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Solvency Resps

1. A focus on Ethics distracts attention from other aspects of Responsible Use, and leaves us vulnerable to Unethical states.

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Allies with articulated views also translate their obligation to protect into language on military AI. This can be seen in arguments for the moral imperative to pursue AI-enabled capability development to maintain freedom of action and protect from adversaries whose uses of AI do not respect legal and ethical obligations.190 In these views, maintaining freedom of action can also mean maintaining interoperability, or even developing AI systems that help protect friendly forces, as most allies depend on cooperation to fill capability gaps.191 Beyond operational risks, responsibility also means incorporating ways to minimize risks in the international security environment. DOD has a role to play off the battlefield in this regard as well, including by developing norms around arms control. Allied concerns about diffusion and access, as embedded in the German international security and AI governance agenda, as well as risks that the Dutch identify, make this a compelling area for responsible AI cooperation between defense ministries. In doing so, the United States could find complementary areas of interest with allies that see responsible military AI as encompassing norms in the international environment. In fact, this may be a palatable way to move debates beyond questions exclusive to autonomous weapon systems. While autonomy in weapon systems undoubtedly introduces important questions for ethics, legality, and responsibility, the dominant attention it receives tends to overshadow other aspects of military AI. This not only includes responsible AI implementation, but potentially even the responsibility states have to defend against AI-enabled threats from less ethical adversaries. The fact that most allies are still transitioning from ethical questions wrapped up in autonomy in weapons means that DOD can facilitate and complement their views on ethical and technical dimensions of AI in non-lethal or non-autonomous systems. In doing so, it could help steward the conversation toward other, underrated aspects of ethical design, development, and deployment of military technology.

2. NATO cooperation on ethical principles ignore incoherence in national viewpoints on AI – principles will fail in implementation

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.”64 Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another.65 These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway.66 While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies.67 Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.68 NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation. Many remaining questions and uncertainty will be addressed in NATO’s forthcoming AI ethical principles guidelines. But the guidelines adopted in 2021 do not address every ethical dilemma. Regarding accountability, especially, likely major questions will continue to affect the Alliance. As Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel recently clarified, NATO will offer a framework of responsible use for the Allies—but the question of accountability for member states, as opposed to civilian technology manufacturers for example, is one principle that will not have an easy solution.71

3. No solvency - Human control is vague which prevents it from establishing a norm.

Bode, 2021 - Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark [Ingvild June 25, AutoNorms “Reflecting on the Future Norms of Warfare” https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare-2/ Acc. 5/27/22 TA]

We may therefore continue to have two parallel processes shaping the norms of war and conflict that do not necessarily overlap. Further, even if states agree on setting a legal norm defining a necessary quality of human control, that legal norm is likely going to be ambiguous in character, providing states with a significant amount of leeway. States may therefore continue to engage in use of force practices with AWS in much the same way as before the legal norm was in place. Norms that have emerged as part of practices of designing and using AWS therefore run the risk of undercutting deliberative legal efforts. To counter these dynamics, it is vital that such silent norm-making processes are closely examined closely and publicly expressed. Autonomous weapon systems and an emerging norm of human control The debate about autonomous weapons systems poses fundamental questions to the extent to which the use of force in conflict and warfare, as well as the very application of international law, remains in human hands. At first glance, practically all states parties addressing the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS highlight the importance of maintaining human control over the use of (lethal) force. The most substantial outcome of the GGE yet, the Guiding Principles on LAWS, includes a principle on human-machine interaction. We can therefore observe the potential making of a new legal norm, if states proceed towards a negotiation stage. This option has arguably gathered steam after the ICRC’s clear positioning in favour of new international law around LAWS in May 2021. But any consensus on what quality of human control is appropriate is yet to emerge. Many states favour a long-term view on human control as something that should be present throughout the entire life cycle of a weapon system from design to operation. Further, the US and Australia have argued that autonomous features can enhance human control in specific use of force situations by “effectuating the intent of commanders”. This perspective treats AI as a straightforward extension of human agency. Such thinking downplays the complexity of human-machine interaction and how this challenges the decision-making capacity of humans operating (or working in teams) with AI-driven weapon systems. Indeed, we must consider the extent to which the technology itself, having been designed and conceptualised in a certain way, can itself become a change agent for shaping (new) legal norms.

