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Ethical limits that prevent the US from Using autonomous AI weapons gives China a technological edge.
Horowitz, 2018 – prof of political science at the Univ of Pennsylvania [Michael C., May, Texas National Security Review, The Scholar “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power” Acc 5/14/22 TA]
From a balance-of-power perspective, this scenario would be more likely to feature disruption among emerging and great powers but not a broader leveling of the military playing field. The ability to exclude many countries from advances in AI would concentrate military competition among current leading militaries, such as the United States, China, and Russia. There could be significant disruption within those categories, though. A Chinese military that more rapidly developed critical algorithms for broader battle management, or that was more willing to use them than the United States, might gain advantages that shifted power in the Asia- Pacific. This assumes that these algorithms operate as they are designed to operate. All militarily-useful AI will have to be hardened against hacking and spoofing. Operators will use narrow AI applications only if they are as or more effective or reliable as existing inhabited or remotely-piloted options.111
Autonomy is key to develop AI systems that enable all levels of military innovation
Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Military operations are the essence of warfare. The introduction of military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) will most likely transform the preparation and conduct of military operations. AI can increasingly support and replace humans for military tasks as they are becoming faster and more accurate as well as able to consider more information and higher levels of complexity. This may lead to an increased speed of military operations and better military decision-making, ultimately offering armed forces with performant AI significant advantages. The military use of AI may indeed lead to another revolution in military affairs.1 AI can be used for various military purposes. In multi-dimensional battlefields, AI technologies can be utilized as sensors, planners, and fighters, or a combination thereof.2 More concretely, military applications of AI can range from systems supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to autonomous navigation and target recognition systems.3 This can lead to diverse forms of interaction between military staff and AI systems as well as various levels of delegation of military tasks to AI systems. AI systems may assist commanders and soldiers in decision-making processes, unmanned AI systems may operate together with manned systems, and AI systems may operate autonomously under minimal human supervision, for instance.4 While currently only narrow and task-specific AI exist,5 significant efforts for the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) – systems with an ability to reason across a wide range of domains akin to that of the human mind - are underway.6 This is in line with the continuous trend towards increased autonomy of AI systems.
Regulations stifle AI innovation that is necessary to win the military competition
Schmidt and Work, 2021 – Chairs of The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence [Eric and Robert, “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Final Report Executive Summary” Acc 6/7/22 TA]
AI systems will also be used in the pursuit of power. We fear AI tools will be weapons of first resort in future conflicts. AI will not stay in the domain of superpowers or the realm of science fiction. AI is dual-use, often open-source, and diffusing rapidly. State adversaries are already using AI-enabled disinformation attacks to sow division in democracies and jar our sense of reality. States, criminals, and terrorists will conduct AI-powered cyber attacks and pair AI software with commercially available drones to create “smart weapons.” It is no secret that America’s military rivals are integrating AI concepts and platforms to challenge the United States’ decades-long technology advantage. We will not be able to defend against AI-enabled threats without ubiquitous AI capabilities and new warfighting paradigms. We want the men and women in national security departments and agencies to have access to the best technology in the world to defend themselves and us, and to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners. Despite exciting experimentation and a few small AI programs, the U.S. government is a long way from being “AI-ready.” The Commission’s business leaders are most frustrated by slow government progress because they know it’s possible for large institutions to adopt AI. AI integration is hard in any sector—and the national security arena poses some unique challenges. Nevertheless, committed leaders can drive change. We need those leaders in the Pentagon and across the Federal Government to build the technical infrastructure and connect ideas and experimentation to new concepts and operations. By 2025, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community must be AI-ready. We should embrace the AI competition. Competition already infuses the quests for data, computing power, and the holy grail: the rare talent to make AI breakthroughs. The fact that AI courses through so many adjacent technologies and is leveraged across so many fields explains its power and leads inexorably to another critical point: AI is part of a broader global technology competition. Competition will speed up innovation. We should race together with partners when AI competition is directed at the moonshots that benefit humanity like discovering vaccines. But we must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China. China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications. We take seriously China’s ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s AI leader within a decade. The AI competition is also a values competition. China’s domestic use of AI is a chilling precedent for anyone around the world who cherishes individual liberty. Its employment of AI as a tool of repression and surveillance—at home and, increasingly, abroad—is a powerful counterpoint to how we believe AI should be used. The AI future can be democratic, but we have learned enough about the power of technology to strengthen authoritarianism abroad and fuel extremism at home to know that we must not take for granted that future technology trends will reinforce rather than erode democracy. We must work with fellow democracies and the private sector to build privacy-protecting standards into AI technologies and advance democratic norms to guide AI uses so that democracies can responsibly use AI tools for national security purposes. Given these convictions, the Commission concludes that the United States must act now to field AI systems and invest substantially more resources in AI innovation to protect its security, promote its prosperity, and safeguard the future of democracy. Today, the government is not organizing or investing to win the technology competition against a committed competitor, nor is it prepared to defend against AI-enabled threats and rapidly adopt AI applications for national security purposes. This is not a time for incremental toggles to federal research budgets or adding a few new positions in the Pentagon for Silicon Valley technologists. This will be expensive and require a significant change in mindset. America needs White House leadership, Cabinet-member action, and bipartisan Congressional support to win the AI era.
Ethical limits put our allies at a technological and military disadvantage.
Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]
The potential use, thus, of AI in weapons systems has raised controversy, not least in the UK. A recent report by the House of Lords Select Committee on AI recognised that, while UK spending on AI could not match that of the US or China, the UK could still be a world leader in terms of the ethics involved. The report warned: ‘The autonomous power to hurt, destroy or deceive human beings should never be vested in artificial intelligence’. It advised that the UK should be acting to ‘lead the international community in AI’s ethical development, rather than passively accept its consequences’. It went on to urge the UK to ‘forge a distinctive role for itself as a pioneer in ethical AI’. The UK is, it seems, to be a global leader in the governance of the ethical use of AI. In light of this report, one journal article rather pointedly carried the headline: ‘The UK says it can’t lead on AI spending, so will have to lead on AI ethics instead’. With such sentiments abroad, it is no surprise then that the official UK line is that none of its offensive weapons systems will be capable of attacking targets without some degree of human control. As one Ministry of Defence spokesperson put it: ‘The United Kingdom does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them’. This is a laudable but debateable statement. Surely, the UK will be developing purely defensive AI system that are fully autonomous – anti-missile missile systems, for instance – where speed of reaction cannot be left to dithering humans. In a broader sense, though, this is a declared restriction that could put UK forces at a serious disadvantage on future battlefields when it comes to the employment of LAWS. It cannot really be imagined that the likes of China and Russia, as they develop their AI systems, will feel limited by ethical sentiment. Their view will be that they cannot afford to be. They both see themselves as weaker militarily than the combined forces of NATO and its partner countries and, as such, have doctrinally declared that they will be seeking out any asymmetric advantage they can. If these Western powers – including the UK – want to self-restrict their use of LAWS, for instance, then this will be seen by Beijing and Moscow as a weakness to be exploited in an asymmetric sense.