hangar, a massed enemy formation, a munitions factory, or a hospital—some cyber weapons must be tailored to a specific target set or type.23 As Martin Libicki notes, “A piece of malware that brings one system down may have absolutely no effect on another. The difference between the two may be as simple as which patch version of a piece of software each system runs.”24 The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack that wreaked billions of dollars in damage and was attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, for instance, targeted hundreds of thousands of computers around the world across a range of industries that were running an older version of Windows.25 The widespread damage belies the highly specific and targeted nature of the malware—almost all of the affected systems were running a version of Windows 7; the same strain of malware had no effect on computers running more up-to-date operating systems. Moreover, asset owners of targets of strategic significance—such as critical infrastructure—typically employ highly customized software and specific hardware with tailored configurations that are unique to those systems and usually only intimately understood by the original developers and manufacturers. It has been reported, for example, that the malware employed in the Stuxnet cyberattacks against the Iranian nuclear program was tailored to target the specific model of Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLC) used at the Natanz enrichment facility.26 Indeed, while Stuxnet was discovered in computers around the world, it delivered destructive effects only against the centrifuges in Natanz.27 The non-substitutability of entire classes of offensive capabilities by definition increases the cost of developing an arsenal of offensive cyber capabilities.28
Therefore, the time and resource requirements to gain access and develop specific offensive capabilities may render important escalatory response options infeasible or impractical at the desired time. Operational planning and execution must consider that a given capability may not be usable or even exist at a chosen time of employment.29 As the above discussion illustrates, many of the target sets that would represent strategic (and therefore escalatory) targets, such as a state’s critical infrastructure or nuclear command and control, demand extensive planning, pre-positioning, and capability development in advance of employing offensive capabilities. Therefore, the timing of a crisis plays a crucial role in decisions about cyber escalation responses. Specifically, the time required to develop access to hold strategic targets at risk means that, even if a state seeks to escalate against an adversary using cyber means, it may find itself limited by the accesses and capabilities it possesses at the moment a crisis occurs. Cyber response options may be limited to less decisive or more vulnerable target sets, rather than those that are more strategically significant.