Mearsheimer and Walt are wrong; offshore balancing undermines global stability
Hoffman 16 (Frank G. Hoffman, Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Institute and a Distinguished Research Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies”, “Retreating Ashore: The Flaws of Offshore Balancing”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 5th 2016, https://www.fpri.org/2016/07/retreating-ashore-flaws-offshore-balancing/, WC-NAS)
While Offshore Balancing claims some historical evidence and some relevant geostrategic advantages as the basis for an American strategy, there are a few distinct disadvantages from a pragmatic perspective. By passing the buck, Mearsheimer and Walt want to have their cake (America’s core interests preserved) and eat it too (a smaller and less costly defense establishment). The authors note that the U.S. represents only 46% of the NATO Alliance’s aggregate GDP but that our defense spending “contributes” 75% of NATO’s military spending. This is a canard however, as it compares the total US defense establishment as if all these resources were devoted to the defense of NATO countries. Obviously, U.S. defense spending far exceeds the regional-oriented European states. Just as obviously the $535B U.S. defense budget includes resources for homeland defense, military health care, a large American R&D establishment, numerous domestic military bases, and a sizable strategic deterrent. Some of our budget directly supports either our own homeland security or our interests in Asia. But these resources are not directly related to NATO defense and thus the comparison is meaningless. Untested by the pair is the presumption that by withdrawing our forces from Europe and Korea, there will be substantial savings.
Some advocates of this approach would abandon many, if not all, of America’s treaties and security obligations. Walt and Mearsheimer are vague on this in their Foreign Affairs article but many advocates explicitly reject NATO or our bilateral Pacific partners as obligations. Dr. Mearsheimer has called for U.S. in the past. No mention is made about other allies or partners, and presumably Israel is also left adrift to care for itself, until it is nearly overrun.
The biggest flaw in their argument involves allied state behavior if this strategy became operative. This approach argues that it exploits the capabilities of regional players in their own neighborhood where they have vital interests in order to preserve stability. Instead of risking resource overstretch by the extensive investment in building up and posturing U.S. military forces around the globe, Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies would be expected to provide more for their own national and regional security commensurate with their interests. These major regional powers would police themselves in their interaction with other powers.
But this assumes that regional powers share our interests and have the will and capacity to stabilize the region. China’s actions (and Russia’s in the Black Sea or Iran’s in the Persian Gulf) suggest that these assumptions are frail. Mearsheimer and Walt fail to consider the possibility that such countries will not take advantage or operate against U.S. allies negatively. Their hope is an illusion belied by the rising level of geopolitical competition of the last several years. Withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific or Europe is not likely to have a stabilizing effect on these region. This produces a very reactive strategy that arguably increases the chances of a war breaking out, for example in Korea or in the South China Sea.
The fourth problem relates to the law of unintended consequences. As Dr. Hal Brands has noted, this version of OSB appears to offer numerous benefits at little risk, but in fact, the including greater nuclear proliferation, are indeed quite significant. Critical allies like Japan would face a stark choice having to hedge against a lack of commitment from the United States and would need to appease or negotiate a subservient position to Chinese hegemony. Other scholars have noted this particular in OSB:
In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.
A related strategic and operational disadvantage that Mearsheimer and Walt fail to recognize is the presumption that U.S. forces will have the capability to regain access to key regions during crises. Offshore balancing places our forces back at home, far from future flashpoints. The further one distances U.S. capabilities from its interests in critical regions of the world, the slower and harder it is to make an effective response.
Having abandoned Asia or the Middle East, returning after being absent for some time is not a matter of simply sailing back. Having unburdened ourselves of forward stationed forces and basing, port and airfield infrastructure will be needed to deploy forces at great distances, we should be more realistic about the time and cost involved in generating combat power overseas in the absence of access. Regaining access and bringing forces to bear will be harder and take longer for future U.S. Presidents under such a strategy. Embedded in OSB is the notion that American credibility, commitment and capabilities can be “surged” at will. That’s not how the world works. More likely, our perceived detachment would undercut U.S. crisis management actions and our diplomacy. Certainly, it would make U.S. policy actions reactive and belated.
My preferred alternative to OSB was published in Orbis several years ago. This option, which I deliberately titled “,” rejects OSB’s assumptions, its reactive character, and reduces the distance it puts between the U.S. and its friends. This strategy accepts that unilateral action in this century is a bankrupt method and that alliances and multilateral responses are in our interests. This strategy embraces the need to engage broadly with designated partners and friends to preserve regional stability without extensive forward-stationed forces. As suggested by the name, this strategy operates forward with alliances and partners to leverage cooperative and preventive actions to preclude conflicts before they occur. It uses forward-deployed naval power and Special Operations Force assets to generate and sustain preventive actions and promote true partnerships (vice dependencies). The strategy focuses on critical national interests in the global commons, ensuring access to critical markets and resources, for ourselves and our partners. Rather than husbanding our forces ashore in California or Norfolk this strategy is forward with our partners, retaining our regional access, our influence, and our interoperability with our friends. Far better than detachment, this strategy is more reassuring and actually balances. It also provides a flexible deterrent posture that is able to move where and when needed. This element, flexible presence without costly stationary posture, is a far better tool for balancing than what Mearsheimer and Walt offer. In short, OSB–as presented by academics–is less of a strategy about how to secure U.S. interests more efficiently, and is more of a dodge. As presented, it is not a strategy that advances our core interests. Overall, this strategic approach cedes the initiative and our national interests to another power until that power, a friend or foe, takes actions that we deem unacceptable. There is something to be said for restricting imperial overstretch and for calibrating U.S. interests with greater discipline, but sacrificing U.S. leadership and contributions to global stability is simply a retreat, and one that is ill-timed. If there was a strategy destined to accelerate the unraveling of world order, and the establishment of the United States as accelerator to the demise of global stability, this is it. Certainly, in the face of rising revisionist powers and constrained resources, we should not ignore the value of collective security. Surely, as Jakub Grygiel has persuasively argued, we can do more to along the frontiers of freedom. Nor should we shrink from the embattled peripheral countries where allies and partners are and where collective defense is needed to stand up to coercive states. If adopted at this point in history, OSB would just represent another distinct step toward the and the alliance structure that has underwritten peace and prosperity for the last generation. Rather than husband U.S. resources, it abdicates our leadership position, abandons friends and allies, and dismisses our ability to shape events. On one hand it minimizes the possibility of making foreign policy mistakes and eliminates entanglements. But it only does that by increasing instability however, and ensures that U.S. forces will arrive belatedly and at a disadvantage. We need a strategy that avoids being the , without abandoning friends and encouraging opponents. This strategy reenacts the myths of Splendid Isolation that some British policy makers mistook for strategy in the last century. Mearsheimer and Walt’s version, one we might call Delighted Detachment, would be an even worse disaster. OSB, as presented, is a strategy that makes a virtue out of ignoring strategic interests, eluding obligations and responsibilities, and avoiding disciplined strategic choices. Were we living in the 1990s, at the apex of the , this strategy would be relevant. Today, it risks power vacuums, entices regional aggression, and puts U.S. military forces at both a strategic and operational disadvantage. Developing a more viable strategy, without these defects, will be a critical task for the next President.