4. Russia and China take out solvency – they will not model plan.

Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]

With such sentiments abroad, it is no surprise then that the official UK line is that none of its offensive weapons systems will be capable of attacking targets without some degree of human control. As one Ministry of Defence spokesperson put it: ‘The United Kingdom does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them’. This is a laudable but debateable statement. Surely, the UK will be developing purely defensive AI system that are fully autonomous – anti-missile missile systems, for instance – where speed of reaction cannot be left to dithering humans. In a broader sense, though, this is a declared restriction that could put UK forces at a serious disadvantage on future battlefields when it comes to the employment of LAWS. It cannot really be imagined that the likes of China and Russia, as they develop their AI systems, will feel limited by ethical sentiment. Their view will be that they cannot afford to be. They both see themselves as weaker militarily than the combined forces of NATO and its partner countries and, as such, have doctrinally declared that they will be seeking out any asymmetric advantage they can. If these Western powers – including the UK – want to self-restrict their use of LAWS, for instance, then this will be seen by Beijing and Moscow as a weakness to be exploited in an asymmetric sense. There may then come a future scenario where UK force elements, facing adversaries with different ethical standards and free to deploy their ‘killer robots’, would be unable to reciprocate with their own. They could be left exposed; fighting with one arm behind their back.

5. No solvency - The US cannot lead AI collaboration – we are not the AI leader, we lack the AI workforce, and funding is insufficient

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Despite the momentum within the US federal government to prioritize AI and align efforts across the interagency to maintain America’s AI leadership, there are three key challenges that imperil the ability of the US to achieve its strategic goals. Private Sector Landscape: The US leads in many metrics of AI innovation. Notably, the US has the greatest number of AI-related startups and the largest amount of venture capital and private equity funding for AI.151 However, as already described in The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation, China’s AI-related private industry and private funding, combined with government funding, a lack of regulation, and widespread economic espionage constitute threats to America’s edge.152 The decentralized US approach, uncertainty across the US private sector on how to balance sometimes competing economic and ethical considerations, and the weak funding and information sharing links between government, academia, and industry could also hinder US efforts at AI leadership.153 Workforce & AI Talent: As already mentioned, since 2016 the US government has recognized that it needs to build up its domestic workforce of AI talent as the demand exceeds the supply. According to Acting Director of the JAIC Nand Mulchandani, a significant amount of AI talent chooses to work in the private sector. As a result, the US Government’s focus is on leveraging commercial AI offerings instead of only focusing on building internal AI talent.154 Recognizing the growing lucrative nature of the private tech industry, students at American universities are increasingly demanding classwork focused on AI-related fields like computer science. However, universities are unable to match this demand with an appropriate expansion of tenure-track faculty in the same areas.155 US immigration policy also threatens America’s AI edge. Countries like Canada, the UK, and China have reformed their visa processes to attract foreign talent focused on AI research.156 The US may lose its attractiveness to foreign researchers and AI experts if it does not similarly ease immigration procedures including vis-à-vis China, whose nationals have historically been part of America’s science and technology innovation workforce.157 AI Funding: Although the Administration has pledged to increase (non-defense and defense) AI-related spending and absolute AI R&D budget numbers have increased, there are concerns that these numbers may not accurately reflect development. First, as AI-related expenditures have increased, the budget for all government R&D has decreased.158 For example, the President’s budget request for cuts in R&D at NSF, NIH, DOE, and other agencies, would force these government entities to prioritize AI R&D to the detriment of other, potentially equally useful R&D.159 Second, without full transparency about the procedures undertaken to re-classify projects as AI-related, it is not possible to fully credit the supposed increase in AI-related R&D to new AI projects. One analysis by Bloomberg Government of the Pentagon’s FY2020 budget found that approximately 27% of the legacy AI-related activities had not included any AI components or descriptors in the previous year budget.160,161 Observers have suggested that the DoD was partaking in “AI-washing,” or exaggerating the increase in its AI-related R&D to meet government imposed objectives. 162 The US government will need to be careful that initiatives to enhance AI innovation do not foster a zero-sum competition between AI and other S&T research but instead foster genuine innovation.

6. No solvency – most AI technology is available from private companies – this guarantees circumvention.

Horowitz, 2018 – prof of political science at the Univ of Pennsylvania [Michael C., May, Texas National Security Review, The Scholar “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power” Acc 5/14/22 TA]

What countries benefit from AI will depend in part on where militarily-relevant innovations come from. Non-military institutions, such as private companies and academic departments, are pushing the boundaries of what is possible in the realm of artificial intelligence. While some AI and robotics companies, such as Boston Dynamics, receive military research and development funding, others, such as DeepMind, do not, and actively reject engaging with military organizations.12 Unlike stealth technology, which has a fundamentally military purpose, artificial intelligence has uses as varied as shopping, agriculture, and stock trading. If commercially-driven AI continues to fuel innovation, and the types of algorithms militaries might one day use are closely related to civilian applications, advances in AI are likely to diffuse more rapidly to militaries around the world. AI competition could feature actors across the globe developing AI capabilities, much like late- 19th-century competition in steel and chemicals. The potential for diffusion would make it more difficult to maintain “first-mover advantages” in applications of narrow AI. This could change the balance of power, narrowing the gap in military capabilities not only between the United States and China but between others as well.

