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The counterplan solves the aff and is competitive---creating an AI center results in effective evaluation procedures and overcomes resistance but ownership is key

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

While innovation is often treated and discussed as an outcome, it is in fact also a process whereby champions – whether individuals or organizations – promote and implement changes leading to performance, mission or operational improvement.116 Within NATO, many stakeholders have an inherent interest in AI and in promoting the AI agenda. However, there is no clear “champion” whose goal is to steer the Alliance’s approach to adopting the technology, promoting the necessary reform, and devising the best practices for its employment. For this reason, the process of “NATO-mation” could benefit significantly from a centre specifically intended to serve this goal – tentatively referred to here as an Artificial Intelligence, Integration and Implementation-Enabling Centre (A3IC). Such a centre could lead adoption of AI for the Alliance, support Allies in their own adoption strategies, and connect the relevant offices and institutions at both the national and NATO levels. With a focus on training and interoperability, an AI champion for NATO could ensure that the Alliance treats innovation as an ongoing process and disseminates successful outcomes.

The innovation process often requires a person or an organization mentoring, supervising, advocating and protecting innovations and innovators. Having an innovation champion is important to promote those micro-changes that often permit the successful adoption of an innovation: this is achieved by aligning the interests of all the individuals involved with the overall goal, so that resistance, opposition and sometimes even boycotting are minimized and addressed.117 While the buzzword “innovation” is generally perceived favourably, resistance often emerges because of cultural barriers such as opposition to change, sociological factors such as group identity and concern for loss of status, organizational dynamics such as career advancement being hindered by a new technology, as well as for cognitive and psychological reasons.118 The old adage goes: the thing people really hate, more than the way things are, is change.

Military innovation poses even more subtle challenges. Adoption of AI may be perceived as especially daunting, because the technology is intangible and difficult to quantify: we can neither touch it nor see it. Additionally, previous lessons of military innovations show the close relationship between platforms and service identity. For example, innovation in military aviation became easier when air branches became independent organizations, separate from armies and navies.119 Similarly, operators of transport or rotary-wing aircraft have often struggled to obtain the necessary recognition and resources from within their respective military services. These dynamics also occur between surface and underwater services, as well as between combat and intelligence or between surveillance and reconnaissance units. It remains to be seen where AI will fit into the culture of military organizations, but algorithms, data and processors are unlikely to be in the ensigns of any military service, at least in the foreseeable future: the tense discussions about counting drone operations as flying hours or assigning medals to drone pilots bear testament to that.120 This is a small, but powerful lesson: in the foreseeable future, some military services could lack interest in, or display insufficient attention to, these domains.121 This is why an AI champion within NATO may be particularly important.122

There is an additional consideration: interoperability would be difficult without coordination among Allies. At the NATO level, a centralized body could play a particularly useful and effective role in this respect. Future discussions could determine whether such a Centre should be independent, like a Centre of Excellence, or sit within the NATO Enterprise structure (natural options being under Allied Command Transformation or in the NATO Communications and Information Agency). There are, however, strong reasons to assign such a Centre a number of specific goals.

Lead. The Centre should be at the forefront of NATO’s and the Allies’ AI efforts, including discussions about ethics and ownership of pilot projects (see below) as well as development of targeted solutions to existing problems and challenges.

Support. The A3IC should have an interest in helping Allies adopt AI through a set of procedures, roadmaps, best practices and, where possible, readily available solutions, either developed in-house or borrowed from others. From ethics to training, from recruitment to procurement, from cyber security to data management, the Centre could provide important support, especially for some Allies or some of their services that may lack inhouse solutions or expertise. Cases in point would be Testing and Evaluation (T&E) and Verification and Validation (V&V): with the adoption of ML, these will have to be rethought, upgraded and updated in order to integrate the non-deterministic nature of algorithms into existing procedures and methods.123 Similarly, in the age of software, procurement needs a major upgrade. In contrast to traditional military platforms, it is faced with a paradigm shift: rather than deliver finished and well-functioning products, it must come up with adaptable solutions that, by their very nature, can never be considered as “done” once and for all.124 Realistically, not all Allies possess the necessary expertise to face such challenges. The Centre could play an important role in these areas. Since the AI ecosystem, as this document shows, is admittedly massive but also scalable, for many Allies it may be much more convenient to rely on common, Alliance-wide capabilities, since they would probably struggle to achieve the required depth and the breadth if left to their own devices.

