Digitalization threatens mission command---CP solves
Paolo Spagnoletti & Andrea Salvi 21,. Associate Professor of Information Systems and Organization, Luiss Business School. Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Business and Management at LUISS. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf //pipk
As recounted in the previous section, the debacle in the Vietnam War posited the need for a change, and Mission Command slowly gained prevalence. Nonetheless, digitalization posits several challenges to this doctrine. Remote-controlled technologies as well as automatic arms systems and real-time data intelligence have been seeing a widespread application in military organizations. These devices and techniques provide higher ranks with a virtually unlimited control over their subordinates. Being able to see, hear and evaluate what a platoon experiences, commanders may have an incentive to give tactical directions transcending the original intent-setter role. The archetypal scenario would be that of a circle of officers sitting in a controlroom, overseeing and leading a unit on the other side of the globe. As an anecdotal example, in 2011, during Operation Neptune Spear that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden, the President of the United States was able to receive live updates from the battlefield in the White House Situation Room. The risk – or the promise – is that of a renaissance of micromanagement (Storr, 2003). This approach has brought some authors to announce the re-emergence of a C2 doctrine typical of technology-intensive armies (Connor, 2002). This is further reinforced by the widespread use of semi-automated firepower: drones and tele-guided artillery strikes have become a frequent complement to the activity of soldiers. Despite their effectiveness, these tools are managed from the center of the command structure and risk to eliminate the discretion of soldiers on the ground to decide when and where to use them based on sheer necessity. As mentioned in the introduction, technological advancements provide high officers with more intimacy, with the battlefield tempting them to “impose their preferences on tactical units” (Augier et al., 2014: 1430).
This is inherently a risk for the Mission Command model. The centripetal effect of this technologies may hamper initiative and frustrate flexibility. As Augier et al. (2014) argue, changes brought by the implementation of technological systems may have consequences on an organization’s ability to learn and adapt. In turn, subordinates will have an incentive towards de-responsibilization (Bateman, 1996).
While this is not an automatic process, the lack of ‘practice in choosing’ may lead to a progressive desensitization to contingency. Furthermore, the introduction of these new technologies does not entirely dissolve the risk of the fog of war. As it was outlined in the very opening of this piece, uncertainty is hardly eliminated from a ‘boots on the ground’ scenario. Data may be inaccurate or discontinued due to technical issues: in that case, the cost in human capital may be conspicuous. It follows that “if the confidence of senior leaders outpaces the efficacy of the technology” (Augier et al., 2014: 1430), the space for tactical adaptation may be severely reduced.
In other words, taking away the power to make decisions from the operational level inevitably decreases situational awareness. In turn, as shown in the figures above, this will impact the plans’ effectiveness in the long-run, in cases whereby the flow of information is interrupted or erroneous. Furthermore, this approach makes trust harder to establish, as servicemen would be asked to follow vertically-imposed orders. Empirical examples of this phenomenon include the implementation of the Below-Blue Force Tracker (BFT). Among other functions, it provides the command center with the GPS coordinates and real-time tracking of the movements of troops. The original rationale behind this system is allowing a more agile manoeuvring at the tactical level, vis-à-vis the fine-grained disaggregated data. Conversely, the command center can use the aggregated data to provide units with strategic directions (Augier et al., 2014). The estimated marginal effect of its implementation translated in a reduction of Blue-on-Blue events between 24% and 12% in the Gulf War, increasing situational awareness of commanders not only towards enemy forces, but especially towards movement of allied ones (Augier et al., 2014).
Yet, having more trust in technology than in the lower levels of the organization is highly problematic. In 2003, General Franks of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) made use of BFT to push forward idled units that did not adopt an aggressive advancement as seen fit to higher strategic goals (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Furthermore, empirical evidence from surveys suggest that most of the times BFT was used to issue direct orders from the headquarters to Marine platoon commanders, with a progressive centralization of the tactical decision-making (Dreier & Birgl, 2010).
Digitalization and Fragmented Coordination in Military Operations The review of previous studies on data technology in military operations sheds light on the tensions between the centripetal force of digitalization and the diffused leadership principle underlying Mission Command. It is then possible to conclude that digital tools may be shaped in such a way to favor Mission Command, instead of contrasting its core principles. In other words, Big Data, and other advanced data-driven coordination tools, can be used as means to foster widespread responsibility and tactical awareness in extreme contexts. Technical advancements can be used to better support coordination in Mission Command, and do not intrinsically threat the applicability of the doctrine. This chapter thus claims that digitization does not automatically imply a C2 structure. The implementation of new technologies should be adapted to the decentralized nature of a Mission Command environment. A catch-all product indeed has a centripetal effect, while a carefully tailored one may be able to foster diffused ownership. Equipping different branches of the organization with ad hoc tools based on their operative needs and requirements would further their capacity to take initiative, increase situational awareness and act in accordance with the commanders’ intent.
This analysis shows how C2 decisions are embedded in the institutional context of military operations, and highlights affordances and constraints of digital technologies in this specific domain (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). Since fragmentation has been recognized as a suitable coordination mode in the fast-paced environment of extreme contexts (Wolbers et al., 2018), this chapter claims that combat units in military organizations can achieve flexibility, sensitivity to operations, and improvisation by designing C2 systems that support fragmentation more than integration. By focusing on digital technologies’ role in supporting working around procedures, task delegation, and expertise, further studies can develop a design theory for digital tools effectively supporting the fragmentation paradigm (Wolbers et al., 2018).
In addition to fragmentation in coordination, the present study suggests looking into other affordances of data technologies, such as those emerging in their application to training and simulations tools. Military organizations operate under special conditions characterized by extreme events with a high potential magnitude of consequences for both organizational members and often hostile and non-hostile actors at risk. As military organizations engage in extreme events less frequently than other organizations (e.g. trauma organizations), they may require more extensive collective training and simulations. Due to chance of casualties, such training requires redundancies and cross-functional exercises to ensure flexible job rotation and contingency-driven substitutions. In military organizations, since they often operate under austere conditions or time constraints do not allow personnel replacements, team members must be ready to step up and take the role of other team members, or assume formal leadership positions if leaders are lost. This requires a balance between generalization and specialization – necessitating advanced training and simulations tools for leader-development across combat units. Therefore, future studies can apply a contingency approach to investigate the fit between data technologies and leadership development in extreme contexts (Hannah et al., 2009).
Finally, this study revitalizes the long-standing centralization and decentralization debate in organization studies (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992), revising it in light of new digital trends. The analysis instantiates the contradiction between data-processing capabilities seen as both centralized hierarchical control systems and as decentralized internal control and interfaces supporting semi-autonomous units. Further empirical investigations on the mechanisms and conditions under which Big Data capabilities can lead to organizational performance in extreme contexts can contribute to work through this dilemma (Mikalef et al., 2018 and 2020).