Modern satellite infrastructure has functioned as the panoptical architecture of surveillance capitalism and the security state, enabling the surrender of all agency, accelerating the transfer of information, furthering globalization of liberal capitalism, and augmenting geopolitical competition.
Jocelyn Wills 17, assistant professor of history at Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Tug of war: Surveillance capitalism, military contracting, and the rise of the security state, Introduction: Satellites and Surveillance Capitalism \\SYang
On 4 October 1957, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Humiliated by the Soviet feat, the United States quickly countered, launching its Explorer satellite on 31 January 1958. On 29 July 1958, the US Congress then passed the National Aeronautics Space Act, declaring that “activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of humankind.”1 Signed into law by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Act established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct all non-military activity in outer space while also incorporating elements of the US Army Ballistic Missile Agency and Naval Research Laboratory. NASA began its official operations on 1 October 1958, with a mission to create a space program based on non-military and commercially promising satellites for scientific research, communications, terrain mapping, meteorological and environmental monitoring, and other Earth resource applications. Knowing that NASA’s satellites would collect images from countries other than the United States, the agency’s representatives also entered into cooperative agreements with US allies, assuring other countries’ representatives that NASA had peaceful intentions.2 Sputnik-1, Explorer-1, the creation of NASA, and a quick succession of additional satellite launches by the United States and the USSR captured the imagination of technological enthusiasts around the world. As conspicuous political acts performed on the world stage during the Cold War, those launches also inaugurated a global space race, accelerated the arms race, and encouraged other nations to compete for the military and commercial spoils of satellite surveillance.3 In an agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom soon entered the space race, sending its Ariel satellite into orbit on 26 April 1962. Constructed by NASA at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, and launched aboard an American rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, Ariel distinguished the United Kingdom as the third nation to send a satellite into orbit. Damaged by an American high-altitude nuclear test, Ariel never lived up to its promise. Nevertheless, the launch signalled the United Kingdom’s commitment to the development of a space program, including a pledge to devote its efforts to peaceful scientific research and commercial applications.4 On 29 September 1962, Canada followed the United Kingdom into outer space, sending its Alouette satellite into orbit aboard an American rocket launched from the Pacific Missile Range at California’s Vandenberg Air Force Base. Built by the Special Products Applied Research (SPAR) division of de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, and assembled by the Electronics Division of Canada’s Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE), Alouette distinguished Canada as the fourth country to launch and the third one to build a satellite. Although several more years passed before satellite technologies reached beyond military, government, and scientific communities, Canada announced its stake in peaceful Earth observation, including its intention to develop remote sensing technologies (to acquire information via aerial photographs, satellite images, and other observation systems, and to detect and classify objects and phenomena without making physical contact with them). The country’s policymakers also tied Canadians to American developments, both signing continental trade and defence sharing agreements as well as vigorously promoting space exploration, scientific research, and the engineering disciplines as vital for protecting both national and continental interests.5 As other nations joined the space race over the next thirty years, developments in computing, digitization, and satellite reconnaissance, imaging, and communications pushed the boundaries of surveillance capitalism. Following the formal dissolution of the USSR on 26 December 1991, Americans then moved swiftly to commercialize the Internet, deregulate communications and financial industries, and assist in the further liberalization of the global economy and the evolving space industry. By the end of 2012, NASA’s National Space Science Data Center confirmed that more than 6,600 satellites had launched into orbit since Sputnik, with the vast majority of them reaching outer space after 1993.6 By 2012, Space Security Index (SSI) reported that artificial orbiting objects had reached approximately 8,300. The United States owned about half of all active satellites, with fifty other countries and several international consortia and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) owning the others. Although satellites have declined in price, launching them remains expensive. As a result, by the end of 2012, only nine countries and one intergovernmental organization (the European Space Agency) had launching capabilities, with the United States dominant. In 2011 alone, global actors had embarked upon eighty space launches that placed 126 new satellites into orbit, with participating nations contributing billions of dollars to the effort. SSI further revealed that the International Space Station (ISS) had already cost US$100 billion, with most of it paid for by the taxpayers who helped to fund billions of dollars’ worth of other space initiatives. “Advanced and developing economies alike depend on these space-based systems,” SSI observed, with commercial space revenues “steadily” increasing “since the mid-1990s. From satellite manufacturing and launch services to advanced navigation products and the provision of satellite-based communications,” SSI declared, “the global commercial space industry is thriving, with estimated annual revenues in excess of $200 billion.”7 SSI