Connect. The Alliance will not be effective if individual Allies’ efforts remain disconnected; and it will be more efficient if Allies are able to build on each other’s progress and achievements. The Centre could play a major role in this respect. For instance, the software community around the world relies on platforms such as GitHub to accelerate software development.125 The Alliance has the opportunity to move in the same direction, enabling Allies to benefit from each other’s progress. Researchers in different fields need the same types of tools, from science workflows to AI-driven experimentation, from testing and evaluation to other domains. If NATO’s A3IC could provide a central repository of AI software, it would connect all the actors, accelerate their work and also address potential failures.126 Similar considerations apply to data. “Usually, the biggest challenges [are] related to getting sufficient high-quality training data”. In fact, “system performance is directly tied to data quantity, quality, and representativeness”.127 For the A3IC, a key goal would be to make training data available, as this would dramatically accelerate Allies’ progress. Recent progress in AI has been possible, because nowadays there are “many open source code libraries and developer tools that allow organizations to use and build upon the work of external communities. As a result, no team or organization has to start from scratch, and may parts that used to require highly specialized expertise have been largely automated”.128 The A3IC could play a similar role in making all tools and tests available. This is particularly important for T&E/V&V activities, as will be discussed later.

Initiate. Building on its own and the Allies’ work, the Centre could identify and then propose solutions to the Allies in order to achieve efficiencies, spread AI fluency and favour interoperability. Innovation is, often, a cognitive or cultural process: individuals and organizations need to know they are lagging behind, inefficient or faced with a problem in order to accelerate, to improve, and to find solutions. The A3IC could approach NATO Allies and promote readily available packages. The package of administrative and military functions discussed earlier, where AI can be plugged in, integrated and exploited, would be beneficial for all Allies.

Train. In order to NATO-mate, Allies’ services and units will have to develop in-house AI teams – not only to support their activities, but also to execute an initial sequence of cross-functional enabling projects for different divisions/business units.129 In this respect, since AI talent – as will be discussed – is scarce and difficult to recruit and retain, AI training is particularly important. The A3IC could play a relevant role in providing it. On the one hand, once AI teams are established, they may in fact better understand how to exploit AI for the purpose of the organization. On the other hand, resistance to AI, due to lack of knowledge, is likely: “People are naturally nervous about something they don’t understand”.130 This is the reason why an “enterprise-wide educational programme to teach everyone about the basics of AI and its benefits for the workplace” could help address some concerns and, overall, reduce scepticism.131 The overall goal is to increase AI literacy within NATO and its Allies, as the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence notes.132 However, it is important to emphasize the required conceptual change: not only have individuals to be able to use new tools, but also they also need to be in a position to take full advantage of them. For instance, in business, “intelligent analysts are used to thinking in probabilities […]. But to make a recommendation for action based on probabilities, they need justifications to build their case […]”. AI platforms help conduct scenario planning and build a case for reacting to a probabilistic event.133

Disseminate. It is also imperative that the AI quotient within the Alliance grows. This goes beyond simple training. Nowadays, every employee in an office is expected to have basic IT literacy. This mostly consists of fluency with MS Windows Office. The same should hold for AI: individuals within NATO and the nations should progressively become fluent with the various packages and opportunities. This does not mean that every operator is expected to code or understand the intricacies of how models function. This is more about user interfaces, solutions, and understanding opportunities and limits. Most people use Facebook, Twitter or Instagram on a daily basis. This does not mean they understand the algorithms and the software integration challenges related to third-party applications. In partnership with the existing educational facilities and institutions within, and outside, the Alliance and the Allies, the Centre could coordinate dissemination efforts – whether as part of outreach or education. The ultimate aim of this would be to equip interested stakeholders with the necessary skills and expertise.

Notwithstanding the important contributions this centre could deliver, it is important to be realistic: challenges will emerge with its inception. Three aspects deserve attention. First, discussions about its hierarchical location within existing structures are necessary, but could slow down its creation or hamper its effectiveness. Second, recruitment could generate tensions among different actors. Were the Centre to be filled with AI experts, some could see it as competing unfairly with national authorities. Conversely, were it to provide just support and coordination, some could see it as less useful and effective. Third, ownership and acceptance may be difficult to secure. Its workforce must necessarily be younger than in most other structures, centres and units. This would mean that, without strong leadership at the top, many could be reluctant to accept its support.

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