That solves.
Zhang Tuosheng ‘21 ,academic committee member at the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University, and also Chairman of the Academic Committee, Grandview Institution. "Strengthening crisis management, the most urgent task in current China–US and China–Japan security relations." China International Strategy Review 3, no. 1 (2021): 34-55. // Ali
First, at present and in the foreseeable future, the focus of China–US crisis management should be placed on issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and cyberspace. Among these issues, security frictions in the South China Sea and on cybersecurity have emerged as the newest challenges for China and the US over the past 10 years. When strengthening crisis management measures, it is necessary to clarify each party’s bottom line as soon as possible. With regard to the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, after long-term consultation, both China and the US have a clearer idea of the other’s bottom line. The key to crisis avoidance lies in never crossing one another’s bottom line. In the long run, the East China Sea and outer space will also become important areas that require strengthened crisis management.
Second, for the time being, China and the US should redouble their efforts to prevent contingencies in the sea or air due to the potential for misunderstanding, miscalculation, or accidental discharge of fire. The two sides must earnestly strengthen the military maritime consultation mechanism; strictly observe the rules of conduct for air and maritime encounters in order to ensure safety, as well as the mechanism of notification of major military activities plus the two annexes; and constantly enrich and improve these rules and mechanisms in practice. To this end, in addition to holding annual meetings to analyze the overall situation and evaluate various risks, relevant departments must strengthen regular and ad hoc consultations to eliminate hidden dangers in a timely manner and minimize security risks.
Third, while trying to resume and strengthen security and defense dialogues, the two sides should make crisis management an important item on their agendas. To this end, they must strive to create conditions to first resume the diplomatic and security dialogue (or the defense consultation), the joint staffs dialogue, the annual meeting of the military maritime consultation, and the law enforcement and cyber-security dialogue. These dialogues should cover setting up and improving bilateral crisis communication mechanisms, establishing various confidence- and security-building measures (including codes of conduct in the sea, air, space, and cyber-space), and ways to avoid the militarization of the South China Sea. In addition, the two sides should work hard to launch, as soon as possible, a strategic stability dialogue53 that focuses on nuclear strategy, nuclear development strategy, and related cybersecurity issues, as well as outer space security, missile defense deployment, and new conventional strategic weapons, and touches upon crisis stability and confidence-building measures in the nuclear field.
Fourth, China and the US should explicitly assign a crisis management function to the head-of-state and defense hotlines and strengthen the function to ensure the hotlines’ role in crisis prevention and control. To this end, the two sides should try to set up more frequent phone conversations and allow them to happen on short notice, thus giving full play to the hotlines’ role in exchanging information promptly, clarifying intentions, and sending clear signals. To establish crisis communication more quickly, the two sides should also seriously consider establishing a military hotline at the theater level. The various hotlines may, of course, be used in peacetime, but their function during a crisis is critical. The head-of-state hotline did not serve such a function during the 1999 embassy bombing incident and the 2001 aircraft collision incident. This history must not repeat itself.
Fifth, in addition to the various hotlines, the two sides should also give full play to the role of emergency communication through Chinese and American embassies and special envoys. The two should also set up a joint working group to respond to emergencies and task it with collecting and sharing risk information; discussing crisis prevention, control, and response plans; engaging in crisis communication as soon as possible and making recommendations to decision makers; and carrying out post-crisis review and evaluation. The joint working group may be placed under the diplomatic and security dialogue and led directly by the foreign and defense departments.
Sixth, the top leaders of the two countries and militaries should reach a common understanding on the basic principles of crisis management. In the Track 2 dialogue on security crisis management, experts from the two sides jointly proposed several basic principles of crisis management, such as “maintaining direct channels of communication and sending clear and specific signals”, “escalating slowly and responding in a tit-for-tat manner”, “acting on interests instead of ideology”, “exercising restraint in using extreme pressure and avoiding commitment traps”, and “dividing hard-to-resolve disputes into smaller, more manageable issues and aiming at gradual resolution”(Zhang and Swaine 2007, 7–10). If agreed upon and adopted, these basic principles will serve crisis management between China and the US well.
Seventh, China and the US should continue supporting and strengthening the role of Track 2 dialogues. Over the years, as a supplement to intergovernmental interactions, dialogues hosted by think tanks have played a positive role in helping the two sides conduct security cooperation, manage differences and crises, reduce mis-understanding and miscalculations, and increase mutual trust. Now that security and defense dialogues between the two governments are bogged down in difficulties, the various Track 2 security dialogues, such as the China–US Security Dialogue, China–US Strategic Nuclear Dynamics Dialogue, China–US Security Crisis Management Dialogue, and China–US Cybersecurity Dialogue, should be further boosted instead of being suspended.