Bipolarity inevitable, stable, and solves nuclear conflict
Kupchan 22 (Cliff Kupchan, “Bipolarity is Back: Why it Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, February 2nd 2022, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457?scroll=top&needAccess=true, NAS)
Bipolarity is no longer returning—it is here, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. News today is dominated by US-China relations, indicating a recognition of today’s bipolar system, and China continues to close the gap in the economic realm. The effects of this bipolarity have substantially deepened as elites in both Washington and Beijing have become aware of the new global structure and are acting accordingly. Structure and beliefs are amplifying each other.
Because the world now has a bipolar distribution of capabilities, it will be more peaceful than expected by the consensus view. Bipolar structures deductively and empirically tend to be peaceful (stable); regarding great power war—it is unlikely to happen. That prognosis for the current period is strengthened because balancing or competition between China and the United States will occur in the economic arena to a far greater extent than in the more dangerous military realm. The term “Cold Peace” best captures the current system; it will be broadly peaceful but by no means warm. Nationalist views in both the United States and China present a potential risk to the stability forecast by bipolarity, primarily through the specter of military conflict over Taiwan. This risk, however, is much overhyped—predictability and nuclear deterrence will very likely deter an invasion and preserve the Cold Peace.
Competition in the economic arena will be far greater than the more dangerous military realm
Bipolarity will, however, spur Chinese revisionism in some key economic arenas, with direct implications for both geopolitics and firms. This essay links the latest political science to market outcomes, drawing heavily on realist thought, which posits that the distribution of capabilities produces a structure that is the single greatest determinant of outcomes. The presence of nuclear weapons is also a major driver on the systemic level. It breaks from classical realism in recognizing that elite beliefs are a third, significant driver of events.
The essay will first present the evidence that the current system is bipolar. It then explains why bipolarity, nuclear weapons, and elite beliefs are the key drivers of states’ policies. The piece then fleshes out implications of the model for subsections of the international order and concludes with implications for geopolitics.
The Data on Bipolarity
The evidence shows that the geopolitical system is bipolar, albeit with a considerable degree of asymmetry because of US military dominance. Bipolarity is established by data sufficient to support the claim that two superpowers are: 1) broadly peer competitors regarding the distribution of capabilities; and 2) separated from the “pack” by a substantial gap. Bipolarity may exist even if there is a large gap between the powers on a key metric. (In 1970, for instance, during a period commonly referred to as bipolar, Soviet nominal GDP was roughly 40% of US GDP). In 2020, Chinese nominal defense spending was 32 percent of US defense spending, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on par with 2019. The gap between China and the number three power, India, is huge; in 2020, India’s nominal defense spending was 29 percent that of China.
The US advantage over China in the military realm is amplified by its alliance network (China has far fewer allies), its nuclear preponderance (3,750 warheads versus roughly 350 for China, likely growing to 1,000 by 2030), and its military-technological advantage. In addition, the US has at least 65 overseas bases, while China has one—in Djibouti. US superiority is sufficient to establish strategic stability and deter China from balancing against the US on a global level in the military realm, at least for the foreseeable future. The gap is simply too big. Regarding the sub-balance in the Asia-Pacific region, the trend is toward parity, and balancing is ongoing. A focus of China’s military modernization has been to balance or surpass US power in the Taiwan Strait. While China is closing the regional gap with the United States in terms of air power and missile coverage, Washington still leads when it comes to power projection capacity and the ability to conduct joint combat operations.
Regarding economics, China is much closer to a peer competitor. Its nominal GDP was 71 percent that of the United States in 2020, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), up from 67 percent in 2019. The IMF predicts that number will rise to 74 percent in 2021, and many sources predict China will surpass the United States within two decades. Japan is third at 34 percent of China’s GDP. With regard to research and development, China has drawn dramatically close to the United States. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that in 2019, Chinese spending was 84 percent of the US, up from 47 percent in 2010. The third-ranked country, Japan, spends 36 percent of China’s budget. China also leads the US on trade volume and on overall investment. The rapidly narrowing economic gap warrants graduation to full bipolarity. And it is in this realm that severe balancing and competition will occur.
