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Solves NC3---forensics techniques, backdoor reduction, shift in architecture, honeypots can be implemented solely by the US.

Dr. Jared Dunnmon 17, postdoctoral fellow in the Computer Science Department at Stanford, xx/xx/2017, “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining Surety in Outer Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23162.5.pdf \\SYang

One approach to the above scenarios would be an in-depth analysis of each question to determine exactly how the United States should respond. However, in light of substantial modernization to the NC3 system currently planned and under way, it is perhaps most useful to consider technological and policy avenues that could be pursued with the goal of ensuring that the above scenarios, each of which is fraught with uncertainty around nuclear intentions and appropriate U.S. response, would never come to pass. Distinct sets of technology and policy recommendations intended to inform discussion around modernization and design of the future nuclear enterprise are presented below. Technological Directions Several concrete technological initiatives would help reduce operational uncertainty and ensure resilient NC3 functionality. Apply Advanced Forensics Techniques All NC3 satellites should be outfitted with advanced forensics capability. Motion sensors, heat sensors, and EM intensity sensors should be emplaced in order to assess whether any given satellite inoperability resulted from external physical attack. For protection from cyber attack, domestic control over supply chains should be pursued to reduce the possibility of backdoors, insecure or undocumented protocols, and hard-coded credentials. Finally, in addition to traditional antivirus scans of satellite software, commercially available assessments based on computationally efficient code-level machine learning tools that proactively detect both new variants and repackaged versions of existing malware should be implemented.48 Such methods should prove powerful in reducing the possibility of a successful cyber attack on NC3 systems. Emphasize Modern Network Defense Techniques in NC3 Traditionally, network defense has focused on keeping attackers outside of a virtual “wall,” while keeping all critical functionality accessible to those with valid credentials. In today’s democratized cyber environment, cost to attackers is substantially lower than cost to defenders. Thus it is useful to consider moving toward an architecture that is more akin to a building with all of its doors open, but riddled with traps and misdirection. As NC3 is modernized to utilize Internet-based protocols,49 for instance, considering widespread implementation of mechanisms designed to increase costs to attackers via such methods as honeypots, script white-listing, and address scrambling would help to deter and frustrate potential attackers. Honeypots, or environments that look like useful targets to an attacker but are in fact benign, can be particularly useful in enabling U.S. personnel to identify candidate attack vectors and enact defenses before critical systems are compromised. Script white-listing entails using efficient data structures to enable a computer to run only code with a bit representation that has been explicitly pre-specified as part of an allowed execution set. Finally, address space scrambling methods such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) protect from common buffer overflow attacks by randomly arranging address space positions of key portions of a process, such that an attacker cannot jump between different points reliably. As a higher-level consideration, the United States should consider the idea that it is generally not possible to be completely sure that a networked computer system has not been compromised. If an adversary informed the United States that it had compromised U.S. NC3 and that surety of the nuclear deterrent had been affected, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the United States to prove otherwise, which fundamentally undermines the strength of the U.S. deterrent posture. Thus, it is imperative that the United States be able to viably make the argument that compromising the entirety of NC3 would be a statistical impossibility; and for this to occur, there must exist no possible mechanism for a single point of failure. While the command, control, and communications triad architecture ensures this posture adequately from a physical standpoint, it is imperative that NC3 systems be constructed with the same ideas in mind. Specifically, the United States should consider a fractionated NC3 network design, with a large number of sub-networks, each secured via different sets of protocols or standards. In this case, it would be nearly impossible for an adversary to convince either itself, the United States, or third parties that the surety of the U.S. nuclear deterrent could be fully compromised by what would effectively be a first cyber strike. Minimize Code Base Size As systems are modernized to take advantage of twenty-first century information technology (IT), the temptation will exist to implement a great deal of additional functionality. While there may exist substantial operational benefits