Offshore balancing fails. It causes proxy conflict, intervention, and instability
McKeil 22 (Aaron McKeil, London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony”, Journal of Global Security Studies, 2022, https://watermark.silverchair.com/ogab020.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAsUwggLBBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKyMIICrgIBADCCAqcGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMxzftFwOe6eKqb9NBAgEQgIICeKPdAGy8yiDxcz_bwBdOtfXnZln6BmGfdhIW0XPNYzggwhWF8Y9QBLY4EDStNk8kYgNtlTIIxyBlY6T9RIKirYnqPVZlGmU1sZDUTOCK1nHyvGZeKGp54iPIyYpd972caLCXU65oK-M6LDc4vsm7oggbalR64MybdKfN5agWBxmmPJ2nbLyAm2HWGf9p8KyxUT1zLEDxuafVQbWL3KdIwoATfeUXYFGzNZM7w9dgokGD_i04R1dX9ee0nPWuon2g8yDvTm3MA_DwhintNM4gHja4xYHxNdhOcQJbXTaymbXWQo6riHzUILd3NAe-6s4Bf7gaKp5CsN8DblNJyl_Tr0Bx0NteHO_o6RQRUkEldfQnBdea4s-f3II-qU_rMTPHheGJcN5_Xs1uj0ew43Y6vY21l0NUKnwJsv9vPJrXfiKG16VADRkbh1pTnobXIHwQaF8YbFFpfxLL-1IsYWHcI53MG9onpv-0kbfmFAZon0HCim1g8bPGkGxtH_M-c-cJ_OxSU2mj7syBJAw6G4BUAxBrby5sCvelFmF3YfyvuM4uSnAYuSEB2YGRP1YKgEki8TSPZ4HxlTmbfhMl4Z-mwTAEPtltDULDhS5P_3cZEs7Tre8sJWgw7FO4cgNe6ZAhHYTNw85vwqSw-fjxC1TxUc-5vbNGeRnIlNPsolwwZv9pweig8V04qZQNbfW09F2oCHP_TQRrwOctXYAi26E43VgjXQFHQUBvM3PwvuZwm29iymqVnecacJFkJJm0JVBV2b6PTknRszYfo42tRIe3LfIBNJu4-XngzGsBYrZIdpkL4cjmnE-ftr3DohphYjunpDBBs9oCZWt6, NAS)
The Limits of Realist Policy Alternatives Regardless of any analytical limitations of their critiques, however, the pragmatically more significant shortcoming of realist critiques is their struggle to offer more promising alternative paths to international order. Although realist critics identify important problems with liberal hegemony, what of the alternative international order strategies they offer? Are defenders of a US-led “liberal” international order project right that despite its flaws it is still nevertheless the best international order strategy among bad options, if modifications are made? While the critiques leveled by realists may identify important problems and make some damaging points, the alternative policy proposals they offer suffer from their own serious limitations, when scrutinized. From closer examination and consideration, that is, these limitations of alternative realist foreign policies questions their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems associated with liberal internationalism. Realist critics have offered variations on balance of power foreign policy proposals, suggesting that the deployment and use of US forces should be restricted to only vital US interests, while abandoning ambitions of democratizing other states.Mearsheimer and Walt in particular make cases for “restraint” and “offshore balancing,” meaning a reservation of the use of force to the most serious threats to US power, coupled with a policy to prevent China’s assumption of regional hegemony in Asia (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). Mearsheimer explains that when following a realist policy of restraint, there are only a limited number of regions where [the US] should be willing to risk a war. Those places include the great power’s own neighbourhood and distant areas that are either home to another great power or the site of a critically important resource. For the United States, three regions outside the Western Hemisphere are of vital strategic importance today: Europe and East Asia, because that is where the other great powers are located; and the Persian Gulf, because it is the main source of an exceptionally important resource, oil. (Mearsheimer 2018, 222)
Mearsheimer argues this more strategically “restrained” policy will better manage the balance of power, reduce the amount of wars by eliminating liberal interventionism, and improve great power diplomatic relations by easing liberal antagonism of non-democracies. Walt likewise strongly argues for realist foreign policy of “offshore balancing”, meaning a deployment of US forces only where necessary, while more heavily relying on allies and strategic partners to balance regional challengers and Russia and China. Walt provides a clear description of this policy and its logic, worth quoting at length, to fairly convey its contents: Under a strategy of offshore balancing, the proper role and size of the U.S. national security establishment depends on the distribution of power in the key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Gulf, there is little reason to deploy U.S. ground or air forces there and little need for a national security establishment that dwarfs those of the major powers. If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States should turn to local forces as the first line of defense. It should expect them to uphold the regional balance of power out of their own self-interest and to deal with local security challenges themselves. Washington might provide material