Cyber-vulnerabilities can be inserted at any point in the satellite supply chain and remain latent indefinitely---no way the aff can solve it
David Livingstone 16, associate fellow at Chatham House, was policy lead on Military Aid to the Civil Powers at the UK Ministry of Defence between 1994 and 1999; and Patricia M. Lewis is the research director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf
For a successful cyberattack to occur, the threat vector needs to be inserted within the system. This could take place during the manufacture, distribution or operation of the products and services that characterize the system. During the manufacturing and distribution phases, conventional physical security controls need to be applied to minimize the risk of cyberattacks. However, during operation, the conjunction of electromagnetic and cyber vulnerabilities becomes critical. As telecommunication systems integrate complex technology to improve performance, flexibility and efficiency, they are increasingly dependent on software that can be modified during operation rather than hardware or firmware that remains relatively unchanged once it has been designed and deployed. One example is the C-RAN (Cloud-Radio-Access-Network) concept being developed as part of the evolution of terrestrial mobile networks, and this type of software will be integrated into future satellite systems. Commercial tools such as SIM-toolkits are increasingly used to perform over-the-air provisioning and denial of service. Over-the-air software (both operating system and application) upgrades will be familiar to everyone using smart devices.
The ability to emulate a network, and to access, configure and control communications devices via wireless interfaces during normal operations also offers opportunities to an attacker to launch a large-scale cyberattack that remains latent within a system indefinitely, until activated at a time of the adversary’s choosing.
There exists, therefore, a need to create infrastructure and procedures that allow full system vulnerability assessment to be undertaken and mitigation strategies to be developed, taking into account both electromagnetic and cyber techniques. Such facilities need to be available during the design, development and operational phases. As the internet has become near-ubiquitous, as devices become ever more interconnected and as critical infrastructure becomes more complex, vulnerability to cyberattacks is increasingly becoming the focus of network security, risk management, mitigation and resilience techniques. A multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability assessments and the design and implementation of mitigation strategies is required, while cybersecurity and wireless professionals alike require both greater awareness and sophisticated tools. Assuring the space-based capability must be the principal driver of the agenda. The industry needs to take stock of the GNSS vulnerabilities and develop pragmatic approaches to countering them,41exploring and adapting new technologies, and building in redundancies.42 This will include ascertaining the prevalence of unintentional jamming and interference, and how jamming and spoofing play out in the realm of offensive state-initiated cyberattacks or may be used by terrorist groups.