Unilateral cyber sanctions solves all of their internal links---best mode of deterrence.
Iryna Bogdanova and María Vásquez Callo-Müller 21, research fellow at the World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Berne, post-doctoral researcher at the University of Lucerne, December 7, 2021, “Unilateral Economic Sanctions to Deter and Punish Cyber-Attacks: Are They Here to Stay?”, https://www.ejiltalk.org/unilateral-economic-sanctions-to-deter-and-punish-cyber-attacks-are-they-here-to-stay/#:~:text=Unilateral%20cyber%20sanctions%20are%20restrictive,in%20other%20malicious%20cyber%20activities. \\SYang
When international cooperation fails to take root, unilateralism blossoms – as we see in the field of cybersecurity. Unilateral cyber sanctions are restrictive economic measures of a temporary nature imposed against individuals, legal entities, government bodies and officials that conduct or facilitate cyber-attacks or engage in other malicious cyber activities. They are imposed without any prior authorization of a regional or an international organization, i.e., according to states’ domestic laws.
The 2014 cyber-attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, as a result of which private data, including unreleased movies, was stolen and emails were hacked as well as thousands of confidential documents were leaked, paved the way for the US cyber sanctions targeting North Korea, thus adding pressure to one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. In the following years, the United States expanded its cyber sanctions framework and used it to sanction malicious actors as well as states sponsoring them.
The European Union introduced a new framework for cyber sanctions in 2019 and the first cyber sanctions were announced in July 2020. Several non-EU member states expressed their desire to align with the EU cyber sanctions. The United Kingdom closely follows the EU cyber sanctions and enacted the Cyber Sanctions Regulations, which came into force on the exit day.
Leaving aside the politically salient debate on the legality of unilateral economic sanctions, the next paragraphs are devoted to the analysis of international law obligations that unilateral cyber sanctions may breach. A more in-depth analysis can be found here.
The existing cyber sanctions target government bodies as well as senior government officials and thus may entail freezing of government bodies’ assets along with travel bans on senior government officials. Freezing of government bodies’ assets may in theory violate the customary international law of state immunity, yet it is debatable. In particular, whether state property benefits from the enforcement immunity irrespective of the existence of a court proceeding is unsettled. Travel bans preventing senior government officials from fulfilling their functions encroach on the immunities guaranteed to such officials under international law, but this immunity entitlement is only guaranteed to the officials who represent the government and hence travel to other states for that purpose.
The consistency of unilateral cyber sanctions with the minimum due process rights may be questioned. For example, persons targeted under the EU cyber sanctions regime are guaranteed the right to good administration, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, which are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These guarantees are frequently invoked in disputes questioning the EU economic sanctions. Besides due process rights, other possible grounds to question the legality of unilateral cyber sanctions are the right to property, the right for family and private life and a prohibition of attacks on honour and reputation that are guaranteed under various international human rights treaties as well as domestic laws.
Against this backdrop, states may advance an argument that cyber sanctions are justified as countermeasures. Indeed, states are allowed to impose countermeasures if certain preconditions are met. First and foremost, there should be a previous violation of international law, which is remedied by countermeasures. Second, such violation should be attributed to a state. Third, countermeasures should not affect obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, countermeasures should be proportional, temporary and adopted only after the procedural prerequisites were fulfilled. Even a shallow analysis demonstrates that the possibility to justify cyber sanctions as countermeasures is hindered by two main hurdles: the lack of internationally agreed obligations regulating malicious behaviour in cyberspace and the attribution of cyberattacks to a state under the rules of state responsibility.
Unilateral cyber sanctions may also violate bilateral agreements of economic nature and WTO commitments. By imposing unilateral cyber sanctions that either entail a complete economic boycott of sanctioned persons, as it is the case with the US cyber sanctions, or prohibit the provision of funds and economic resources to sanctioned individuals and entities as the EU regulations prescribe, states are blatantly acting in contradiction to their professed WTO commitments. Whether such actions can be justified either under national security exceptions embedded in bilateral agreements or under the WTO national security clause is debatable. Moreover, cyber sanctions, such as freezing of assets, property and interests in property can result in legal claims of indirect expropriation, violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment and other standards of treatment incorporated in international investment agreements.
On a normative value of cyber sanctions, they may signal “red lines” of unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace and in such a way contribute towards the formulation of rules on responsible behaviour in cyberspace.
Given the ever-growing digitalization of all aspects of life and a steadily increasing number of cyber-attacks, it is expected that states would increasingly rely upon unilateral cyber sanctions to deter and punish cyber-attacks as well as their perpetrators. In this context, one may ponder what role is left for multilateralism when society is faced with imminent threats and there is a lack of effective international cooperation and whether in such circumstances unilateralism should be discussed and explored more openly?