Both countries are emerging from the pandemic with their formidable structural strengths intact. The United States possesses the strongest financial system, its currency remains dominant, it is a leader in innovation, and it has one of the most favorable demographic outlooks among leading powers. China has enormous innovative capacity, a high savings rate, and the ability to mobilize and direct resources.
Soft power—the power to influence through attraction—affects outcomes as well. Its impact is often less important than hard military or economic power, and it is harder to measure. However, data from the Pew Research Center show that this is the most significant locus of change over the past year—a dramatic drop in China’s favorability ratings among major industrialized countries. Meanwhile, foreign approval ratings for President Joe Biden are massively higher than those of former president Donald Trump, suggesting a surge in US soft power.
These structural trends are robust. That said, each country has challenges, such as political polarization in the United States, and debt and demographic issues in China. A disjuncture like the breakup of the Soviet Union is possible in either country, and this would end bipolarity. But in coming decades that is unlikely because the structural strengths of both countries are so profound. The data suggest that this is a bipolar era, if a partly asymmetric one, and that COVID-19 did nothing to change that structure and little to affect its details.
Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Peace
Bipolarity and nuclear weapons combined provide strong guardrails against a great power war, a fact that is often overlooked in the context of escalating US-China tensions and hand wringing about a new Cold War. Bipolarity is less stable than the unipolar period that preceded it, but more stable than the multipolar future that many observers foresee. In bipolar systems, the superpowers primarily use internal balancing, such as arms buildups and bolstering economic strength, to offset each other’s capabilities. External balancing, such as the formation of alliances, is of secondary importance because of the powers’ outsized capabilities. This yields stability because internal balancing is more predictable, reliable, and transparent than the use of alliances.
History is replete with examples of destabilizing alliance defections under multipolarity. For instance, alliance jockeying in a multipolar landscape played a role in the onset of both World War I and World War II. The 1890 suspension of Germany’s secret reinsurance with Russia set in motion balancing dynamics that ultimately produced war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. During the 1930s, alliance defections and buck-passing cleared the way for Nazi Germany’s unchecked advances both before and after the outbreak of World War II. In other words, operationally a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one because the two main powers need to focus primarily on the actions of the other—and not on those of many countries, as is necessary under multipolarity.
Nuclear weapons, and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level, add a huge overlay of caution to behavior. When two superpowers possess an assured second-strike capability, each can cause the other catastrophic harm—and that induces extreme caution. Weapons deployments and competitions will continue, and advanced technologies will pose challenges to nuclear stability. War between two nuclear-armed superpowers is surely possible; but the bottom line remains that nuclear weapons make it very unlikely. Moreover, this caution interacts with the predictability of bipolarity to increase restraint. A nation that can see what is coming and is already very cautious is unlikely to miscalculate on decisions of war and peace.
Bipolarity also injects a binary, fragmenting impulse into international relations. Both superpowers pursue their interests, and spheres of influence result. This imparts the fragmentation dynamic into existing international relations and institutions.
Nuclear weapons and the predictability of bipolarity both increase security caution and restraint
Lastly, several features of the current operation of bipolarity and nuclear weapons are important. First, as it did during the Cold War, some external balancing will occur, but it is of second-order importance compared to the power of the two leading countries. Each superpower is, as expected, recruiting allies, with the US focusing on the EU, the UK, and Australia, while China focuses on emerging markets. China is balancing almost exclusively internally, in line with the expectations of bipolarity—in part because of the lack of allies. While the US is primarily using internal balancing, Biden is also trying to form a balancing coalition against China. His main successes so far have been a harder-line EU policy and, in the military realm, AUKUS. The latter, if the 8 agreed nuclear subs are built, will add to deterrence. But even in this narrow field, deterrence will primarily rest with internal balancing—flowing from the US and its large fleet, which currently stands at 68 nuclear subs. Second, China and Russia on some issues balance against the US, which at times marginally increases China’s influence. But on military issues, where balancing is especially dangerous, it is very difficult to devise a credible scenario in which Russia decides to join China in a war against the US. Third, with focus on the US and China, scholars have laid out the structural risks of war that occurs in the context of a rising and a ruling power. Historically, this dynamic often leads to war. But the aspirations of the new power and the fears of the older one are doused by strong caution in the nuclear age.