also disclosed that operational satellites accounted for fewer than 5 per cent of the objects orbiting the Earth during 2012, while the remaining 95 per cent represented orbital debris due to anti-missile testing, accidents, and dead batteries.8 One of China’s older weather satellites is among that debris, blown out of the sky in January 2007 when the Chinese conducted their first test of an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) and, according to one commercial space writer, put “other nations on notice that their commercial and military space assets were vulnerable to attack.”9 As part of an article on Sapphire, Canada’s first military satellite, the commercial space writer mentioned neither the fifty-year history of US and USSR anti-missile testing nor the more recent space-based collisions and accidents cited by Space Security Index as central to the creation of orbital debris. Regardless, the article reflected a trend among business-friendly space writers employing national security concerns to justify increased budgets and private-public initiatives for ASAT detection, “collision avoidance maneuvers,” and “debris mitigation efforts.”10 All of these initiatives now promise to become as significant as satellite launches and what their information-gathering capabilities have revealed about the Earth and its people, with “rapidly increasing revenues associated with satellite services” and the protection of commercial space systems linked to the government contractors who manufacture and maintain the satellites, ground receiving stations, advanced navigational products, and security systems that receive data for both civilian and military users.11 This book weaves the history of one of those government contractors – Canada’s MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA) – into a larger narrative about the ways in which the forces of surveillance capitalism integrated Canada into regional, industrial, academic, and military alliances, particularly but not exclusively with the United States. Founded in Vancouver, British Columbia, during 1969, MDA evolved from a four-person software consultancy into a multinational supplier of space-based systems. A significant provider of the world’s ground stations that receive, process, archive, and exploit satellite data, MDA received global recognition in the 1970s for its pioneering work in the commercial applications of remote sensing and synthetic aperture radar (SAR, a high-resolution device that provides surface mapping no matter the weather conditions, cloud cover, or levels of darkness). MDA also became the prime contractor for Canada’s powerful Radarsat-2 Earth observation satellite and the official data distributor for Radarsat images worldwide. Other notable feats include MDA’s global delivery of the navigational systems that support aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly known as drones), as well as its role as primary builder of Sapphire, and central contributor to Canadarm-2 (the remote manipulator component of the robotic, mobile servicing system that moves equipment and supplies around the International Space Station and supports astronauts working in space). MDA has additionally received credit as the incubator for Vancouver’s high-technology corridor, with many of the firm’s former employees launching some of British Columbia’s most successful technology ventures. Of the surviving firms, most work as important surveillance-related government contractors in their own right.12 As Canadians celebrated the fifty-year anniversary of Alouette-1, and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) readied the nation for the launch of Sapphire at the end of 2012, MDA’s strategies culminated in the acquisition of the US Space Systems/Loral (SS/L), a global provider of communications satellites and subsystems. According to industry analysts, the SS/L acquisition furnished MDA with a “critical mass in the commercial satellite manufacturing industry.”13 When the deal closed on 2 November 2012, MDA had also created one of the world’s most significant communications and information systems integrators, an achievement that promised “to boost estimated earnings” and provide “a platform to win upcoming space contracts” and more “defence and intelligence work” from the US government. The US government soon fulfilled that promise, in multiple contracts that gave MDA the market value and visibility its executives and shareholders had long craved as “the top technology stock in Canada over the past year.”14 Although financial news reports finally acknowledged MDA’s significance to Canada’s place within the global surveillance power core, the firm still remains largely invisible in the historical record and to the general public. According to David Ebner of the Globe and Mail, MDA’s obscurity has much to do with the ephemeral nature of systems engineering. Whereas one can touch and see products, MDA’s “technology isn’t widely recognized by most people because” the firm “generally operates unseen, in the background,” Ebner argued. As a result, “when MDA’s Radarsat satellites monitor Canada – the surveillance can spotlight down to a single metre – there isn’t any obvious MDA or Made in Canada stamp that people can see or cheer.”15 Operating “unseen, in the background,” MDA has played a critical role in the long-term development of the information systems and products that proliferate in global positioning devices, flight navigation systems, drones, mobile satellites, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR, also known as “Battle Command”), and a host of other networks that dominate various industries, from communications and financial services to environmental monitoring and resource extraction. Although they did not initially work on surveillance technologies for overtly political reasons, MDA’s scientists and engineers also played a part in turning satellites into a multi-billion-dollar commodity and outer space into a competitive, militarized zone. Along with other technological enthusiasts, they embraced satellites, the commercialization of space, and a notion of the “end of ideology.” In practice, however, their work has contributed to the expansion of the neoliberal project of privatization, fiscal austerity, deregulation, free