Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Satellites, and specifically environmental monitoring systems, fuel environmental security rhetoric through the use of the visual as a uniquely distinct medium.

Delf Rothe 17, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, June 23, 2017, “Seeing like a satellite: Remote sensing and the ontological politics of environmental security”, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399?casa_token=StJp7_PKhUkAAAAA%3Ac_wg-VURPt3gATjXf35OGB5PQZ85Int99mWbYn1AZptShG7WJmCASah20h2sqqHIqZ9iXCxCjcmF#_i2 \\SYang

In the aftermath of the so-called linguistic turn in the social sciences, an increasing number of scholars in International Relations studied how environmental problems have been discursively framed as security problems. Starting from the assumption that security threats are not simply objectively given, they showed how different authorized actors – including politicians, scientists, and military officials – have successfully reframed environment problems like climate change as security concerns (Buzan et al., 1998; Floyd, 2010). The merit of these works has been to demonstrate that ‘framing matters’ (Dalby and O’Lear, 2016: 5): that the way in which environmental problems are perceived and treated politically depends on how they are framed discursively. They revealed that different discourses of environmental security identify different threats (e.g. climate-induced migration, scarcity-induced conflicts, or natural disasters), multiple referent objects to be protected (e.g. the environment vs. the nation-state vs. vulnerable populations), and heterogeneous policy responses to organize this protection (Detraz and Betsill, 2009; McDonald, 2013; Trombetta, 2008).

Notwithstanding these merits, the literature on the securitization of the environment has been criticized for its narrow focus on securitizing speech acts and linguistic threat constructions and for drawing a stark boundary between the physical reality (which is not directly perceivable) and the socially constructed world (the meaningful representation of reality). By concentrating on ‘threat perceptions rather than an actual danger emanating from objective factors’ (Mayer, 2012: 167), linguistic constructivist approaches might thus unwillingly play into the hands of climate skeptics. Furthermore, the one-dimensional relation between discourses and practices implied by linguistic constructivist works has been criticized (Rothe, 2016). Asking how certain speech acts unidirectionally shape policy responses to environmental threats, they would fail to acknowledge the mutually constitutive relationship between discourses and practices.

A broader understanding of environmental security is provided by governmentality approaches (Oels, 2013; Rothe, 2016). In this perspective, environmental security is understood not so much as a discourse but as a particular field of government shaped by competing political rationalities, subjectivities, practices, and technologies. Some of these works, for example, have shown how environmental problems such as climate change have been turned into security problems through a range of expert practices including risk assessment, scenario development, and hotspot modeling (Mayer, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2014). Others have shown that practices of environmental security cohere with different ideal-typical governmentalities such as liberalism, biopolitics, or neoliberalism, each of which produces a different set of assumptions on the subjects, objects, and means of government (see Oels, 2013). Governmentality studies, however, have been criticized for their tendency to simply assign practices and discourses of environmental security to ideal-typical governmentalities (Corry, 2014). This would risk overstating the coherence of existing governmentalities and treating practices and political technologies as epiphenomenal to the broader political discourses that shape them.

A further important extension of discourse-analytical works on environmental security has been provided by works that focus on the role of visuality in the construction of security threats and risks. As nicely expressed by Bleiker (2015: 874): ‘Images … frame what can be seen, thought and said. In doing so, they delineate what is and is not politically possible.’ Two features are said to distinguish pictures and other visuals from words in the construction of security. First, pictures and satellite images are taken as authoritative sources of knowledge, as they apparently represent reality in an objective manner (Dodge and Perkins, 2009: 498; Shim, 2014: 156). The authority of visuals is particularly evident in the realm of environmental security. Here, a whole range of visualization techniques – from colorful data visualizations to computer models or satellite images – make abstract and complex phenomena such as climate-induced migration (Methmann and Rothe, 2014) or the geopolitics of climate change (Manzo, 2012) visible and sizable. Second, images are particularly suitable for invoking certain emotive reactions, such as fear, horror, or grief, that are crucial for the creation of urgency and danger in security discourses. Again, this is mirrored in the debate on environmental security, where powerful icons – such as images of polar bears on retreating ice sheets – or colors in data visualizations are used to invoke emotive reactions and a sense of risk (see Liverman, 2009; Schneider and Nocke, 2014).

