Space Force involvement causes militarized arms races AND undermines multilateral governance.
Robert Farley 20, Senior Lecturer in Security and Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, 12/1/2020, "Space Force: Ahead of Its Time, or Dreadfully Premature?," https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/space-force-ahead-its-time-or-dreadfully-premature,
The primary legal instrument for managing the militarization of outer space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.64 The treaty regulates space exploration and colonization and establishes rules for the peaceful use of space and the heavenly bodies therein, including the moon. The treaty bans the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, although it does not prohibit military operations altogether.65 While the prospects for multilateral governance of space seem grim, especially in context of current American policymaking, the inception of the Space Force necessarily raises questions about the future of multilateral management of space. Will the institutionalization of the Space Force make it easier or more difficult to develop mechanisms for multilateral space governance?
Military services tend to warily view arms control arrangements that affect their autonomy in their specialized domains. The events described in the 1964 film (and 1962 novel) Seven Days in May, in which an Air Force general seeks to topple an arms control–minded American president in a coup, are overstated, but services have historically opposed arms control limitations that affect their core priorities. The Royal Air Force’s preference for offensive bombing doctrines during the interwar period, and its belief that the realities of war would rapidly blow past any legal limitations, undoubtedly influenced the United Kingdom’s approach to international law in the 1920s and 1930s.66 Similarly, the U.S. Navy (and its counterparts in Britain, Japan, and elsewhere) resented the Washington Naval Treaty process because it limited the construction of their most prized vessels.67
Even in the prehistory of the U.S. Air Force, Billy Mitchell warned about the threat that international arms control might pose for aerial bombardment. However, opposition to arms control was not always automatic or immediate; the Army Air Forces chiefs offered qualified support for nuclear arms control in the immediate aftermath of World War II.68 By the early 1960s, however, the Air Force senior hierarchy resolutely opposed most multilateral arms control, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.69 In part because of generational change, the Air Force had minimal influence over the early Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Later activism on the part of the Air Force and of the Navy focused on the protection of specific systems, such as the B‑1 Lancer bomber, the LGM-118 Peacekeeper ballistic missile (then the Missile, Experimental, or MX), and the Trident submarine‐launched ballistic missile.70
The reasoning behind this opposition is clear: Strategic bombing (and later the delivery of nuclear payloads through intercontinental ballistic missiles) provided the rationale for the autonomy, independence, and primacy of the Air Force. Limitation of these weapons would not only require significant revision of doctrine and force structure but also would strike at the core cultural stories that undergirded the services. Moreover, compliance with the restrictions of a multilateral governance regime can be onerous in terms of financial, human resources, and intelligence demands.71 Most modern arms limitation regimes demand transparency on the part of the participants, which services tend not to welcome.
Given that services tend to pursue autonomy, the Space Force could pose some obstacle to future efforts for multilateral arms control in space. To be sure, neither the navies nor the air forces of the 20th century managed to prevent arms control. Nevertheless, if the Space Force manages to acquire the bureaucratic heft it needs to accomplish its core missions, it could act as an interest group within government to prevent the execution of strong multilateral arms control agreements. The record offers qualified reasons for concern about the role that the Space Force could play in future arms control negotiations. Services tend to resent the imposition of external limits on their procurement and force structure, although the extent of this resentment depends on organizational priorities. Still, the Space Force is unlikely to spearhead a drive for arms control within the U.S. government and probably will resist limitations imposed by such arms control on its core interests.