assistance and pledge to support certain regional powers if they were in danger of being conquered, but it should refrain from deploying significant U.S. forces under most conditions… In essence, this strategy aims to keep U.S. forces “offshore” for as long as possible while recognizing that sometimes the United States will have to come onshore even before a conflict starts. If that happens, the United States should get its allies in the region to do as much of the heavy lifting as possible and go back offshore once the threat has been defeated. (Walt 2018, 262–63) The realist foreign policy alternative of “offshore balancing” aims to balance against potential hegemons in overseas regions, but with emphasis on using US allies to invest in that balancing. The benefits of this policy, Walt argues, are partly that it reduces costs by requiring allies to contribute more, but more importantly that it preserves US power by managing its de ployment and avoiding costly interventions with US forces. Compared to a policy of liberal hegemony that has been troubled by costly military interventions, these realist policy alternatives on a superficial reading appear sensible and even peace-loving, because they advocate restricting intervention to a much higher threshold condition of defending vital security interests. Yet, under scrutiny, these realist policy proposals suffer from two key limitations that ultimately question their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder (McKeil 2021), even if they avoided the problems associated with liberal interventionism. Firstly, and most troubling, is the likelihood that realist policy alternatives would contribute to proxy wars between the great powers in strategic regions. That is, a realist policy of restraint and offshore balancing means less US-led interventionism, but an equal amount and plausibly more proxy wars, where the United States would seek to defend its strategic interests indirectly. In fairness to realist policies, they prudently cede key states neighboring Russia and China, such as Ukraine and Myanmar, thereby avoiding proxy wars in such strategically sensitive territories (Mearsheimer 2014). It is nevertheless concerning, however, that realist proposals for “restraint” and “offshore balancing” do not offer a genuine foreign policy alternative for crises such as Syria, where both the Obama and Trump administrations have already sought to avoid direct intervention, by waging protracted a proxy war with regional consequences and casualties in the hundreds of thousands. The costs and dramatically circumscribed successes of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Libya, have already made it an increasingly commonsense belief that direct interventions are infeasible, even misguided, but this has suggested to many that therefore more use of proxies is the only feasible policy option for certain crises. The literature on proxy wars suggests that states engage in proxy wars when their interests are perceived to be threatened, but direct intervention with their own forces is also perceived to be too high-risk or too costly (Groh 2019, 8). Proxy wars are “war on the cheap” and they have the advantage of reducing potential escalation to direct great power conflict and nuclear war at the highest and last stage of escalation. A policy of restraint as such follows the perception that use of US forces in small wars is too costly and too high-risk where great powers may come into direct conflict. Yet, by increasing this threshold for intervention, realist policy alternatives decrease the threshold at which the United States would use strategic partners to wage proxy wars against assumptive hegemons, or to suppress terrorist groups, or secure vital resources. Let me unpack these points further. A degree of skepticism is warranted about the extent to which realist policies of restraint and offshore balancing would be conducive to international order, and not a series of protracted proxy wars. As a recent study on proxy wars notes, “If the United States does less, it must rely on others to do more” (Berman and Lake 2019, 3). Inversely, however, if the United States does less, its proxies must also rely on the United States for more support, and when allies and partners engage in conflict for their own interests, for instance, they likely will call for support in terms of kit, including heavy arms, finance, training, and perhaps air support, even while US “boots on the ground” are denied. Where crises emerge and allies and strategic partners become unstable or engaged in a local or regional conflict, a realist-guided US foreign policy would be inclined to support US partners and allies as proxies for US forces. Because the use of US forces would have a higher threshold, but because realists also advise maintaining