Solves -- the IEGC will develop and enforce cybersecurity standards regarding the electric grid.
Bipartisan Policy Center 14, Washington, D.C.–based think tank that promotes bipartisanship, February 2014, “Cybersecurity and the North American Electric Grid: New Policy Approaches to Address an Evolving Threat”, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Cybersecurity-Electric-Grid-BPC.pdf \\SYang
NERC should continue to develop and enforce cybersecurity standards in a manner that is consistent with a risk-management approach and that provides affected entities with compliance flexibility. FERC and applicable authorities in Canada should be supportive of this approach in their review of NERC standards. n The electric power industry should establish an organization, similar to INPO, that would develop cybersecurity performance criteria and best practices for the entire industry. This organization would be intended to complement the standards process that is in place at NERC. We encourage the industry to establish such an organization before a significant cybersecurity event occurs and requires a rapid response. A centralized, industry-governed institution may be in the best position to promote effective strategies for managing cyber threats that could have broader systemic impacts. This effort should include the full range of generation, transmission, and distribution providers and market operators in the North American power sector, including municipal utilities and electric cooperatives. It should be funded through member dues. We envision that this organization—which we will call, for purposes of this discussion, the Institute for Electric Grid Cybersecurity (hereafter, the institute)— would be charged with several activities: • Development of performance criteria and cybersecurity evaluations. The institute would develop performance criteria and best practices for cybersecurity and perform detailed evaluations of individual facilities according to these criteria. Performance criteria and best practices should be tailored to address conditions for individual companies and systems, taking into account their contribution to larger systemic risks. • Analysis of systemic risks. With industry’s assistance, the institute should conduct analyses to identify facilities or locations on the system, and in particular the distribution system, where a localized cyber event could have disproportionate implications for the broader electric grid or for economic or national security. For example, there may be places on the grid where, because of system interdependencies, the loss of a particular substation could trigger a cascade of impacts in multiple critical infrastructure sectors. While many utilities have taken inventories to identify critical facilities or customers, a broader national inventory, combined with modeling and scenario analysis, should help to identify priority areas for cybersecurity investment from the perspective of protecting the grid as a whole. • Event analysis. While NERC, FERC, state and provincial agencies, and potentially federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies are likely to be involved in analyzing significant cybersecurity events, the institute should play a role in understanding the cause of such events and disseminating lessons learned. • Technical assistance. The institute should provide technical support to entities that need assistance implementing performance criteria. It should also facilitate the use of cybersecurity tools—such as the ES-C2M2—produced by industry and government partnerships. • Training and accreditation. The institute should engage in efforts to define positions and career paths for utility cybersecurity professionals. The institute could partner with, or potentially house, ongoing efforts to develop cybersecurity certifications.