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Centralization turns the case---now is the key time to shape digital policy to protect Mission Control doctrine

Paolo Spagnoletti & Andrea Salvi 21,. Associate Professor of Information Systems and Organization, Luiss Business School. Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Business and Management at LUISS. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf //pipk

This chapter looks at Mission Command as a manifestation of collective mindfulness for HROs. Mission Command (Auftragstaktik) is a doctrine born to address these environmental constraints through diffused leadership to attain strategic objectives set by the higher ranks. In other words, in a Mission Command framework, the goal is identified and indicated at the top of the command chain – how to reach said goal is delegated to lower ranks and to specialists. Decisions in this context are a by-product of a thorough situational analysis that encompasses evidence from the battlefield, condensed in tactical decisions and abiding the strategic address laid out by high-rank decision makers. Such a course of action requires high levels of cooperation and trust at multiple levels. In first place, lower units – at all levels – need to be aware of the strategic goals set by the commanding officers and – most importantly – they need to embrace and share their rationale. Secondly, horizontal coordination is required: the operating units need to trust each other. Thirdly, lower officers need to fully embrace the logic of mission command and take initiative to accomplish the mission.

Such doctrine is in stark contrast with the so-called “managerial approach” adamantly adopted and renown among the ranks of the US Army almost until the Vietnam War (Shamir, 2010). The latter was heavily reliant on traditional “business oriented techniques”: decisions were taken from above, making use of large volumes of data. As Shamir (2010: 649) puts it: “the managerial approach is characterized by centralization, standardization, detailed planning quantitative analysis and aspires for maximum efficiency and certainty”. In other words, the command chain promoted and enforced a purely vertical doctrine of command, rewarding compliance with meticulously detailed orders and discouraging deviance from the established pathway.

Starting from the eighties, both the British and American Army progressively turned into a more decentralized philosophy of command (Farrell, 2008; Shamir, 2011), better suited ”to contend with the demands, uncertainties and frictions of command in war” (Yardley & Kakabadse, 2007; British Army, 1995). Said management methodology has been codified in doctrinal documents (see e.g. US Department of the Army, 2014; NATO, 2010; UK MoD, 2014), and most military organizations have adapted to it and took measures to implement it in manoeuvre warfare. These measures include extensive training and leadership programs as well as renewed tactical practices. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that Mission Command increases operative efficacy (Yardley & Kakabadse, 2007). Moreover, it fosters widespread engagement and diffused ownership. Given that “no plan survives the first contact with the enemy” (Hughes, 1995), flexibility and freedom of action are values to be actively pursued: “This requires understanding your superior commanders’ intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, good organisation and good communications” (UK MoD, 2014: 31). Despite this promise of success, the literature argues that modern military theory is grounded on Mission Command, but the extent to which extent it has been implemented at various levels is rather unclear (Shamir, 2010).

Yet, the growing use and the organizational implementations of real-time control system technologies have led to the renaissance of direct supervision and micro-management practices (Storr, 2003). Given the availability of fine-grained and detailed data, commanders have an incentive to centralize the decisionmaking process pushing towards a more task-oriented approach. The new wave of digitalization has brought cutting-edge remote-controlled technologies, automatic arms systems and data analytics tools that have seen a widespread application in modern warfare and in recent campaigns. High-rank officers can de-facto monitor and control the battlefield from afar, providing platoons with real-time orders. This approach led to the resurgence of Command and Control (C2), deemed a re-emergent doctrine mainly in Western and technology-intensive armies (Connor, 2002). In principle, these systems are able to provide commanders with clear insights from the operative ground and with a level of “intimacy previously reserved for the men in the trenches” (Shamir, 2011: 166). As a result, according to the critics of this system, flexibility and initiative will be hampered with the result of a progressive de-responsibilization of subordinates (Bateman, 1996). Thus, digitalization seems to be intrinsically in contrast with Mission Command, as “C2 leaders” would be prone to establish a more direct control over the structure. This is problematic for the entire command pyramid: “remote commanders” are less likely be warranted trust from the lower ranks.

This chapter conceptualizes the tension between the centripetal force of digitalization and the diffused leadership underlying Mission Command. It critically reviews the main contributions in the field and concludes that digital tools may be shaped in such a way to favor Mission Command, instead of contrasting its core principles. In other words, Big Data, and other advanced data-driven coordination tools, can be used as means to foster widespread responsibility and tactical awareness in extreme contexts. Therefore, the goal of the analysis is to discuss affordances and constraints of digitalization in command and control of military operations.

The first part of this chapter reviews the concept of Mission Command and presents evidence of its applications and adaptations in contemporary military organizations. The second part will discuss the limits of Mission Command vis-a-vis the digitalization. Furthermore, the study will present the main feature of the C2 approach that supposedly better fit a digitized army. Lastly, it will evaluate the co-existence of digital tools and Mission Command exploring avenues for a balancing stance. This work aims to make a contribution to the field of organizational studies and to that of military studies. It constitutes the first step of a broader project that will test the authors’ claim, empirically resorting to interviews and focus-groups.

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