the material balance of power, a realist-guided US foreign policy would become more easily persuaded to engage in proxy wars. Furthermore, because it is a “cheap” way to balance, the United States could engage a wide number of proxy wars simultaneously, almost indefinitely. This strategic environment would also tempt the United States to trap Russian or Chinese forces in costly protracted wars against US proxies, along the model of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a strategy to drain the power of China and Russia and limit their ability to engage in other conflicts. The potential for a wide number of proxy wars could potentially condemn the twenty-first century to the miseries and suffering of a series of protracted proxy wars waged with ever-more sophisticated weapons technology. Proxy wars are an immense source of international disorder because they tend to be protracted, devastating the countries in which they are waged. They are also generative of regional consequences including humanitarian and refugee crises, as well as new military groups operating across borders, whose long-term alignment with the United States is not always ensured. The Syrian civil war, for example, evolved into a proxy war with immense loss of life and consequences for regional stability (Hughes 2014). It involved embedding of US forces in proxy forces against Russian-supported government forces. At the same time, the diminishing presence of the United States in the region and inconsistent US support for key partners has been a critical contributor to the intensity, duration, and regional involvement in the Syrian conflict (Phillips 2020). Realists rightly suggest diplomacy is required to unwind the conflict in Syria, yet, where the United States withdraws its presence, as realist policies advise, proxy wars will tend to continue and emerge without diplomatic breakthroughs, which require years to develop, achieve, and implement. Realist thinkers foresee as an emerging “bounded order”, divided between China and the United States (Mearsheimer 2019). A bounded order pocketed by a series of proxy wars is not unimaginable and well within the realist vision of the emerging twenty-first century. The conditions of potential nuclear war and the global scope of the struggle made proxy warfare a common ingredient of the Cold War. A realist policy of US restraint and offshore balancing without sufficient additional measures to develop a stable international order likely would contribute to a series of proxy wars between the great powers seeking to support their partners and defend their vital interests through proxy forces in key regions. The fighting itself would invariably differ from that of the Cold War with state and nonstate proxies likely being mixed with use of remote weapons and cyber war, for instance (Innes 2012; Krieg and Rickli 2019). The ideological contest between the great powers will also instead likely become increasingly geo-cultural and geo-civilizational, not simply geostrategic or purely geopolitical (Coker 2019; Acharya 2020). But the conditions of security competition, high risks of direct conflict, lower costs of proxy warfare, and realist proposals for doctrines limiting the use of US forces with little other institutional measures for managing conflict likely would precipitate protracted proxy wars where conflicts emerge. Proxy wars, moreover, are an international activity with virtually no international rules beyond those applying to the conduct of war in general. This assessment of realist foreign policy proposals suggests that additional policy measures are required for developing a stable international order, to avoid proxy wars where possible and to contain and resolve them when they do emerge, in addition to further global challenges. Realists are not opposed to the use of diplomacy to avoid and manage conflict. To the contrary, they encourage it, but in encouraging the use of diplomacy it is crucial to recognize that diplomacy also requires the support of international institutions and established diplomatic networks. Diplomatic breakthroughs are difficult to achieve, requiring years of skillful and patient negotiations. Diplomacy, moreover, is an inconstant and limited tool without the support of broader international institutions that provide mechanisms of delay, ongoing networks of collaborative great power pressure on belligerent parties, and collaboratively developed processes and agreed terms of dispute resolution, negotiation, and mediation. Realist critics of liberal hegemony often suggest policy-fuzzy gestures toward diplomacy and accommodation. Porter for instance argues that the United States should abandon liberal hegemony in favor of détentestyle collaboration with illiberal powers in the making of global order (Porter 2020, 170–99). The