The emerging body of literature on visual security represents a promising way to broaden the analytical scope of environmental security beyond the narrow realm of language and speech acts. However, I hold that it often follows a too narrow understanding of visuality – as simply a particular form of discursive representation – that ignores the complex materiality of the visual. This materiality is to be found in the visual economies in which images are produced, circulated, and interpreted (Dodge and Perkins, 2009; Parks, 2009). Furthermore, images and pictures are not only semiotic systems of signs but also physical objects that can be printed, circulated, blocked, (re-)combined, and reproduced. Finally, looking at, seeing, touching, or interpreting visuals are material bodily practices – which are increasingly supplemented with technological practices such as algorithmic pattern detection or automated image analyses (see Brannon, 2013).

Environmental security as ontological politics

To account for the materiality of the visual and for the special role of visual technologies in the construction of environmental security, I reread the existing literature on environmental security through the lens of ANT and the notion of ontological politics. In short, ANT radicalizes the assumptions of linguistic or visual constructivism. Instead of viewing texts, images, and other semiotic systems as representations of a pre-existing single reality, it holds that the interplay of expert practices, scientific discourses, technologies, and visuals constitutes multiple realities (Hind and Lammes, 2016: 81–82). Annemarie Mol (2002), for example, shows through her long-term ethnographic research in Dutch hospitals how different medical practices and diagnostic tools produce multiple versions of atherosclerosis. To assume that phenomena are multiple implies they are ‘more than one but less than many’ (Mol, 2002: 55). According to this understanding, ontology ‘is not given in the order of things but … ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices’ (Mol, 2002: 6). As Ingunn Moser (2008: 99) puts it, natural realities become ‘matter-real’ and are ‘mattering’ only through their ‘continued enactment and re-enactment in situated practices’. Following these assumptions, environmental security can be understood as a form of ontological politics, in which the ontological status of phenomena such as climate change, deforestation, or natural disasters – as well as the ways of knowing them – becomes the subject of debate (Barry, 2013: 7; Schouten, 2014).

I argue that visual technologies such as satellite remote sensing play a crucial role in the ontological politics of environmental security. Consider Mol’s seminal work in the ontological politics of disease. A large share of the practices that render a disease such as atherosclerosis ‘matter-real’ are based on visual technologies: X-ray units, MRI scanners, microscopes, molecular imaging techniques, etc. The same holds true for the realm of environmental security. Here, visual technologies, including computer modeling, satellite remote sensing, data visualization, hotspot mapping, and graphs of future scenarios, enact different versions of ‘the environment’ as security risk (Randalls, 2014). Rather than producing mere representations of pre-existing environmental risks, visual technologies essentially bring them about: ‘The world does not exist before these ways of sensing’ (Hind and Lammes, 2016: 90). For, as Mitchell (2013: 233) crucially reminds us, ‘Nature is unable to speak for itself…. The facts of nature speak only with the help of measuring devices and tools of calculation’. To render a phenomenon such as climate change visible, intelligible, and thereby ‘matter-ing’ and ‘matter-real’, a global assemblage of visual technologies – including satellites, weather stations, computer simulations, researchers, and mechanisms of international cooperation – is required (Edwards, 2010; Wark, 2015: 166–182).

To study visual technologies as part of the ontological politics of environmental security, I first draw on the notion of immutable mobiles (Latour, 1986). Bruno Latour has coined this term to explain the power effects of ‘technologies of visualisation and inscription’ (Latour, 2013: 77), such as the printing press, cartography, photography, or the computer, that allow inscribing parts of the real world into flat and mobile artifacts (Latour, 1986: 17). Through these technologies, reality becomes flattened, mobile but immutable. Inscribed into pictures, maps, or charts, inscriptions of local realities – such as a piece of soil – can be circulated globally, reproduced, or combined with other inscriptions of reality. Pictures of different origin and different scale can be layered (Latour, 1986: 7).

Second, I draw upon the notion of visual assemblage (Bleiker, 2014: 76) to account for the fact that environmental risks and threats are never produced by a single technology – never become visible on a single image – but become enacted by a complex web of linked inscription devices, practices, and discourses (Latour and Hermant, 2006: 29). The notion of assemblage refers to a temporary form of order of heterogeneous elements ‘whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items function together, that they “work” together as a functional entity’ (Patton, 1994: 158). The visual assemblage of environmental security can be understood as exactly such a heterogeneous network of visual technologies and related infrastructures, people, laws and regulations, discourses, and practices (van Munster and Sylvest, 2016: 2). The immutable mobiles (satellite pictures, global climate models, vulnerability maps), which circulate through this assemblage, create new associative relations between actors as diverse as satellite operators, climate scientists, environmental activists, or military officials (Mayer, 2012). Together they turn ‘nature’ into a range of calculable, perceivable, and governable risks through a series of calculations, transformations, and translations (Hind and Lammes, 2016). The notion of visual assemblage makes it possible to account both for the socio-material character of the visual and for the messiness and multiplicity of practices and discourses of environmental security.

