Low-level attacks are stabilizing- no escalation
Yoo, 17—Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (John, “Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies,” 105 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (2017), dml)
New weapons technologies can help overcome the obstacles of imperfect information. Coercive measures can signal political will, the value placed on the resources at stake, or military capabilities that could influence the outcome of a broader armed conflict. The more costly the signal, the more credible the information becomes. A nation's leader can make a threat of war and send military forces near disputed territory or a potential conflict zone. Deployment eats up resources that would go to waste if the nation is bluffing and incurs "audience costs" domestically if the leader backs down."' Escalating steps of force will provide the opportunity to send more precise signals that gradually consume more resources, reveal more military capability, and edge closer to war. With more avenues to credibly signal capabilities, there are more opportunities to reveal reliable, private information, and the likelihood of bluffing is reduced. While new weapons technology may produce more opportunities for violence, it can signal nations' capabilities and therey lead to peace settlements rather than war.
Limiting the ability to deploy new weapons technologies might make war more harmful. A ban could narrow the range of targets and the means of coercion to produce more destructive signaling and ultimately more lethal conflicts. One nation may want to send a signal during a crisis that inflicts a precise cost on its opponent. With a broader set of targets and more levels of harm, the nations can send more discrete signals in the bargaining process. If nations limit their signals to conventional attacks on military targets, they will have to employ more destructive levels of force. They might develop even more devastating kinetic weapons to produce the same effects as the precision offered by cyber or robotic weapons. Limits on new weapons technology might even destabilize crises by encouraging nations to use offensive weapons early in a crisis because they might themselves be vulnerable to attack. 15 4
New weapons technologies can more easily send specific signals that advance the bargaining process toward settlement. Cyberweapons, for example, can be used to shut down an opponent's financial markets or transportation and communication networks for a limited time. During the Kosovo War, the United States Air Force achieved a similar result by dropping graphite on Belgrade's electrical grid, which temporarily disabled power to Serbia's capital city. While NATO claimed that the disruption in electricity undermined Serbian military operations, the attack on the electricity grid also sought to pressure Serbian civilians against supporting the Milosevic regime.15 5 While such an attack would violate the ban on targeting civilian objects set out in the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, it can send a signal that may cause less loss of life and destruction than an attack on a hardened military target using kinetic weapons. Cyberweapons, in particular, present opportunities to send a more nuanced range of signals during interstate crises.' 5 6 Nations can use cyberweapons to attack each other's armed forces more precisely, and hence reduce direct casualties to both military personnel and civilians. In a contest over Taiwan, for example, China could use cyberattacks to disable communications between the Pentagon and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. These cyberattacks can inflict fewer, more directed costs than kinetic attacks. Cyberweapons' precision can reduce collateral harm to civilians by targeting only military communications. While cyberattacks can cause widespread harm, such as cutting water and electricity services to civilian populations, they still offer more precise and controlled power than kinetic weapons.
One might respond that some type of international regulation could forestall long-term harms from cyber conflict that might outweigh the benefits of credible signaling. Cyberweapons, for example, might also make possible new types of harms that did not previously appear in warfare, such as China's alleged theft of the U.S. personnel management database or North Korea's entry into Sony's network. Or cyberwarfare might open up a means for a faster escalation of hostilities. But even if true, these costs have to compare to existing means of signaling, which would depend on the use of conventional, kinetic weapons and their accompanying destruction and loss of life. They would also have to balance against the costs of cutting off a set of communications, which might impede peaceful bargaining.
Even if nations could overcome informational asymmetry, the international system's anarchy creates a second, more difficult, obstacle to cooperation. While nations may understand that avoiding war is mutually advantageous, they may not trust each other. The enforcement problem is acute in situations where a settlement changes the status quo between states, or where rapid changes are already affecting the balance of power."' One nation may find it difficult to trust the other to keep a promise if the latter will become even more powerful as a result of the agreement.
Information problems, for example, do not seem to explain the problems with ending internal armed conflict or long wars. Internal armed conflicts between a government and a rebel group often go on for years-sixteen years, on average.15 8 Over the course of the war, both sides acquire information about each other's goals, resources, and will. Even with far more information than at the war's outset, the parties often choose to fight rather than reach an agreement. This may well be due to lack of enforcement mechanisms. A settlement may put one of the two parties in a better position than when the fighting continues. A rebel group may gain breathing space where it can regroup, or the government may restore its authority in lost territory. One side cannot be confident that the other will not take advantage of its new position to break the agreement and take even more resources in the following year.
A hypothetical territorial agreement between the United States and China over Taiwan illustrates the difficulties of securing enforcement of a settlement amidst a shifting balance of power. In the first time period, the United States protects an independent iTaiwan. The United States has a greater probability of prevailing in any conflict with China because of its larger navy, air force, and forward bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. In the second time period, China's economy has boomed, which translates into greater military power. China gains a higher probability of winning in a war with the United States. In this period, China and the United States agree to divide Taiwan in the middle because, with full information, they both estimate their chances of winning a war at fifty-fifty. China's gain of territory on Taiwan, however, gives it a greater than 50 percent chance of prevailing in the next time period because it now has a land base on the island itself. China's prospects will also improve in the third time period because of faster economic growth and military spending rates.
