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AT Crisis Instability

AI doesn’t lower the threshold for war – it is a Political, not Technological issue – banning weapons won’t solve it.

Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The above arguments against employing LAW are valid reasons to be hesitant. However, there are a few points to consider in juxtaposition with them. The “tacticization of strategy” is a problem at the higher levels of government. However, this issue has been a problem long before the idea of LAWs has been considered. The “tacticization of strategy” or the idea that technology could lower the bar to entry into war is not the problem, it is only the symptom of the problem. The problem is the misconception that technology wins wars. LAWs may contribute to that way of thinking but banning them will not make it go away.

Turn – Banning LAWs increases the risk of hacking because it undermines research that helps cyber Defense against hacking.

Messinger 2015 - Research Associate at the Center on Law and Security [Eric January 15, Just Security “Is it Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar?” https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ban-autonomous-weapons-cyberwar/ Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Of course, those familiar with the debate over AWS in kinetic warfare have already heard arguments about potential upsides for efficacy. Yet the nature of the cyber battleground, and especially cyber defense, will provide strong incentives to employ autonomous offensive cyber systems. The cyber theater consists in whole or in part of computerized systems, where the speed of movement is not constrained by the physical limitations of feet and engines and rockets, and where the scope and scale of combat may proceed beyond the ability of human observers to comprehend in real-time. As Dorothy Denning argues, “[a]t the speed of cyber, placing humans in the loop at every step is neither practical nor desirable.” As a result, in direct analogy to defense systems such as anti-missile systems, [m]ost anti-malware and intrusion prevention systems have both manual and automated components. Humans determine what goes into the signature database, and they install and configure the security software. The processes of signature distribution, malicious code and packet detection, and initial response are automated, but humans may be involved in determining the final response. Effective cyber defenses, in short, will have to rely upon automatic routines. Further, to date, the technological development and practical adoption of autonomous weapons systems for defense has progressed further than that of autonomous offensive systems.

Speed is non-unique – adversaries with autonomous weapons will still compress time for decision making.

Lin-Greenberg, 2020 - member of the MIT Security Studies Program [Erik Vol 3, Iss 2 Spring, Texas National Security Review “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making” http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8866 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

An adversary’s use of AI-enabled systems can also compress timelines and complicate alliance decision-making. Just as AI can boost the tempo of allied operations, it can increase the frequency and speed of a rival’s military actions. AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems that allow states to launch military operations without putting personnel in harm’s way may lead rival leaders to launch operations that they might not otherwise carry out.93 China, for instance, has developed and exported autonomous drones capable of identifying targets and carrying out lethal strikes with little or no human oversight.94 Further, a rival’s integration of AI into its command-and-control networks may speed its decision-making process. Indeed, China’s military has expressed an interest in leveraging AI for military decision-making.95 A publication from the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center, for example, described how the use of AI to play the complex board game Go “demonstrated the enormous potential of artificial intelligence in combat command, program deduction, and decisionmaking.”96 These systems could be employed against the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, forcing allied commanders to respond more quickly to these threats.

No solvency – even if the plan eliminates the risk of crisis instability from NATO weapons, Russia and China will still use Their AI.

Allen, 2022 - director of the AI Governance Project at the CSIS [Gregory, May 20, “One Key Challenge for Diplomacy on AI: China’s Military Does Not Want to Talk” TA]

Over the past 10 years, artificial intelligence (AI) technology has become increasingly critical to scientific breakthroughs and technology innovation across an ever-widening set of fields, and warfare is no exception. In pursuit of new sources of competitive advantage, militaries around the world are working to accelerate the integration of AI technology into their capabilities and operations. However, the rise of military AI has brought with it fears of a new AI arms race and a potential new source of unintended conflict escalation. In the May/June 2022 issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, and Laura Resnick Samotin write: “The United States, then, faces dueling risks from AI. If it moves too slowly, Washington could be overtaken by its competitors, jeopardizing national security. But if it moves too fast, it may compromise on safety and build AI systems that breed deadly accidents. Although the former is a larger risk than the latter, it is critical that the United States take safety concerns seriously.” Such fears are not entirely unfounded. Machine learning, the technology paradigm at the heart of the modern AI revolution, brings with it not only opportunities for radically improved performance, but also new failure modes. When it comes to traditional software, the U.S. military has decades of institutional muscle memory related to preventing technical accidents, but building machine learning systems that are reliable enough to be trusted in safety-critical or use-of-force applications is a newer challenge. To its credit, the Department of Defense (DOD) has devoted significant resources and attention to the problem: partnering with industry to make commercial AI test and evaluation capabilities more widely available, announcing AI ethics principles and releasing new guidelines and governance processes to ensure their robust implementation, updating longstanding DOD system safety standards to pay extra attention to machine learning failure modes, and funding a host of AI reliability and trustworthiness research efforts through organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). However, even if the United States were somehow to successfully eliminate the risk of AI accidents in its own military systems—a bold and incredibly challenging goal, to be sure—it still would not have solved risks to the United States from technical failures in Russian and Chinese military AI systems. What if a Chinese AI-enabled early warning system erroneously announces that U.S. forces are launching a surprise attack? The resulting Chinese strike—wrongly believed to be a counterattack—could be the opening salvo of a new war.

Defense planners face uncertainty even without AI weapons.

Lin-Greenberg, 2020 - member of the MIT Security Studies Program [Erik Vol 3, Iss 2 Spring, Texas National Security Review “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making” http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8866 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

Allied decision-makers will also face uncertainty when confronting a rival’s use of AI-enabled technologies. Leaders will be forced to wrestle with whether to respond to actions carried out by AI-enabled systems — like autonomous aircraft or ships — in the same way as actions carried out by traditionally manned assets. Existing doctrine and law are generally silent on these issues, providing no guidance on the appropriate response. States have drafted domestic policies to govern their own use of autonomous weapon systems, but these regulations and international law make no distinction between how states should react to a rival’s AI-enabled military actions versus “traditional” military actions.103 Yet, decision-makers may believe that a rival’s use of AI technologies demands different responses than those involving manned platforms.104 What happens if a rival claims that an attack carried out by an AI-enabled system was the result of a flawed algorithm? Should air defense forces respond differently to an adversary’s autonomous drones that penetrate friendly airspace than to a manned aircraft that does the same? Decision-makers may find themselves with little time to consider these complicated issues, particularly as AI technology accelerates the speed of a rival’s military operations.

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