trade, and reduced social spending, as well as the use of more efficient data mining systems, precision surveillance, first-strike capabilities, and the use of robotics for commerce as well as war. Engineering systems such as the ones they developed have also helped to remove the last barriers to routine aerial surveillance and the monitoring of everyday life. It would be a mistake, however, to see MDA’s founders, executives, scientists, and engineers as principal architects of this change; recent scholarship on the importance of social capital networks as well as ongoing revelations about surveillance and military-industrial adventurism have exploded the myths that a bright line divides business from government and the “great” man or woman from the socially constructed universe in which they operate. That MDA existed at all made it an entrepreneurial enterprise: the first of its kind in Vancouver, the firm helped to establish a hightechnology presence in BC’s Lower Mainland. But MDA’s history also reveals that business enterprises succeed or fail not simply on technological innovation, the personal qualities of those who lead them, the first-mover advantages that early entrants enjoy, or the “visible hand” of executives and managers who develop strategies and structures for continued expansion. Indeed, business survival always reflects the contingencies of larger social structures and cultural tropes, government priorities and changing educational, legal, and political policies, and unanticipated events and exogenous shocks beyond the control of any inventor, business founder, investor, executive, worker, government bureaucrat, or policymaking body. No different, MDA depended on these phenomena as well as the taxpayers who supported government spending on surveillance and those who hoped to profit from enhanced information-gathering techniques. “Without the benevolence” of the Canadian government, one long-time employee suggested, “MDA would never have grown beyond the size of a very, very small company.”16 MDA’s history therefore reminds us that corporations are juridical constructs and entrepreneurs instruments of state power, with both providing ways for governments to spread risk and for gatekeepers to favour certain individuals and businesses over others. By placing surveillance capitalism at the centre of Canada’s political economy, this book argues that MDA matters to our understanding of poilcymaking and business-government relations during the Cold War and into the twenty-first century. Reflecting the assumptions of capitalism’s culture of individual striving, people at MDA hoped to profit from living and working in a society where government officials promised to nurture their technical skills, reward their surveillance-based work, and bail them out when they stumbled. No matter their technical, business, or political skills, some realized their ambitions while others did not. Some had the ability to sell their ideas and motivate others, but lacked the skills to make the firm a profitable one. Others had excellent negotiating, managerial, and marketing skills, but still failed to realize returns from the “best practices” they had learned from management literature and the experiences of others in similar circumstances. Always, they engaged in complex negotiations with the capitalist system and government policies that provided incentive for some activities and discouraged others. MDA survived because members of the firm’s evolving executive team ultimately embraced MDA’s role as a systems integrator and procurement contractor for governments worldwide. Over time, they also understood that power resided not in the technologies they developed but rather in Ottawa and Washington, DC. Once done, they learned how to lobby the government to keep Canada’s space program on the budgetary agenda. In turn, the federal government encouraged MDA’s surveillance-based work because it promised to expand Canada’s influence as a significant, albeit junior member of the international power club. Canadian policymakers also appreciated that “countries which have less competitive industrial strengths in the areas of information technology face an increasing risk of losing trade, influence and economic power both within the community of developed nations and in the broader context of trade with developing countries.”17 MDA therefore provides more than a case study about how one particular firm managed to survive in the competitive space industry; it serves as a window into a corporate world girded by potent forces at the nexus of state, capital, and geopolitical power games. That nexus has included myths about space exploration’s peaceful purposes as well as competitive posturing for the spoils of surveillance-based commerce. Largely well-intentioned and with little interest in war, people at MDA nevertheless got caught up in the excitement of technological development, capitalist ambitions, and state incentives for both. Their eventual move into military work also reflects the unique security but problematic cultural relationship that integrated Canada into a continental defence economy with the United States while members of each country struggled to define their national identities and the imperial role each would play during the Cold War and beyond. As that relationship played out, Canadians consistently feared the overwhelming influence of their more powerful southern neighbours. Whether Conservative or Liberal, policymakers thus attempted to protect Canadian sovereignty and an autonomous international identity while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of their geographical proximity to as well as trading relationship with the United States. They also concerned themselves with foreign investment in the Canadian economy and the brain drain of technical talent that such investments might engender. Hoping to realize a “fair share” of the bounty promised by participation in world trade organizations and international governing bodies, they additionally wrestled with balancing desires to project Canada’s peacekeeping role and the realities of the country’s place within the American military-industrial complex. Satellites played a prominent role in that struggle. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SATELLITES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SURVEILLANCE STUDIES Artificial satellites, those ubiquitous “eyes in the sky,” twinkle as stars in various orbits. Some stand alone; others work in constellations. All contain powerful computers and subsystems, including those for propulsion, power, and communications. They vary in size and purpose, but ultimately they all gather information, with each of them launched to perform particular jobs for military and commercial purposes, often both. Whether for reconnaissance, remote sensing, or communications, satellites track assets, map resources, and communicate information to users on Earth and in outer space. In constant competition, those who own satellites seek to create more powerful features and capture more information for their own uses and profit, for “without a comparable capability,” one Canadian task force on satellite surveillance stressed, “we may never learn what other nations know about us, which must be viewed as a serious non-military threat.”18 Governments and their private contractors use reconnaissance (or spy) satellites to gather intelligence on military and other activities in outer space and on Earth. Launched into polar orbit, the most powerful among them can cover the entire globe every fourteen days. They come in four basic varieties and interact with each other. Optical-imaging satellites use light sensors to detect missile launches and weapons on the ground. Radar satellites use synthetic aperture radar to see through clouds and darkness. Signals-intelligence satellites employ powerful receivers to capture radio and microwave transmissions from every foe and friend. Relay satellites quickly move data from spy satellites to military bases on Earth, thereby speeding up the communications process for engagement. As surveillance studies scholars remind us, reconnaissance satellites are very useful tools for militaries and the police-security state.19 Remote sensing (also known as Earth observation) satellites measure and photograph the surface of the Earth and oceans as well as the atmosphere. Like most non-military satellites, Earth observation satellites typically launch into geostationary orbit over the equator. They use sensor technologies to detect objects and other phenomena via electromagnetic radiation signals from aircraft, satellites, and other systems, taking pictures of and classifying those objects without having to make physical contact with them. With SAR onboard, remote sensing satellites can map the entire surface of the Earth in the same ways that sonar technologies map the oceans, day or night, in all weather. Google Earth provides just one example of their power. Because they are very expensive to launch, Earth observation satellites are funded and used mainly by governments, to detect mineral and oil deposits, changes in agricultural activities and forests, weather damage, military bases, submarine wakes in the ocean, and other assets. MDA’s Radarsat-2, launched into the sun-synchronous polar orbit during 2007, can cover the Arctic daily, Canada every seventy-two hours, and the entire Earth every twenty-four days. The Canadian government has given MDA the right to sell Radarsat images to others around the world, as an export for economic development. MDA can downlink images to multiple ground stations in real time, or store them in the satellite’s computer until within range of a ground station. Once other countries, companies, and individuals have those images, they too can see resources, thereafter exploiting them for various applications, including city and regional planning, resource extraction, market segmentation, intelligence work, warfare, and a host of other reputable and nefarious activities.20 Most communications satellites also launch into geostationary orbit so they can circle the Earth within the same time that the Earth rotates just once. With their powerful antennas, these satellites send radio, television, and telephone transmissions, so that the Earth-bound can receive live broadcasts, use cellular telephones, and communicate by e-mail, among other activities. All of these devices record activities, making it easier for their owners to share information with each other. 21 There are many other satellites, including those used for astronomy, meteorology, navigation, search and rescue, space exploration, and other scientific applications. Working interactively with the space stations that make living in outer space possible, as well as with aircraft (including drones), ground-based computers, multimedia platforms, geographical positioning systems (GPS), and other technologies, satellites have created the panoptical architecture for the global surveillance state we experience and serve, all the while increasing the power of the elite who own and control the technologies and firms that produce them. As Michel Foucault observed, surveillance networks make us self-policing subjects. We daily use technologies we can no longer seem to do without, whether on the job, through the cash register, or at the ballot box. We “check in” with authority figures, even perform for them. We congregate with online communities because we have few public spaces left to meet. We trade civil liberties for protection because we receive daily reminders that we live in a dangerous world. We consign our control to the awesome power of the networks and inanimate objects created to extend shareholder value and the power of the elite. Ultimately, we even connect our identities to machines, watching, touching, and speaking into them, inviting them to become one with us.22 Investigative journalist Christian Parenti has argued that we do all of these things because surveillance techniques developed in earlier eras have gone global, become ubiquitous, “mundane, decentralized, and even convenient.”23 The conveniences of surveillance technologies come at a price, just as earlier conveniences came at a price to those enthralled by railroads and telegraphs, automobiles and radios, and airplanes and televisions. Technological revolutions have created great wealth, but they have not necessarily effected a greater distribution of that wealth or a more peaceful and inclusive world. “If the twentieth century has shown us anything,” Joel Mokyr concluded in his intellectual