key strategic proposal Porter advances is to attempt a settlement with Russia with significant mutual concessions, including sacrificing the interests of non-NATO countries on its eastern flank, in order to ease the growing sense of mutual threat. To facilitate negotiations, the USA should revive government-togovernment dialogue to reach a new bargain. (Porter 2020, 187) This is a strategy to ease pressure on Russia, in the hopes of encouraging tensions between Russia and China, which Porter proposes to combine with a reduction of forces in the Middle East, and a containment strategy against China in Asia, by cultivating regional strategic partners. This proposal in the abstract sounds promising and genuinely contains helpful strategic thought, but does not propose sufficient measures to produce a lasting and stable order, and crucially requires the willingness to collaborate from Russia, which Porter admits is not guaranteed to be forthcoming (Porter 2020, 188). There is surely more needed for the construction of a stable and lasting order between the United States and China than a containment balancing strategy, even if it were successful in dividing Russia from China. Where the first proxy war between the United States and China would emerge can only be speculated. China, like the United States, has the capacity to wage indirect warfare, incentives to avoid direct conflict, and experience from the Cold War. This as such poses a second limitation of realist policy alternatives; they are insufficiently ambitious in developing new and revised ordering of international institutions and take for granted the role of deeper primary institutions in producing international order (Mearsheimer 1994–1995).2 With limited confidence in the use of international institutions, realists struggle to provide a substantive and sufficient strategy for producing international order. Realists do acknowledge the importance of major institutions such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization for providing general 2 In this discussion, I define international institutions both narrowly as regulative organizations and broadly as bundles of constitutive and patterning rules and norms. “rules of the road” that clarify expectations among states (Mearsheimer 2018, 131; Walt 2018, 71). Yet, realists offer no suggestions for reforming these institutions for current challenges, nor do they see much promise in developing new institutions, and ultimately claim international institutions are ineffective because they have “no coercive leverage over states” in a context where states in anarchy find themselves in security competition precipitating conflict (Mearsheimer 2018, 131). As Mearsheimer states, “The nub of the dispute between liberals and realists regarding both institutions and economic interdependence has to do with whether they promote world peace. Liberals believe they ameliorate conflict; realists do not” (Mearsheimer 2018, 143). Walt provides a clear explanation of the realist lack of confidence in institutions where he states, As multilateral organizations such as NATO, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization have shown repeatedly, international institutions can facilitate cooperation when states have clear and obvious incentives to work together, but they cannot stop powerful states from acting as they wish and thus cannot remove the danger of conflict and war. International institutions are simply a tool that states use to advance their interests, and they inevitably reflect the interests of the most powerful states. (Walt 2018, 71) Because institutions lack an ability to coerce great powers, realists claim, they have little to no impact on conflict between great powers that arises as a result of security competition. Because of this lack of realist confidence in institutions, Walt and leading economist Dani Rodrick have instead advanced a global order proposal for constructing a collection of select global “meta-norms” as conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms at a global level (Rodrik and Walt 2021). This proposal is important and in the right direction, as a needed element of building shared global order, but it is also a thin set of meta-norms, highly modest and limited in their order-making capacities and ambitions. The proposal does not include integrative institutions to formalize and embed meta-norms, nor does it provide inclusive principles to legitimate those meta-norms beyond the imperative to avoid direct great power conflict. Walt and Rodrick, moreover, suggest that their international order proposal exists within an emerging “bounded order” marked by proxy wars, and concede their meta-norms do little to help mitigate or resolve proxy wars, focusing more on avoiding direct great power conflict (Rodrik and Walt 2021, 20).