to additional features, these should always be balanced with the reality that more code almost always equates to more vulnerability—and NC3 is an area wherein a vulnerability could result in mistakes of nuclear import.50 Thus, the usual analysis around the cost-benefit trade-off of IT upgrades may not apply to NC3 systems, and this reality should be taken into account in system design processes. Maintain Small-Scale Launch and Inexpensive NC3 Communications Hardware A particularly interesting suggestion put forth by Dr. John Harvey, former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense, is that “small, single-purpose ‘cheap-SATs’ to replenish lost communication or GPS [global positioning system] functionality” could improve system-level resilience of space-based NC3 assets. Instead of or in addition to large, multifunctional satellites, leveraging the widespread proliferation of small, inexpensive CubeSats51 that cost on the order of $100,00052 to construct and launch could substantially reduce overall system cost and improve reliability. In addition to allowing inexpensive system updates as technology improves, these small satellites would be extremely difficult to target for ASAT operators. Further, since Dr. Harvey’s address in 2014, small-scale launch technology has seen significant advances. In fact, several commercial entities currently have the technology to offer 150-kilogram payloads to sun-synchronous orbit (500-kilometer altitude) on a single dedicated rocket costing only $5 million.53 These rockets could be retained specifically for emergency NC3 launches as backups to current satellites. In this way, expensive AEHF satellites that would require an expensive, large-scale launch to reconstitute would be supplemented or ultimately replaced by a small satellite and dedicated launch ecosystem that would result in a substantially more resilient NC3 system. Moving to a reserve of small satellites as a backup for the NC3 network would also have the advantage of increasing the number of possible launch sites the United States can use. At present, only a handful exist, and these are well-known to any potential adversary.54 Decrease Reliance on Space-Based NC3 In addition to shoring up the reliability of space-based NC3, ultimately decreasing U.S. reliance on these assets would likely enhance overall NC3 surety.55 In particular, relying more on the various airborne components of the NC3 system and deploying “long-range airborne communications relay networks that could be stood up on short notice” would potentially mitigate the vulnerabilities posed by cyber threats to space-based assets. This risk reduction would result not only from the ability to more rapidly deploy space-based systems, but also from the simple reality that 50. Danzig, Surviving on a Diet of Poisoned Fruit. 51. A variety of companies (e.g., Planet Labs), universities, national labs (e.g., Los Alamos National Laboratory), and research institutions already fly multiple CubeSats. 52. “Commercial Space Launch Schedule and Pricing,” Spaceflight.com, accessed 31 July 2016, http://www.spaceflight .com/schedule-pricing/. 53. “Space Is Now Open for Business,” Rocket Lab, accessed 31 July 2016, https://www.rocketlabusa.com/. 54. Ellis, personal conversation with the author. 55. Rose, “Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-Term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment.” This content downloaded from 67.194.16.231 on Fri, 24 Jun 2022 18:46:22 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 30 Project on Nuclear Issues performing diagnostics and updates on hardware that is not in outer space is a far simpler process than the reverse.56 Policy Considerations Carefully Consider Unilateral Action: Anticipatory Self-Defense and Belligerent Reprisal Given the Tallinn Manual’s clear authorization of anticipatory self-defense and the potentially dire consequences of the scenarios outlined above, it would be prudent to pursue a national policy that enables U.S. intervention to combat the development of cyber capabilities that would compromise NC3. In the context of peacetime international law, this would likely entail either claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction over those developing anti-NC3 cyber capabilities and/or claiming anticipatory self-defense if an attack is imminent. Were the United States to already be engaged in an armed conflict, the functional equivalent of anticipatory self-defense would be legally termed belligerent reprisal.57 In this case, if the United States views attacks on NC3 as outside the boundaries established by the LOAC, the question would become whether a proportional attack on opponent (potentially on their NC3) would be appropriate, and, if so, what form that proportional response would take. Even in the case that U.S. NC3 is compromised, for instance, it is still desirable from the U.S. point of view for the adversary’s NC3 systems to be able to verify that the United States has not launched a nuclear attack. Thus, in the context of belligerent reprisal, it is critical to make a clear policy decision on what constitutes a proportional, but practically optimal response to an attack on U.S. NC3.

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