Too many groups can cyber-attack satellites---terrorists certainly have the capability to inflict catastrophic damage
David Livingstone 16, associate fellow at Chatham House, was policy lead on Military Aid to the Civil Powers at the UK Ministry of Defence between 1994 and 1999; and Patricia M. Lewis is the research director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, September 2016, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf
Cyberthreats against space-based systems may be classified as follows:
• States setting out to create military advantages in space, or seeking to steal strategic quantities of intellectual property and having sufficient computing power to crack encryption codes, for example;
• Often well-resourced organized criminal elements seeking financial gain;
• Terrorist groups wishing to promote their causes, even up to the catastrophic level of satellite collisions with space debris including a cascade of collisions – called the Kessler Effect,23 denying the use of space for all actors;
• Individual hackers who simply want to prove and fanfare their skills;
• Any combinations of the organizations and individuals above.
And their methods would be:24
• Jamming, spoofing and hacking attacks on, for example, communication networks, by using space infrastructure;
• Attacks on satellites, by targeting their control systems or mission packages, perhaps taking control of the satellite to exploit its inherent capabilities, shut it down, alter its orbit (perhaps thereby ‘weaponizing’ it), or ‘cook’ or ‘grill’ its solar cells through deliberate exposure to damaging levels of highly ionizing radiation;
• Attacks on the ground infrastructure, such as satellite control centres, the associated networks and data centres, leading to potential global impacts (for example on weather forecasting systems, which use large quantities of space-derived data).
International cooperation will be crucial in any response to space-based cyberthreats, and is at the heart of current debates, for the following reasons:
• Large numbers of satellites orbit the Earth, traversing all territories, and their uplinks and downlinks are transmitted via ground stations from all around the world;
• These satellites are used worldwide, whether for communications, Earth observation or precise navigation and timing capabilities;
• Satellites are built with components from an internationalized supply chain.
Space is thus no longer a technological playground for the privileged few countries involved in sending humans to the moon, spying on others or putting communications leviathans into geostationary orbit.
For some states, there is still the simple allure of national prestige to be gained by entering the space race, with the successful launch of a sovereign vehicle being seen as a demonstration of technological achievement. More importantly, however, an ever increasing number of countries and private enterprises are commissioning satellites or buying timeshares in satellites for an equivalent number of reasons; and market forces and technological advances are leading to lower-cost launches, smaller and more reliable satellites, and satellite constellations that can provide aggregated capability. As service providers become more aware of how space can be used, they are looking to satellites to deliver reliable, cheap and persistent capabilities that support commercial enterprises.