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Ambiguity specifically solves non-state actors – spills over to responding to state actors which solves case.

Łukasz Kulesa 19; Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, MA in International Relations from the Faculty of Law of Jagiellonian university; 11/28/19, "The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures," https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-deterrence-effectiveness-and-limitations-of-conventional-and-nuclear-postures-pub-80440

NATO needs to be careful about defining and signaling its redlines. Making these boundaries too specific could embolden adversaries to intensify their actions below NATO’s declared threshold of response. Being deliberately ambiguous and raising the fear of retribution may be more useful for encouraging adversaries’ self-restraint.

At the same time, NATO should aim to deter specific types of particularly threatening unconventional activities. These include major and sophisticated cyber attacks against allies’ military forces and critical military and civilian infrastructure, proxy military and special forces operations, and state-sponsored terrorism. NATO could declare that such activities may lead it to invoke Article 5 and respond in various ways, including asymmetrically (for example, the response to a cyber attack may not involve only cyber capabilities).

The alliance must be able to identify early whether and when unconventional and hybrid gray-zone actions have become a more substantial and coordinated campaign. In such a case, NATO should aim to deter the adversary from escalating further. This requires increasing the alliance’s capacity to share early-warning intelligence and pool national intelligence-gathering, investigation, and attribution capabilities. NATO should not shy away from attributing ongoing operations to state adversaries, relying on national data as needed. The alliance and its members should be prepared to use direct channels of communication and other means to deliver immediate deterrence signaling in specific cases.

On the Southern flank, NATO faces state actors that use unconventional tactics and proxy forces (for example, Iran and Syria); state collapse and the emergence of ungoverned spaces in Libya, Yemen, and parts of the Sahel; and the activities of a range of nonstate actors, from loose groups to terrorist and criminal networks to highly organized quasi-state structures like Hezbollah. Cooperation with regional partners in addressing these threats will be vital. NATO’s primary task, as elsewhere, should be to deter states in the region from using unconventional tactics against NATO and its allies, using signaling and attribution tools. When possible, the alliance should aim to affect the calculus of nonstate actors to prevent them from harming alliance interests. This may not work with jihadist groups but may be possible with actors motivated by political or economic interests.

Since many of the unconventional threats are not linked to specific regions or actors, a more general approach is called for. The alliance and its members need to continue investing in passive and active measures to neutralize unconventional threats, including in peacetime. Further developing cyber defense and offensive capabilities—NATO’s toolbox for countering hybrid tactics—and strengthening resilience can affect adversaries’ willingness to use unconventional means against NATO and thus help establish deterrence by denial. The toolbox—counterterrorism, special forces, information operations, disruption of terrorist groups’ cyberspace activities—that allies develop for dealing with nonstate and quasi-state entities posing unconventional threats can also be used to deter state adversaries that rely on such tactics.

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