Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Chinese A2/AD dependence on cyberweapons gives the US an advantage because we’re better at shutting down their systems than they are at targeting ours. Having cyber options give them false confidence and decreases their emphasis on conventional capabilities.

Jon Lindsay 15, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies., Lindsay, Jon R. “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” International Security, vol. 39, no. 3, Jan. 2015, pp. 7–47.

the downside of “informatization” China’s ambition to become a world-class military power will lead the PLA to become more like the U.S. military in its dependence on networks and space assets. This modernization will undermine the asymmetry of vulnerability thought to make cyberweapons so dangerous to the United States and instead put some of the PLA’s own most sophisticated systems at risk. PLA antiaccess capabilities against U.S. power projection also include antiship ballistic missiles, cruise missile boats, antisatellite weapons, and ªfth-generation aircraft. The PLA requires traditional forces, moreover, for other missions that might require warªghting, military operations other than war, or coercive diplomacy (a role ill-suited for secret and intangible cyberweapons). China’s goal of “winning local wars under the conditions of informatization” requires the PLA to “enhance [its] warªghting capabilities based on information systems.”94 This transformation into a modern “informatized” force, inspired in no small part by American RMA ideals and force structure, entails greater reliance on C4ISR systems and computer networks. Yet China’s pursuit of the promise of the RMA will also reveal its liabilities. In imagining and planning for a potential war with the United States, the PLA has to worry about the demonstrated ability and willingness of the U.S. military to conduct cyber operations on the battleªeld (in Iraq and Afghanistan) and in covert action (e.g., the Stuxnet attack). If cyberwarfare is as effective as Chinese writers believe it is but they underestimate the costs of mastery, then the PLA is doubly disadvantaged. Chinese attacks can be expected to be less skillfully coordinated against more robust U.S. defenses, and vice versa. The United States already has, while China still struggles to develop, the institutional complements and experience required to plan and control cyber operations in synchrony with the larger battle. Meanwhile the fear of cyberwarfare has prompted considerable U.S. military investment in network protection, active cyber defense measures (e.g., counterintelligence deception and “hack back” counterattack), and exercises in cyber-degraded conditions. The vaunted asymmetry of cyberwarfare, usually posed as an advantage for the weaker power, in fact runs in the opposite direction, giving the stronger and more experienced force the advantage.95 If the military utility of cyber- warfare is actually more limited than Chinese doctrine writers seem to believe, then conventional considerations about military effectiveness (e.g., the balance of power as well as skill in combined arms warfare and joint operations) should be expected to dominate strategic calculation and operational interaction in any conºict.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.