history of technology and the “useful” knowledge economy, “it is that the capacity of humans for intolerance, stupidity, and selfishness has not declined as their technological power has increased.” He also conceded, “The institutional setup of the world is such that holdouts that reject modern technology or cannot adopt it will eventually have to change their minds.” Canadian policymakers therefore embraced space exploration and surveillance technologies as a way to maintain Canada’s sovereignty and relevance, marketing both on their abilities to create a “new” world order of economic and social opportunities without end.24 Sociologist Vincent Mosco captured the force of such strategies a decade ago while tracing the dot-com bust of the late 1990s to the seductive power of the Internet. With Internet enthusiasts demonstrating “a remarkable, almost willful, historical amnesia,” Mosco observed that each generation “has renewed the belief that, whatever was said about earlier technologies, the latest one will fulfill a radical and revolutionary promise.” As a result, when the dot-com bubble burst, many Internet enthusiasts were shocked to learn that the power structures they thought they had overthrown remained remarkably resilient.25 MDA’s history resonates with these findings. Thanks to the mythological power of space exploration, MDA’s engineers and scientists thought they were different from previous generations, that their technical expertise could insulate them from past imbroglios. After all, they reasoned, they were well-educated, scientifically adept, computer-literate professionals, the vanguard of a new economy. 26 People from all walks of life rationalize their decisions and choose selective memories to make sense of their current circumstances and imagine themselves as active agents of the systems they develop and the structures they support. But as social anthropologist Hylton White recently observed, in an environment structured for competition and unending expansion, capitalism inevitably turns each new wave of technological enthusiasm, every gadget and new profession from an exotic first to a ubiquitous necessity. 27 This is just one of the consequences of the willful innocence people at MDA and elsewhere possess. In her study of engineering and the legitimacy of state power, sociologist Chandra Mukerji has argued that “the intelligence of engineering is not just pragmatic, but also deeply invested in social, legal, and moral conceptions of power” that privilege efficiencies over ecological awareness and quality-of-life issues as well as “produce an engineered world that shapes our lives – in ways we systematically ignore.”28 Surveillance studies scholars concur, including David Lyon, whose work continues to stress that surveillance is a “morally and politically loaded activity,” with what “we disclose to whom, and under what conditions” a highly significant act of state power. 29 Sociologists and surveillance studies scholars have contributed a great deal to our understanding about the synergies between capitalism, state power, military aims, academic research, and technological change, particularly in the Internet era. With few exceptions, however, most tend to focus on the United States, the United Kingdom, and other “great powers” while remaining remarkably silent on the history of the secondary powers that have helped to serve the interests of capital and the hegemonic ambitions of the United States. They also have the propensity to explore the state without examining the businesses involved in the space-faring enterprise. This omission flows, in part, from the classified nature of defence-related work; however, disparate sources can help to connect the dots between governments and their surveillance contractors. Tug of War draws upon interviews I conducted with MDA’s founders, employees past and present, and government patrons during 1992–93, and prior to MDA’s larger leap into the secret world of international defence/military contracting. Once transcribed, the tapes of those interviews produced an oral history of more than 1,000 pages. As I reread and reflected on that oral history after the heady dot-com boom had busted, terrorists had flown airplanes with sophisticated flight information systems into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and the US government had stepped up its war footing, ultimately invading Iraq in 2003 on manipulated intelligence derived from military briefings and private contractors, I knew I had a larger story to tell. I therefore turned to archival material at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), some of it received through several requests under the Freedom of Information and Protection Act, as well as publicly available business records, government documents, and other sources that could place MDA’s trajectory within the larger context of surveillance capitalism’s expansion, the Cold War’s emphasis on permanent military preparedness and continental integration, and the rise of the North American security state. Interviewees who spoke about MDA’s first decade focused on the excitement of their technological innovations. Those who discussed the 1980s and early 1990s emphasized the business strategies and structures MDA had instituted to survive the winds of technological change and global competition, including the pull of military contracting. And documents collected after MDA went public in 1993 disclosed the ways in which the firm capitalized on neoliberalism, systems integration, and the expansion of the world’s surveillance architecture. Together, these sources have given me the luxury of hindsight, an increasing appreciation about the concatenation of events that pulled MDA into surveillance capitalism and a larger tug of war, and a better understanding about the ways in which time, memory, and selective amnesia shape the histories we tell ourselves and others over time.30 The MDA case therefore demonstrates that historians have much to contribute to the field of surveillance studies, particularly when they search for sources that allow them to trace how those asserting no particular interest in gaining military power nevertheless get drawn into the promises of space exploration, larger state objectives, and the US military-industrial complex.31