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Provocative friction is good --- reduces escalation by demonstrating capability, and the capacity to escalate deters attackers from crossing red lines --- the aff undermines both dynamics

Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.

1 Introduction Information technology is the nervous system of the global economy. Critical infrastructure for banking, power, transportation, and industry increasingly depends on embedded computers connected to the internet. Firms and citizens entrust vital personal, medical, and financial data to distant servers in return for more convenient and efficient services. Military command and control relies on digital networks to connect far-flung surveillance and strike systems and to project power rapidly and precisely. Yet this vital interconnectivity also facilitates new modes of crime, protest, espionage, and warfare. Ubiquitous computer networks both provide access to valuable targets and become targets themselves. Protecting and influencing cyber infrastructure has thus become a major priority for governments and other political actors around the world. The very ubiquity of information technology makes the danger of cyber threats easy to exaggerate. In contemporary defense policy discourse there are three influential narratives of mounting cyber peril. The most dangerous envisions the paralysis of industrial control systems of military command and control through surprise attack by anonymous hackers. This scenario is often described as a “digital Pearl Harbor” or a “cyber 9/11” depending on whether the imagined aggressor is a revisionist state like China or Iran or a non-state anarchist or terrorist empowered by the information revolution. A second narrative offers an alternative to the shock of sudden catastrophe by warning of the long term erosion of economic and military competitiveness. The relentless theft of vital secrets stored on corporate and government networks is thus thought to cause a prolonged “death by a thousand cuts.” In both of these scenarios, weaker states and terrorists gain increasing access to powerful hacking tools while technology-dependent advanced industrial states become increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack and exploitation. 1 A third category of threat narrative concerns the transformation of internet architecture to decisively benefit one political group at the expense of the other. At one extreme, the growth of flexible social media enables connected protesters to overwhelm and overthrow authoritarian regimes.2 At the other extreme governments censor and reconfigure the internet to undermine innovation and freedom. State paranoia about paralysis and erosion thus leads to digital lockout or “the end of the internet” as we know it.3 National security officials, the defense industry, and media pundits all have incentives to exaggerate the cyber threat.4 The secrecy of cyber operations further complicates assessment, even as states make major investments in cyber defense. Each of the three narratives above are indeed exaggerations, but they point toward more plausible scenarios using cyber operations as subtle complements to or even substitutes for more traditional forms of aggression. Understanding the dynamics, magnitude, and likelihood of aggression online requires greater attention to the operational requirements for staging various types of cyber operations, the strategic benefits actors hope to gain through them, and the risks of unintended consequences. Too often defenders of the cyber revolution focus narrowly on the technological possibility for harm but discount operational and institutional obstacles to effectiveness and ignore the strategic utility of cyber harm or threats of harm. 5 A realistic appraisal of cyber threats must take not only technological but also strategic logic into account. Thomas Schelling distinguishes brute force, which is needed in a contest of strength, from coercive threats, which are useful in a contest of resolve.6 Both require the power to inflict harm, but brute force exercises it while coercion holds (at least some of) it in reserve. Likewise, actors might use cyber operations to attempt to change the balance of power directly or they might use them to provide information about their intentions and commitment. To paraphrase Clausewitz, cyberwar is politics by other means. As a result of technical and political constraints, the coercive potential of cyberspace is more limited than generally appreciated, but it is not negligible, especially when exploited in conjunction with other forms power such as military force. In this chapter we lay out a typology of cyber operations, distinguishing the skills and resources needed to cause different types of harm. Not all cyber options are equally available to all actors because of varying requirements in organizational capacity, intelligence support, and risk sensitivity. For each of the exaggerated myths mentioned above, there are low-cost, low- payoff irritants widely available as well as higher-cost, potentially higher-payoff adjunct capabilities available to a more restricted set of predominantly nation-state actors. Next we evaluate the coercive utility of these various harms, or threats of these harms, by taking into consideration the interaction of cyberspace with other domains. Finally we ask, what types of cyber coercion are most likely? We argue that there exist two important bounds on the distribution of cyber harm. First, because voluntary connections to the internet make cyber harms possible in the first place, aggressors must be careful not to provoke their victims to disconnect. Second, the availability of military instruments beyond the cyber domain, creates potential for retaliation for unacceptable harms. These constraints combine to make small-scale cyber aggression relatively appealing and thus more likely while making large-scale aggression difficult and undesirable for initiators and thus less likely. The finding of this chapter extends the logic of the stability-instability paradox pioneered in the 1960s. While nuclear weapons can deter nuclear war, they can fail to deter, and even encourage, conventional or peripheral war. Mutually assured destruction restrained the superpowers from engaging in direct confrontations during the Cold War, even as this restraint encouraged and facilitated the exercise of proxy wars throughout the Third World. The mechanisms of restraint in the cyber domain are slightly different than in the nuclear world—the risk of voluntary disconnection and military retaliation vs. mutual Armageddon—but the results are similar: little truly dangerous behavior and a lot of provocative friction. The social and economic value of the internet expands the scope for minor aggression like espionage, covert influence, and symbolic protest. Cyber operations also act as valuable adjuncts for battlefield operations akin to signals intelligence and electronic warfare for states who are willing and able to go to war for other reasons. However, there are diminishing incentives to “go big” with cyber warfare alone given the incentives targets have to identify even a hard-to-identify attacker and shift domains to punish cyber aggression. Although the attribution of the attacker’s identity is widely thought to be hard problem in cyberspace, anonymity is never guaranteed and might not even be useful for some forms of coercion. A nonzero risk of attribution opens the door to retaliatory punishment, which encourages attackers to exercise restraint in cyber aggression. Ironically enough, the instability we perceive in cyberspace is indicative of the stability of deterrence of the most dangerous cyber threats.

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