Using the framework in practice

The perspective of assemblage calls for a pluralization of methods in the study of visual politics (Bleiker, 2014). To grasp the social/technical/discursive/visual character of visual assemblages, I combine three analytical layers. The first analytical layer is a semiotic visual analysis (Rose, 2016: 106–146). A corpus of highly visible demonstration images – provided on websites, in demonstration reports, in social networks, or in demonstration videos – has been compiled in each case. Such showcase images are particularly promising for the objectives of this article because they are pre-selected by the respective actors to demonstrate the whole range of possible applications and capabilities of satellite imagery. A set of heuristic questions helps to structure the analysis: What do the images show and what is hidden? Are there common visual characteristics or patterns? How are images arranged and how are colors used? And what are the aesthetic and political effects of decisions on the composition, color, framing, or resolution of images?1 Second, a discourse-analytical layer reveals the interdiscursive context of images through a study of the reports, homepages, flyers, or policy documents in which they are embedded (Rose, 2016: 186–219). Here, I ask how the different texts ascribe meaning to the images, and how the latter become linked to broader concepts, narratives, and storylines in environmental security discourse. A third layer focuses on the performativity of images as immutable mobiles and their function in broader visual assemblages. So, here the question is what visuals do rather than what they show: How are images produced by broader visual assemblages? How are they circulated or blocked? And how do they enact different versions of the environment? To study this third layer, I draw on a comprehensive review of the relevant secondary literature, combined with a thorough document analysis of legislation, regulations, and related policy documents in each case.

The co-evolution of remote sensing and environmental security

The roots of the visual assemblage of environmental security can be traced back to the militarization of geophysical research in the early years of the Cold War (Dalby, 2013: 41). With its successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 during the so-called International Geophysical Year, the Soviet Union fired the starting pistol for a technological and scientific race between the two superpowers. As a crucial part of this race, satellite remote sensing emerged as a dual-use technology, or ‘cyborg science – the result of an irreparable fusion of scientific and military concepts, materials and skills’ (Elam, 1999: 106). At the same time, the strategic communities’ interest in the atmospheric impact of nuclear weapons boosted advancements in numerical weather modeling, which in the 1960s were further developed into the first simulation models of global climate change. The ever more detailed global models at the same time produced ‘an insatiable thirst for data from every corner of the world’ (Edwards, 2010: 24), which since the late 1970s and 1980s was increasingly satisfied by satellite-based remote sensors. In addition, in 1972 the US administration established the Landsat program within the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the first civilian satellite remote sensing program. The program’s eight satellites provided multispectral Earth imagery at moderate spatial resolution – perfectly suited for land (change) monitoring – and thereby contributed considerably to the discovery of macro-scale environmental problems, including deforestation, land degradation, and the ozone hole (DeLoughrey, 2014: 261).

NASA’s Landsat and other emerging remote sensing programs can be considered as parts of an emerging visual assemblage of heterogeneous human and non-human components (Barry, 2013: 14; Edwards, 2010). This assemblage includes hardware such as satellites, sensors, ground stations, and data centers; imagery-processing-and-analysis software; data such as images or digital maps; human actors like system operators, policymakers, scientists, and national security personnel; and legal and regulatory frameworks (Thompson, 2007: 2). The capacity to ‘see’ environmental problems, and to see the planet from a distance, is distributed across this visual assemblage. Neither the satellites, which translate the electromagnetic radiation reflected from the Earth’s surfaces into numerical grey-values, nor the operators in the control room, which process ‘wavelengths in false colours’ (Latour and Hermant, 2006: 8), nor the software tools that turn the data into realistic true-color images, nor the analysts or algorithms that interpret the resulting images would be able see anything were it not for the other elements in the assemblage.

A securitization precursor

I would argue that there was a close co-evolution between the emergence of a global visual assemblage of satellite remote sensing and the emerging discourse on environmental security in the 1980s and 1990s. The notion of co-evolution stresses the reciprocity of this development. While the satellite gaze made it possible to conceive of environmental change as a global threat in the first place (Van Munster and Sylvest, 2016: 6), environmental security also became inscribed into technical decisions, for example when Landsat’s remote sensors were optimized to monitor land change and resource degradation. The mutual imbrication of satellite technology and environmental security played out at several levels. First, the militarization of geophysical research during the Cold War created new associations between geoscientists and security actors that were crucial for the emerging imaginary of the environment as a security problem. Marzec (2014: 244) describes how this emerging actor-network led, for example, to the US defense and intelligence community’s interest in climate change in the early 1990s:

In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to establish relations with climate scientists in the program Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis, or MEDEA, when it declassified satellite imagery for ‘patriotic’ climate scientists.

