Solves better---unilateral action key to defend against cyber-attacks on satellites---development and documentation of best standards, guidance, clarification of liability, creation of an ISAC, and collaboration with the industry solely in the US. Also avoids the link to the DOD tradeoff DA --- DHS is the government facilitator.
Gregory Falco 18, Research Fellow with the Belfer Center’s Cyber Security Project at Harvard Kennedy School, July 2018, “Job One for Space Force: Space Asset Cybersecurity”, http://osa-public.s3.amazonaws.com/papers/csp_falco_space_asset-final.pdf, Cyber Security Project \\SYang
What can space asset organizations do? Organizations developing space assets are largely unregulated for cybersecurity purposes. The lack of specific space asset cybersecurity requirements necessitates a considerable degree of self-policing. Without mandatory standards, space asset organizations can improve their security either individually or collectively. What follows are some options to consider: • Employ existing cybersecurity standards and develop new standards for space systems where needed. There is no lack of cybersecurity standards and best practices available for developers to follow when attempting to design and develop secure systems. Many of these standards, like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, are well-documented and widely adopted in some form.28 Most space systems’ security can benefit from using these standards. In some cases, these standards may not apply for the specific technologies used in space systems. For these systems, space asset organizations should create new space asset-specific standards and best practices so that security can be applied consistently across the organization. Vendors of space asset organizations should also be held to these standards. This should involve the explicit testing and demonstration that vendors to these organizations conform to the security standard in place for the space asset organization. • Establish cybersecurity capabilities for mission systems and internal network/server systems. Similarly to what was done at NASA JPL, it is important to establish separate cybersecurity specialists for mission systems and internal networks/server systems. The distinction between the two systems are operational technology versus information technology—each one has very different operating and security requirements and need to be addressed accordingly. 28 Nicole Cieslak. “NIST Cybersecurity Framework Adoption on the Rise.” Tenable. 2016. https://www. tenable.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework-adoption-on-the-rise. To date, congress has provided little guidance in terms of enabling cybersecurity across sectors. One of the few examples includes the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) which was signed into law in late 2015 by President Obama. CISA is meant to help facilitate information sharing between the government and the private sector by limiting the liability of the private sector for certain attack disclosure.29 Congress should develop more laws that could be specifically relevant to space assets. Recommendations concerning these laws follows. • This is Urgent. Act quickly. Be proactive, not reactive. Do not wait to pass a law on space cybersecurity until there is a WannaCry (major ransomware attack that compromised healthcare systems around the world) or Mirai (IoT attack that took down a major DNS provider on the East Coast resulting in downtime for websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Reddit) equivalent for Space. It seems that action only occurs when a disaster strikes. A space cyberattack can have serious consequences as detailed previously and we cannot wait until something happens to pass legislation protecting these critical systems. • Clarify critical infrastructure security requirements to include underlying systems. Currently, policy concerning critical infrastructure security does not require third-party, enabling infrastructure to also comply with the same requirements. Space systems should be held to the same standards of the critical infrastructure on which they rely. • Assign responsibility and liability for cyber. Cybersecurity responsibility and associated liability for a breach should be clarified and assigned for space asset organizations. An important component of cybersecurity legislation currently under review concerns the liability of technology developers, owners and operators. In January 2017, the FTC sued D-Link for the vulnerability in their routers leading to the widespread Mirai botnet attack in October 2016.30 This was the first time a manufacturer was sued for the cybersecurity failures of their devices. Legal guidance concerning where liability falls will encourage the responsible party to take the necessary measures to secure their systems. Today’s lack of clarity around liability for the space asset ecosystem results in poor accountability and inaction to secure these important systems. • Make space asset organizations accountable for cybersecurity. All government contracts with space asset organizations should require the contractor to comply with key performance parameters (KPPs) pertaining to cybersecurity. Today, cybersecurity KPPs are a subcomponent of system survivability KPPs. Cybersecurity KPPs should be firmly enforced for all government contracts. • Expand 32 CFR 236 to include space asset organizations. Currently, the defense industrial base is required to report all cyber incidents that have affected or could affect national security under the Department of Defense-Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Activities Regulation31. Considering the critical posture of space systems and the U.S. reliance on these assets for both national security and critical infrastructure, space asset organizations should be included under this ruling. This would improve cybersecurity transparency between the government and space asset organizations. • Establish a Space System Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). Government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could play a crucial role as a convener for public and private sector entities that work with space systems. The DHS could become an important facilitator for this sector’s efforts to improve cybersecurity by creating a Space System Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The DHS should require participation of government agencies that work with space systems ranging from the Department of Defense (DoD) to NASA to participate in the Space System ISAC. This would provide an incentive for private sector space asset organizations to also join. If 32 CFR 236 were expanded to include space asset organizations, the Space System ISAC could be made compulsory through this requirement. Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much further ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members involved. What can a Space System ISAC do? Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much further ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members involved. The recommendations for what a Space System ISAC should are as follows. • Encourage collaboration among space-relevant organizations. The DHS should require participation of government agencies that work with space systems ranging from the Department of Defense (DoD) to NASA to participate in the Space System ISAC. This would provide an incentive for private sector space asset organizations to also join. If 32 CFR 236 were expanded to include space asset organizations, the Space System ISAC could be made compulsory through this requirement. Sharing threat information across space system agencies and space asset organizations would be a logical step to improve the security posture of the sector. Some agencies or private organizations may be much farther ahead in securing systems than others and sharing insights will help all ISAC members. • Establish information sharing requirements. The Space System ISAC should require member entities to disclose vulnerability and attack information to one another within a predefined period. This would be in the spirit of the UK’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that requires an organization to disclose when personally identifiable information is breached within 72 hours of discovery. • Document and maintain space system cybersecurity best practices and standards. Member organizations should share internal or contractor standards for cybersecurity in a manner that does not release sensitive information. A master list of best practices should be shared across the Space System ISAC and curated. Member organizations can comment on the merits of the best practices and cater existing cybersecurity standards to be highly relevant to the idiosyncrasies of space systems. • Cooperate with ISACs for other critical infrastructure sectors that rely on space systems. Because space systems underpin other sectors, certain threat information for space systems should be shared with the relevant sectors that might be affected if an attack occurs. The Space System ISAC should work with the oil/gas, electricity and emergency services ISAC to communicate threats that are relevant to these critical infrastructure and services. The potentially affected critical infrastructure organizations could then work with the space asset organizations to remediate the vulnerability where appropriate.