Canada will say no–they’re working closely with China over cybersecurity, but the plan puts them on the backburner
Dan Bousfield 17, researcher at the university of western Ontario, 8/2017, “Revisiting Cyber-Diplomacy: Canada-China Relations Online”, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319142200_Revisiting_Cyber-Diplomacy_Canada-China_Relations_Online
New avenues of Cyber-Diplomacy between Canada and China emerged during US House Intelligence Committee hearings over the Chinese manufacturers Huawei and ZTE Inc. (U.S. Panel, 2012). American concerns about close links between these companies and the Chinese government have led to bans on their products in the American national broadband network (China’s Huawei, 2012). The US government drew upon national security concerns to politicize the Chinese regulation of network effects, forcing Huawei to abandon its expansion into the American market and to look instead toward Europe (Pfanner, 2012). Protectionism through national security is not new, and cyber threats can be used to undermine the liberal commitments to trade (seen most recently in the tensions following the US election). However, as a middle power in the postwar era, Canada has long been able to leverage its autonomy to facilitate greater coordination and cooperation between states. In the past this was linked to the cultivation of a strong Pearsonian peacekeeping mythos. However, increasingly, Canada has characterized its geopolitical image in terms of commerce and finance (Bousfield, 2013). The Cyber-Diplomacy of Canada’s support for the Chinese ICT industry presents new avenues for expanded engagement. In particular, despite Canadian involvement in North American security arrangements, the Canadian government has been much more willing to work with Chinese ICT firms to foster the image of being a ‘Silicon Valley North’ and it has worked closely with Chinese ICT providers. In addition, Huawei recently sponsored a report from the Economist Intelligence Unit on the extent to which countries were ICT globalized, ranking Canada in the top 10 (The ICT Globalisation Index, 2014). It is important to note that the report highlighted how cyber-security was not a primary concern in the relationship between developing and developed countries, and that ICT globalization also required support for ICT R&D, for which Canada was ranked first (The ICT Globalisation Index, 2014). Thus, there are opportunities for network efforts to facilitate ICT globalization despite geopolitical security concerns, and ways for middle-power countries such as Canada to mobilize their ICT strengths.
The impact of network effects and ICT development in Canada establish a foundation for parallels with China while establishing the importance of the academy in facilitating non-state 1054 D. Bousfield diplomacies. This stems from what Marshall Beier has characterized as the struggles of Canadian autonomy—namely, the tension between adopting independent policy positions while also being overshadowed and influenced by closeness to the American hegemon (Beier, 2005). Specifically, Canada’s longstanding cooperation in the ‘Five Eyes Intelligence Community’ and the 1946 UK/USA intelligence agreement has meant that Communications Security Establishment Canada has remained heavily classified and thus largely unable to engage in public debates about cyber issues (Cox, 2012). As Barry and Bratt have described, Canada’s security strategies are a ‘defense against help’, that is, doing enough to prevent the United States from acting unilaterally on Canada’s behalf (Barry & Bratt, 2008). This situation also explains Canada’s limited funding to securitize cyberspace, its delay in formulating a cyberpolicy framework, and its relative lack of transparency about its cyber policy options (Levin, Goodrick, & Ilkina, 2013; Van der Meulen, 2013). Secrecy, combined with Canada’s desire to preserve market autonomy in the face of American ICT network effects, has produced an oligopolistic ISP market with close ties to government interests. Because the government’s goals have been determined by the national interest in responding to global market forces, discussions in Canada about user actions and social preferences have fallen to non-state forums.
Cyber-Diplomacy in China remains defined by strong state centralization and efforts to pursue regulation through traditional diplomatic forums. Whereas Canada’s middlepowerdom has been characterized by a reliance on American security mechanisms, China is increasingly using traditional sites of diplomacy, such as the UN, to pursue its right to manage internet access. Proposals from China, Russia and Tajikistan have utilized intergovernmental forums to push for acceptance of circumscribed internet rights and efforts to push private governance of the internet web addresses (through the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) into systems of governance more directly controlled by nation states (General Assembly, 2011). The legitimacy of the UN system, combined with the justifications for sovereign control of the amorphous security threats online gives China wide latitude to institute Cyber-Diplomacy as it chooses. One common impact is China’s ability to enforce the removal of references to the GFC from UN publications and literature, exposing the susceptibility of Other Diplomacies to hierarchical governance (Deibert, 2012b). Yet, as Montsion argues, China’s ability to access non-traditional economic actors such as Canadian indigenous groups over the internet also speaks to challenge Other Diplomacies can pose to states (Montsion, 2016). Given that Canada and China have several regions defined by graduated sovereignty, the significance of Other Diplomacies is likely to continue. As the Hong Kong protests demonstrated, the ability to constrain the horizontal capabilities of the internet is a complex relationship between nationalism, regulatory capacity and local resistance.