Under these conditions, the United States will have little confidence that China will keep its agreement in the second time period. An agreement will endow Beijing with an even greater advantage in future time periods, which will encourage it to revise the division of Taiwan further in its favor. China's conduct under its agreement with the United Kingdom over Hong Kong illustrates the problem. In December 1984, China achieved a superior military position relative to the United Kingdom in any conflict over Hong Kong. In 1982, for example, China spent $49.5 billion on defense whereas the United Kingdom spent $27.4 billion (they were the third and fourth largest spenders, respectively, with the Soviet Union first at $257 billion and the United States second at $196.3 billion). 59 But, much of the British military was deployed in Europe as part of NATO, and China's proximity to Hong Kong created a strategic advantage. To guarantee a peaceful transfer of power, Beijing promised in an agreement with London that Hong Kong would continue to enjoy an independent political system. Today, it appears that China is reneging on this negotiated agreement; the Communist Party has installed unpopular political leaders in Hong Kong to extend the mainland's power over the territory. In the twenty-first century, the United Kingdom has little military ability to prevent Beijing's revision of the deal. The 1984 handover agreement could not withstand a serious shift in the balance of power between China and the United Kingdom.
Cyberwarfare might provide an unexpected way to increase the ability of nations to commit to the terms of an agreement. In order to make a reliable agreement, a nation has to be willing to suffer a serious loss if it fails to perform, much like a borrower putting up property as collateral for a loan. But nations may have difficulty offering territory or resources as a security deposit on their treaty promises. A nation, however, could leave some valuable resource deliberately vulnerable to attack by cyberassault from its treaty partner. It could ensure that the cyber defense of the resource could only be overcome by capabilities in the hands of the other nation. If one state violated its international agreement, the other state could use cyber weapons to destroy the resource. This would be the twenty-first century equivalent of the ancient and medieval practice of sending the children of aristocratic families to foreign nations to serve as hostages, or the more recent concept of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War. Due to the lack of enforcement, however, states could never be certain that a nation would not renege even on these guarantees-a nation could always remove the vulnerabilities or suddenly deploy new defenses. But these expensive signals of commitment could improve the ability to cooperate beyond matters as they stand now.
A critic might argue that without international regulation of these new technologies, the risk to civilians will increase. Nations at war, however, will have an incentive to distinguish between military and civilian targets to the extent allowed by the capabilities of weapon systems. Rational nations should seek to contain the harms of war in order to maintain the conditions for peace and to preserve the value of the civilian economy in the postwar period. 160 Defenders in a war do not want to kill their fellow citizens or harm their own territory, although they might destroy civilian property to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Invaders will have no interest in ruining the object of their aggression. Reducing civilian casualties may also encourage an end to conflict. Targeting civilians and destroying nonmilitary resources may harden nations at war and make a diplomatic compromise more difficult. The unexpected carnage of World War I, for example, made a peace agreement restoring the status quo to pre-August 1914 politically impossible for both the Allied and Central Powers.
Nations, moreover, have long pursued indirect coercion against civilian populations in war. They have often turned to economic sanctions to conduct hostilities short of direct armed conflict, or in conjunction with active hostilities. In World Wars I and II, of course, the Allies conducted economic warfare against Germany and its allies by levying a blockade of both military and civilian shipping. 161 After the wars, the UN Charter even expressed a preference for such tactics by authorizing the Security Council to impose "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication" in the case of a threat to international peace and security.
While nations such as Great Britain and the United States have argued in the past that embargos blocked only goods that might contribute to the enemy military, this seems difficult to sustain in the case of the complete embargoes that prevailed during the World Wars. Instead, economic warfare serves the same objectives as the approach described here for cyber and robotic weapons. First, new cyber and robotic weapons provide nations with a way to send signals in international bargaining through the gradual escalation of coercion short of outright hostilities. Second, embargoes pressure civilian populations to change the policies of their leaders, or even the leaders themselves. Perhaps cyber and robotic weapons, when employed as steps in the escalation of force, will also be understood as more akin to economic than kinetic warfare.
A rationalist approach to war also provides an answer to the broader critique of the new weapons technologies as facilitating war. Recall that some UN officials and scholars share the concern that drones and cyberweapons will encourage states to wage war more often. Critics argue that these weapons remove a nation's soldiers from the battlefield, theteby emboldening leaders to choose force more frequently. But, understanding war as a bargaining failure reveals the importance of signaling to resolving international disputes. New weapons create more opportunities for signaling, which allows nations to communicate their intentions and capabilities more effectively. Greater signaling should allow nations to share more information, which on the margins will lead to more international deals and therefore an overall reduction of major wars. Ironically, an effort to ban new weapons may well produce more war, not less.