Limiting Chinese capabilities is the wrong approach. Implicit understandings should establish that destructive capabilities are only there for deterrence---clarifies thresholds.
Andrew S. Erickson ’19, Professor of strategy and the research director in the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and a visiting professor in full-time residence in Harvard University's Department of Government. “U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations: Policy Considerations in a Changing Environment”, Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (JULY 2019), pp. 123-144 // Ali
Fifth, even absent related agreements, it is possible to pursue some measure of mutual restraint in the most dangerous and volatile areas. On the positive side of the ledger, some degree of cooperation is possible even when both parties face a security dilemma, although factors such as offense vs. defense, technology, and geography must be considered with particular care.43 Yet negotiating durable agreements under a great-power security dilemma can be extremely difficult, as both sides have incentives to cheat, and no outside party can adjudicate effectively.44 Each side’s belief that the other will simply pocket any concessions without reciprocal actions or benefits strongly disincentivizes unilateral restraint or accommodation. Fortunately, effective arms control and deterrence relations need not be limited to formal treaties; they simply require arranging forces in such a way that neither side has the incentive to act adversely toward the other. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin’s explication of this issue is worth considering in depth.45 A broader, more flexible form of engagement that applies Schelling and Halperin’s conceptual approach to focus on reducing the incentives to use capabilities rather than reducing the capabilities themselves can thus address U.S. and Chinese concerns that would render aspects of formal agreements deal-breakers. China appears absolutely unwilling to accept technical inferiority, and any agreement that attempts to keep the PLA in such a position will fail; nor will the United States voluntarily relinquish capabilities that it has labored and invested to develop, particularly in the face of a security dilemma. Informal understandings may evolve over time through informal communication, and may even lead to more explicit agreements.46 The overall strategic positions of the United States and China are relatively clear; it may be difficult to justify extensive dialogues that fail to go beyond policy platitudes. What could be useful to discuss are operational and perhaps even tactical specifics, which remain far less clear. The most realistic possibility to pursue over time is therefore some form of implicit, non-treaty-based understanding between the United States and China that even if the use of certain lower-end capabilities may be impossible to rule out, other types of capabilities are primarily for deterrence rather than actual operational use. This would help clarify thresholds, an important aspect of risk management.47 As explained previously, however, this approach will only be effective to the extent that both sides restrain themselves. It will fail if Beijing expects preemptive or unilateral concessions from Washington.