Second, the described visual assemblage enabled a new ‘way of seeing’ the Earth and the human environment, which might be called a planetary gaze (DeLoughrey, 2014; Jasanoff, 2004: 44). The new possibility to look at the planet from the outside produced a sense both of the earth’s singularity and of its radical fragility. The planetary gaze produced a certain uncanniness – a feeling of being detached from planet Earth (DeLoughrey, 2014: 264). In so doing, the planetary gaze invoked deep-rooted ‘apocalyptic fears about the end of the earth’ (DeLoughrey, 2014: 266). This sense of urgency created by satellite remote sensing resonated well with the early environmental security debate in the 1990s and its alarmist tone (Marzec, 2014: 235). Yet the planetary gaze of the described visual assemblage did not simply produce another discursive frame of a pre-existing environment. Rather, it constituted a whole new reality of the Earth as a singular, interconnected, and fragile system (Van Munster and Sylvest, 2016: 4–8). This fragile Earth system became ‘matter-real’ through the immutable mobiles – such as true-color satellite images, simulation models, graphs, or numerical calculations – produced by two central inscription technologies: satellite remote sensing and computer modeling (Edwards, 2010: 2). By developing these technologies into a comprehensive global monitoring system, it was believed it would be possible to monitor, predict, control, and manage the Earth system (Jasanoff, 2004: 42; Marzec, 2014: 245). This global monitoring approach, which highlighted the role of national leaders as planetary or environmental managers, considerably influenced the early environmental security debate.

Third, the focus of the early environmental security debate in the 1990s was on large-scale global problems such as scarcity-induced conflict or migration (Rothe, 2016). The detection of these large-scale problems was closely linked to the technical capabilities of satellite remote sensing, for to detect large-scale, slow-onset changes like land degradation and resulting scarcities, an abstracted, distant view from above was required. What is more, multispectral sensors, such as those carried by Landsat satellites, made it possible to visualize processes of plant degradation in the infrared range of radiation. To be precise, these large-scale environmental changes were considered as drivers of conflict and migration in the early environmental security discourse. Remote sensors and their planetary gaze thus considerably influenced the epistemological horizon of environmental security thinking.

Opening and commercializing remote sensing

During the Cold War, access to the visual assemblage of satellite remote sensing was restricted to a closed ‘club’ of a few geoscientists, military research centers, and international bureaucrats (Elam, 1999: 98). The monopolization of space technology and security concerns imposed heavy restrictions on the circulation of the immutable mobiles of satellite sensors. Landsat is a good case in point: while the civil Landsat program was used by the USA to promote ideals of transparency and international scientific cooperation, the US government at the same time restricted the permitted spatial and spectral resolutions of Landsat images (Thompson, 2007: 8). Furthermore, the inaccessibility of satellite images and their abstract, scientific enactment of the environment further limited the number of potential users.

Shortly before the end of the Cold War, however, this picture began to change. The USA reacted to privatization efforts in France and the Soviet Union and decided to open and commercialize its remote sensing industry with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (Elam, 1999: 99). The commercialization process was accompanied by the triumphal march of the personal computer and the spread of geographic information system (GIS) software to read, process, and interpret geodata, which further increased the number of users of commercial satellite imagery. As a result, satellite remote sensing grew into a massive and complex global market with a projected size of US$2.6 billion by 2020. The current global market is characterized by the dominance of a few global players, such as DigitalGlobe, and national space agencies as well as the emergence of myriad medium- and small-sized enterprises that are turning satellite data into maps, GIS products, or data visualizations.

The opening and commercialization of remote sensing technology happened at the same time as a shift in environmental security discourse towards human security and resilience (Corry, 2014; Detraz and Betsill, 2009; Trombetta, 2008). Increasingly, the focus of environmental security was shifted from the international system or the nation-state towards individuals’ and local communities’ vulnerabilities and local environmental risks (McDonald, 2013: 46–47). A global managerial command-and-control approach to environmental problems made way for more regionalized approaches of risk management and other measures to enhance the adaptive capacities of vulnerable populations against environmental shocks (Oels, 2013: 24–26).

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.