7. It is impossible to ban autonomous AI systems – there is no agreed upon definition of lethal autonomy.

Horowitz, 2019 - Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania [Michael C. May 2“When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability” https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348356 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The arms control dilemma, in this case, is that the more the possession of LAWS improves the ability of a military to fight and win the nation’s wars, the harder it will become for the international community to effectively regulate them. That does not make regulation impossible, to be clear. But the dynamic described above whereby the dual-use character of AI means some types of LAWS could be accessible to many militaries, not just major powers, means a broader set of states would have something to lose, from a capabilities perspective, through regulation. It also gives a broader number of states potential interest in regulation. Uncertainty surrounding the definition of a lethal autonomous weapon system, though not a central focus of this paper, could also make traditional arms control more difficult. From nuclear treaties like the Limited Test Ban Treaty to the Ottawa Convention, successful arms control agreements have generally tackled discrete technologies. The breadth of the category of AI and difficulties in defining what constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system at the margins are making reaching agreement on a definition of lethal autonomous weapon system challenging at the international level.

8. Technological Determinism takes out solvency – NATO is too committed to competition for innovation.

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

A number of NATO entities carry out strategic and policy planning, recognizing the importance of policy alignment to sustain political strength and military effectiveness. As relates to S&T, allies’ representations to NATO, defense ministries, and policy entrepreneurs from the relevant entities summarized in Table 69.1 support and negotiate how the Alliance approaches EDTs. NATO’s strategic documentation and forward-looking policy analysis incorporates hints of technological determinism, including noting how technological change inevitably shapes the future strategic and operating environment. Further, the connections between technology and competitive advantage over adversaries and competitors are embodied in the Alliance’s desire to maintain its “technological edge” as the “foundation upon which NATO’s ability to deter and defend against potential threats ultimately rests.”50 This places technology squarely within NATO’s core purpose of deterrence and defense—and while this signals NATO’s express commitment to technology through these channels, this reliance on technology also obscures whether NATO’s governance capacity will be adaptive, anticipatory, or participatory. This position of technological determinism may result in more limitations for AI governance.

9. No solvency – it is easy to circumvent Human Control Norm – weapons can shift easily from autonomous to non-autonomous.

Kania 2018 - fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Elsa B. “China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” April 17, 2018 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

China argues that lethal autonomous weapons are characterized by: lethality; autonomy, “which means absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task” “impossibility for termination” such that “once started there is no way to terminate the device”; “indiscriminate effect,” in that it will “execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of conditions, scenarios and targets”; and “evolution,” “through interaction with the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities in a way exceeding human expectations” (emphasis added throughout). Banning weapons systems with those characteristics could be a symbol, while implicitly legitimizing the development of semi-autonomous or even fully autonomous systems that do not possess such qualities. By such a standard, a weapons system that operates with a high degree of autonomy but involves even limited human involvement, with the capability for distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets, would not technically be a LAWS, nor would a system with a failsafe to allow for shutdown in case of malfunction. Interestingly, this particular definition is much more stringent than the Chinese military’s own definition of the concept of “artificial intelligence weapon.” According to the dictionary of People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology, an artificially intelligent weapon is “a weapon that utilizes AI to automatically [] pursue, distinguish, and destroy enemy targets; often composed of information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, assistance to decision systems, mission implementation systems, etc.,” such as military robotics. Because this definition dates back to 2011, the Chinese military’s thinking has evolved as technology has advanced. It is important, therefore, to consider that there may be daylight between China’s diplomatic efforts on autonomous weapons and the military’s approach.

10. No solvency – it is impossible to Verify human control

Horowitz, 2019 - Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania [Michael C. May 2“When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Jervis argues that arms races occur due to a security dilemma when states have the ability to measure each other’s capabilities, but not their intentions.57 LAWS could be especially risky in this regard because of potential opacity about capabilities, in addition to the “normal” opacity that exists about intentions. First, it will be extremely difficult for states to credibly demonstrate autonomous weapon capabilities. The difference between a remotely-piloted system and an autonomous system is software, not hardware, meaning verification that a given country is operating an autonomous system at all would be difficult. Second, uncertainty about the technological trajectory of machine learning and specific military applications means that countries might have significant uncertainty about other countries’ capabilities. Thus, countries might invest a lot in artificial intelligence applications to military systems due to fear of what others are developing.

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