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Solves their internal links about attacks on allied countries---US unilateral action enables it to act as a cyber framework nation for allies and causes follow-on.

Franklin D. Kramer 17, Robert J. Butler, Catherine Lotrionte, distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council; retired U.S. Air Force colonel and a former member of the Defense Department’s Senior Executive Service, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space Policy; Senior Associate at CSIS and a Senior Fellow at the McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security at Auburn University and former Brent Scowcroft scholar at the Atlantic Council, “Cyber and Deterrence: The Military-Civil Nexus in High-End Conflict”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep03691.8.pdf \\SYang

In a conflict, cyber security will be as or more important in forward theaters as it will be in the United States. Most US allies and partners do not have the same cyber capabilities as DoD, yet it will be their infrastructures and national capabilities that US forces will be relying upon for numerous tasks. Accordingly, the concept of “extended cyber deterrence” will be an important role for the DoD in connection with each of the theaters noted above. The concepts are set forth in the issue brief “Cyber, Extended Deterrence, and ATO,”90 but their application goes beyond NATO to all arenas where US critical interests are intertwined with allies and partners. Most obviously, the United States will continue to develop doctrine and capabilities to provide for the effective use of cyberspace in a conflict as part of US war-fighting capabilities. As noted above, cyber tools potentially could disrupt an adversary’s communications, logistics, sensors, and military supporting infrastructure. The secretary of defense has stated that cyber is currently being used in the conflict with ISIS,91 and NATO has recently designated cyber an operational domain.92 Cyber will continue to be integrated into combat planning. Cyber security will be important not only for US forward forces, but also for the militaries and the critical infrastructures of host nations. It is notable that in each of the theaters that the United States plans for, the potential adversary has been identified as the source of significant cyber intrusions. Russia is responsible for the hacking of the Democratic National Committee, among many other cyber incidents.93 China is responsible for the attack on the Office of Personnel Management and Chinese officers have been indicted for continued cyber espionage.94 Iran is behind the tack on Saudi Arabia’s oil company and Iranian hackers have been indicted for attacks on American banks.95 North Korea is behind the attack on Sony and has regularly attacked South Korean networks.96 What these attacks demonstrate is the vulnerability of host nations to cyberattack, a vulnerability that could significantly undercut deterrence or the capacity of the United States and its allies and partners to prevail in a conflict. To mitigate such vulnerability, three key elements should be used: First, the United States needs to act as a “cyber framework nation” to support host nation capabilities. This would involve the establishment, transfer, training, and support of cyber capabilities to enhance protection, resilience, and restoration. For example, the United States could help a less cyber-capable ally establish an effective intrusion protection system, provide forensic support, and develop resilience capabilities to be utilized in the event of an attack by an adversary. There are several ways to undertake such efforts but one of the most useful would be to utilize the National Guard’s State Partnership Program. The program pairs state National Guard units with seventy-six countries.97 As noted above, the National Guard is substantially increasing its cyber capabilities, including its focus on critical infrastructures. That expertise can be utilized in working with allies and partners in conjunction with the relevant combatant command. The National Guard’s partnership efforts can build on what the NMTs and the National Guard are doing in the United States, adapted, of course, to the particulars of the host nation. The National Guard could also be part of an initiative to provide “fly away” cyber-warfare teams to provide host nation states’ “blue team” assistance to “operate in degraded environments,” including providing malware forensics and recovery/restoration support. In addition to the National Guard, the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3) could have a valuable international role. DC3’s current mission revolves around five focus areas: digital forensics, cyber training, technical solutions, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity, and analytics.98 Like the Guard, DC3 provides tremendous depth and breadth of support; applied to international requirements it could enhance a greater USG role through a modest budget. DC3’s mission could be expanded to support extended cyber deterrence, especially in the areas of building greater allied cyber resilience. Key elements could include growing international training and information-sharing programs for allies (similar to ongoing programs with DIB companies in the United States). Second, associated with US assistance, it will be important for the host nation to establish operational partnerships with key private entities, including ISPs and power grid operators. As discussed in the context of the United States, military, telecommunications, and electrical grid operators should help create, in advance, capabilities that would mitigate a high-end attack. The United States, as a cyber framework nation, would help the host nation organize for this effort. Depending on the theater, it may be important to undertake such efforts on a regional, as opposed to a national, basis. Again, the United States will be well positioned to help create the necessary regional activities. Third, host nations will need to undertake steps comparable to those identified for the United States. These include • identifying highest-priority national military cyber assets and supporting telecom and power grid networks that would need to be protected; • extending/enhancing automated intrusion protection and developing resilience efforts, starting with data classification and segmentation, to participating host nations’ militaries, telecommunication companies, and electrical grids. It will be important to utilize high-end protection capabilities, such as multi-factor authentication, end-to-end data encryption, and diverse and redundant networks to ensure best information ssurance practices in data confidentiality, integrity, and availability; • increasing detection capabilities by provisioning shared cyber threat intelligence capabilities. A cyber threat intelligence capability would develop and share cyber indications and warnings regarding the movement of high-end state cyberthreat activity towards host nation networks and information assets; and • developing cyber defense “playbooks” and training exercises for cyber-attack response, with techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) developed to maximize the value of the defense and resilience capabilities noted above. National grid and telecommunications partners in the private sector would be included as part of the playbook TTPs and training exercises. As previously discussed by the authors: “Initially, the cyber framework nation can help to establish or enhance an existing national framework. Over time, simulations, exercises, and information sharing will help direct and prioritize other efforts by exposing gaps and opportunities. Joint exercises, when effective, usually result in some degree of information sharing. Explicit and incidental information sharing, especially between private and public sector partners, will be a critical requirement if operational protection and/or resilience is to be achieved. Each country should pick a model it finds compatible, but the keys are a combination of speed and full interchange. In the US, one of the most effective models is the ‘Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), a nonprofit organization that provides a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure and providing two-way sharing of information between the private and public sector.’ ISACs are typically developed around a critical infrastructure sector, such as the electrical grid or telecommunications sectors. The Financial Services ISAC is often considered the greater among equals, as it has a highly automated system for rapid cyber threat information exchange.”99 As the foregoing indicates, cyber will be a critical element of high-end conflict. Enhancing deterrence and defense will require extensive actions by allied and host nation militaries along with civil authorities and the ISPs and grid operators in the host nation. VI. CONCLUSION High-end conflict will create challenging requirements for cyber, far beyond those that are already faced on an ongoing basis. The DoD needs to work with civil authorities and the ISPs and grid operators in the United States and forward theaters to create the prospects for deterrence and, if necessary, to defend and prevail in conflict.

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